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East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-169
Thursday
30 August 1990

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FBIS-EEU-90-169 CONTENTS *30 August 1990*

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BULGARIA

Assembly Agrees To Draft BSP Fire Declaration *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Final Declaration Expresses Alarm *[Sofia Radio]* 1
BSP's Tomov Says Fire May Impede Party Reform *[BTA]* 2
Lilov Address to 27 Aug BSP Raily in Sofia *[DUMA 28 Aug]* 2
Semerdzhiev Discusses Burning of BSP Offices *[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK 28 Aug]* 3
National Security Commission Views Crime, Unrest *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Interim Administrations To Replace Local Councils *[BTA]* 4
TU Leader Petkov on Role of Unions, Indexation *[ANTENI 22 Aug]* 4
Deputy Draganov Calls 'Indefinite Token Strike' *[DUMA 23 Aug]* 5
Evidence of Upcoming Winter Energy 'Crisis' *[DUMA 27 Aug]* 6
Independent Public Council Worried Over Unrest *[DUMA 25 Aug]* 7
Commentary Alludes to Possible Effects of Embargo *[Stanchev in POGLED 27 Aug]* 7

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Calfa Interviewed on Separatism in Republics *[MLADA FRONTA 21 Aug]* 8
Slovak Premier on Intergovernmental Talks *[Bratislava Radio]* 10
Slovak Papers Accuse Czech Papers of Nationalism *[NARODNA OBRODA 22 Aug, etc.]* 20
Report on Communique on Slovak Government Session *[NARODNA OBRODA 22 Aug]* 21
Slovak Deputy Premier on Status of Economy *[NARODNA OBRODA 18 Aug]* 22
Rudolf Filkus on Slovak Economic 'Handicaps' *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 21 Aug]* 23
Jezek Explains Planned Reprivatization Law *[MLADA FRONTA 21 Aug]* 24
Record Cereal Harvest in Bohemia *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 24 Aug]* 26
Energy Official Views CSFR's Power Production *[SVOBODNE SLOVO 22 Aug]* 26
Bohunice Radioative Leaks Said To Be 'Grave' *[NARODNA OBRODA 20 Aug]* 26
Iraqi, Other Students Demonstrate Against Husayn *[MLADA FRONTA 27 Aug]* 28
Havel Receives Norway's Syse *[CTK]* 28

HUNGARY

Jeszenszky Statement on Leaving Prague *[MTI]* 29
Accord With ROK on Commercial Disputes, Trade *[MTI]* 29
MSZMP's Thurmer Reports on Moscow Visit *[MTI]* 29
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Ends Trade Talks *[MTI]* 30
Prime Minister Antall Leaves for Finland *[MTI]* 30
Reportage on Antall's Visit *[cross-reference]* 30
Special Parliamentary Session To Continue 29 Aug *[MTI]* 30
Goncz Appeals for Clean Local Elections *[Budapest Radio]* 31
MDF on Coalition Prospects, Election Campaign *[MTI]* 31
Foreign Affairs Committee Approves Ambassadors *[MTI]* 32
Bank Chairman Interviewed on Economic Situation *[NEPSZAVA 28 Aug]* 32

POLAND

Foreign Ministry on Evacuating Poles From Iraq *[TRYBUNA 28 Aug]* 33
New Ambassador to FRG Reiter Reviews Goals *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 27 Aug]* 33
FRG Writer Calls for Tolerance in Silesia *[POLITYKA 21 Jul]* 34
Jaruzelski on Acts Against Soviet Monuments *[Warsaw Radio]* 36
Environmental Inspectors To Visit Soviet Bases *[PAP]* 36

Walesa on 'Solidarity Monopoly,' Presidency *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25-26 Aug]* 36
Solidarity 'Ever More Critical' of Government *[PAP]* 39
Solidarity's 10th Anniversary To Be Marked *[PAP]* 39
Balcerowicz Plan Seen Losing Supporters *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 27 Aug]* 39
Center Accord Petitions Jaruzelski Resignation *[PAP]* 40
TU Chief Proposes 'Social Pact' With Government *[PAP]* 40
Mazowiecki Rejection of 'Revanchism' Lauded *[POLITYKA 14 Jul]* 40
New Administrative Divisions Discussed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Aug]* 41
Religious Periodicals, Market Prospects Surveyed *[POLITYKA 7 Jul]* 42

ROMANIA

Award Anniversary Resurrects Transylvania Issue 45
Vatra Romaneasca on Anniversary *[Budapest Radio]* 45
Joint Parliament Discusses Award *[Bucharest Radio]* 45
Parliament Statement on Anniversary *[Bucharest Radio]* 47
Unity Party Endorses Communique *[ROMPRES]* 48
Senator Ciontea Views Transylvania *[Bucharest Radio]* 48
Armed Forces on Alert *[Budapest Radio]* 49
Defense Ministry Commemorates Award *[ROMPRES]* 50
Campeanu Calls Award 'Condemnable' *[ROMPRES]* 50
Domokos Calls Award 'Arbitrary' *[ROMPRES]* 51
Barladeanu: Award 'Poisoned' Hungarian Ties *[ROMPRES]* 51
French Ambassador Lauds Romanian Stand on Iraq *[ROMPRES]* 52
Scientific Cooperation Protocol With Switzerland *[ROMPRES]* 52
Roman Receives Swiss Economic Delegation *[ROMPRES]* 52
Mayor Meets University Square Demonstrators *[Bucharest Radio]* 53
Original National Peasant Party Refounded *[ROMPRES]* 53

YUGOSLAVIA

Jovic Discusses Reform, Kosovo With Senators *[TANJUG]* 54
Shots Fired Blamed on 'Albanian Terrorists' *[Zagreb Radio]* 54
More Workers Reportedly Leave Iraq for Jordan *[TANJUG]* 55
Peterle, Jansa Discuss Army Service With Markovic *[DELO 22 Aug]* 55
Kadijevic's Attitude Chided *[Flegar in DELO 22 Aug]* 55
Mesic Confirms Meeting of Tudjman, Milosevic *[VJESNIK 28 Aug]* 56
Peterle Wants Sovereignty Before Restructuring *[Ljubljana Radio]* 56
Politics Said Not Behind Planned Slovene Strike *[TANJUG]* 56
Former Kosovo Officials Detained for Questioning *[BORBA 24 Aug]* 56
Kosovo Youth Organization 'No Longer Exists' *[BORBA 17 Aug]* 57
Djukanovic Wants SFRY 'Organized Federatively' *[TANJUG]* 57
Raskovic Said To Meet Croatian Police Minister *[Belgrade Radio]* 57
Serbian 'United Opposition' Rejects Election Law *[TANJUG]* 58
Bosnian Party To Urge Emergency Assembly Session *[TANJUG]* 58
Civilian 'Youth Defense Units' Formed in Zagreb *[TANJUG]* 58

Assembly Agrees To Draft BSP Fire Declaration

AU2908155890 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1530 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Lili Yancheva report from Grand National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[Text] The first part of today's 28th session of the Grand National Assembly lasted precisely two hours and 45 minutes. The peoples deputies adopted an agenda consisting of three items. The first item was a draft law on amendments and additions to the Law on the People's Councils, the second, the burning down and destruction of the building of the Supreme Party Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], and third, a draft law on amendments and additions to the Pensions Law.

A total of 19 members spoke on the first item—the draft law on amendments and additions to the Law on the People's Councils. A number of proposals and remarks were made and the draft law was agreed and approved by vote on the first reading. At the moment, the Legislative Commission is in session and it is expected that this draft law will be submitted for its second reading today.

Under item two of the agenda, on the burning and destruction of the BSP Supreme Council building, after disputes and the voicing of differing views, the people's deputies voted to end the debate and it was proposed that a declaration on this issue should be prepared and put to the vote and that a special commission be elected to deal with this matter.

The parliamentary session will continue after the recess.

Final Declaration Expresses Alarm

AU2908190390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1748 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Declaration" of the Seventh Grand National Assembly read by Stefan Savov, Union of Democratic Forces representative, at the Grand National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[Text] The Grand National Assembly, concerned about the future of the nation and alarmed about the development of the democratic process, addresses all Bulgarian citizens.

The burning down of Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] headquarters in Sofia and its vandalistic devastation is a grave political crime. Nothing could justify the person who committed, organized, or initiated this shameful act.

Regardless of the political motives behind the act and who the specific perpetrators were, or of who committed the act or refrained from preventing it or the devastation of the buildings of the BSP Supreme Council, we categorically condemn the persons who allowed this shameful act.

What happened on the night of 27 August was a large-scale political provocation. This act was aimed not only against the BSP, but also against all democratic political forces. It is, first of all, a blow against our parliamentary democracy.

The freedom for all requires responsibility from all. The responsibility of the political parties is even greater. Their authority and influence are measured not only by their promises and political platforms, but by their specific acts in defense of the civic freedoms.

At the present grave moment Bulgaria does not need hatred and violence but political maturity and civic peace.

The Grand National Assembly positively assesses the uniform position of the political forces which condemned extremism and political adventurism, whose most explicit expression was the burning down and devastating of BSP headquarters. It positively assesses the support for the appeal of the chairman of the Republic, read at 0200 [2300 GMT] on 27 August 1990.

The Grand National Assembly declares that social tension, the inadmissible conflicts, and the illegal acts divert it from its most important tasks. It will not be able in a timely way to enact the new laws and prepare the transition toward the economic and other reforms, which are so important for our impoverished country.

As soon as possible the Grand National Assembly must review the actions of the organizations and movements whose extremist acts destabilize democracy.

The Grand National Assembly most seriously draws the attention of the security organs to the fact that they must strictly implement their constitutional obligation to maintain public order and the citizens' tranquility and safety. It denounces passive onlooking while clear violations of the law are committed. Simultaneously, the Grand National Assembly declares that it understands the justified demands of the law and order organs' employees and will do everything possible to adopt as soon as possible a new law on the People's Militia.

The Grand National Assembly creates a parliament commission of inquiry for clarifying the causes and circumstances of the grave crime committed on 27 August 1990, and appeals to all to assist in its work and the work of the investigation organs in establishing the identity of the organizations and persons responsible for the barbarous acts, which inflicted suffering on people and damage to buildings and cultural assets.

The democratic process in Bulgaria is irreversible. The criminals must be punished on the basis of the law for their responsibility in carrying out this act. They will be stigmatized as people who have acted against their own country and people and thus showed their determination to push our motherland toward lawlessness and terror.

BSP's Tomov Says Fire May Impede Party Reform

AU2908191990 Sofia BTA in English 1743 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Sofia, 29 Aug (BTA)—What happened on the night of August 26, when the Socialist Party [BSP] headquarters was set on fire, will impede the reforms in the BSP, according to Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, member of the BSP Supreme Council. "Instead of reforms, we must deal with defence and self-defence at the forthcoming congress due to open on September 22. This mobilizes the conservative forces, and this is only natural."

Mr. Tomov, who lead Demos, the Movement for Democratic Socialism in the BSP, predicts that in ideological and theoretical terms the congress will almost go the whole hog. But he is not convinced that it will be that radical about personnel changes.

Mr. Tomov believes that the BSP is developing as a left-wing party of a European socialist or social-democratic type. If there is a left wing in Europe, the BSP gravitates to it. Mr. Tomov motivates this assertion by the inner party structure, by the freedom of ideological trends within the party (the Demos leader believes this is out of the question in the SDS-affiliated parties) [affiliated to the Union of Democratic Forces] and by the turning of the BSP into a nondoctrinaire party.

Lilov Address to 27 Aug BSP Rally in Sofia

AU2908191490 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 28 Aug 90 pp 1,2

[Speech by Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, at rally held in Sofia on 27 August]

[Text] Dear comrade Socialists of Sofia:

On behalf of the Supreme Party Council, I thank you for coming here, to this Ninth September Square, which is sacred for our party, at this difficult moment for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP].

Our party cannot be scared easily; our party, which has the support of tens and hundreds of thousands of citizens of Bulgaria, can say "No to fascism," "No to political extremism!" I understand, dear comrades, why you are here. You want to bar the way to the advance of reaction and political extremism. However, I also realize, gentlemen, why you are here. Are you not here in order to distance yourselves from the barbarous act which is also aimed against you? Are you not here, gentlemen, to support the official views of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], which declared that it has nothing in common with this vandalism? You owe us an answer, gentleman, to the question why you are here: Are you here to support this barbaric act, or to dissociate yourselves from it? You owe the Bulgarian people this answer.

Dear comrades, reactionary forces attacked, destroyed, and set fire to our party's home. We condemn this deed. We are sure that the entire party, and all honest Bulgarian citizens, will say, "No!" an emphatic "No!" to the forces which committed this deed.

At 0830 tomorrow the Supreme Party Council will continue its work in this burned-out building, it will continue to carry out its duties. The reactionaries burned down our building, dear comrades, but we have no other home. We will remain here at our posts to advance toward our goals. This house was built by our fathers, by Bulgaria's Socialists, by Bulgaria's nonparty men and women, through stamps bought 40 years ago. This house was erected with the stotinki of the poor Bulgarian people.

I wish to inform you, dear comrades, that the Supreme Party Council and the BSP parliamentary group have decided to open a collection throughout the BSP for the restoration of our party building. However, we must preserve these devastated walls and these shattered windows for a long time, until democracy is victorious in Bulgaria, the democracy, the true flag-bearers of which are the Bulgarian Socialists, and not that democracy which sets fire to party buildings, and which is consigning peace in Bulgaria to the flames.

You say, comrades, that this is a setback. However, I consider that the BSP, both before and after the elections, with all the weaknesses in its work, has been moving along the right road—the road of democracy, the road of civil peace, the road of peaceful transition to a democratic society in Bulgaria.

The question which we are all asking ourselves today and seeking an answer to is this: How are we to assess the event which took place in Sofia? We consider, dear comrades, that not merely an act of physical destruction [pogrom] was committed against the party headquarters. Dangerous political forces have appeared that want to carry out the physical destruction of the BSP, because they fear it and because they know that it is leading its supporters, it is leading 53 percent of the Bulgarian voters along the road of peaceful transition, and that it is against political extremism in our country.

For this reason, dear comrades, we assess this event as one of the most dangerous manifestations of political extremism, as the appearance on the Bulgarian political scene of forces which all of us will make no mistake in calling neofascism!

The second question, dear comrades, is this: Which political forces stand behind this evil and barbaric event? This question must be answered. We consider that behind this event stand the most reactionary forces in Bulgarian political life, behind it stand the "hawks" of the opposition, those who want to push Bulgaria toward the abyss of internecine struggle, toward the abyss of disasters, toward civil war in our native land. This is why we call upon those forces in the SDS who are truly against this evil act, and who truly condemn this assault

upon democracy in Bulgaria, to voice their view in the most emphatic manner. They should not only declare their view, but also prove it by their conduct in the country's political life, by their struggle, and by their assistance to the peaceful political process in Bulgaria.

The last question to be answered, dear comrades, is this: What is the stance of the BSP regarding this event, what should its assessment be, what should the party's further path be from now on? We believe that the BSP must continue along the road of civil peace, it must continue along the road of fighting for a peaceful transition toward democracy, toward creating general well-being for the Bulgarian people.

Semerdzhiev Discusses Burning of BSP Offices

AU2908205490 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 28 Aug 90 p 1

[Interview with Vice President Atanas Semerdzhiev by Georgi Miloshev in Sofia on 27 August: "What Happened Has a More Distant Purpose"]

[Text] Near the university, I already encountered the smell of smoke. The faces of the people hurrying along Ruski Boulevard were serious; on none of them did I see a smile. The ground floor of the building which housed the press center of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] before the elections looked like a gaping black hole. The windows of the main block of BSP headquarters were shattered right up to the fifth floor, and one could see red peaks of flames behind many of them.

In the vice president's office, the telephones rang continuously. Nevertheless, Atanas Semerdzhiev found time between two telephone calls to answer my questions:

[Miloshev] Do you believe that instigators are behind the arsonists?

[Semerdzhiev] Yes, certainly. What happened is part of a design with a more distant purpose.

[Miloshev] Do you have any suspicions concerning the circles from which the instigators come?

[Semerdzhiev] This is a matter for the investigation. I would not like to preempt their findings.

[Miloshev] Why were some of the eyewitnesses left with the impression that the militia failed to act with sufficient vigor?

[Semerdzhiev] This comment on the actions of the militia is by and large justified. However, those who were present should ask themselves what they would have done themselves. They were able to see that the entire area, from the east, south, and even the west, was filled with people. The people who stormed the building were only part of the crowd. What happened might have been prevented if the others had not remained passive observers. Nor should we forget the situation in which we are living, where any use of force may be described as violence.

[Miloshev] Has the investigation begun?

[Semerdzhiev] Yes, and it must be conducted with vigor and the necessary severity.

[Miloshev] Has civil peace any chance, will we be able to preserve it?

[Semerdzhiev] Yes, but only provided that all political forces manage to rise above their political partialities and display common sense and the political will for joint actions. In this way, we can erect an insurmountable barrier against violence. Unfortunately, during the first hours following the event there was no lack of attempts to portray the facts in a perverted light. The first step toward preserving civil peace is to be aware of one's responsibilities. I am referring to a complete, responsible, and objective political assessment. Otherwise, what occurred may become a prelude for a general calamity. I know that some people will accuse me of partiality toward the BSP. However, what public figure who maintains his political dignity, irrespective of his views, would fail to agree with this position?

[Miloshev] How, in your opinion, did President Zhelyu Zhelev react?

[Semerdzhiev] His reaction was vigorous and fully in keeping with the situation.

National Security Commission Views Crime, Unrest

AU2908095790 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] The Permanent Commission on National Security held a meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs this morning in the National Assembly in Sofia.

Stoyan Stoyanov, acting minister of internal affairs, analyzed the situation in the country and laid stress on the rise in the serious crime rate and deteriorating safety on the roads.

In the situation of severe market shortages, illegal trade is acquiring the dimensions of mass-scale crime, he stated.

The basis of the line of action that has been adopted is continuous, equal, and independent dialogue with the political forces and the public, and a careful approach in any situation of conflict in order to prevent bloodshed and civil war.

The setting on fire of the Party Building of the Bulgarian Socialist Party on 26 August marks the start of a new stage in the development of the situation in the country. There is a real danger of an escalation of the situation, further extremist actions, and clashes.

I believe, said Stoyan Stoyanov, that civil peace in the country has never been in such danger as at the present.

At this stage, the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs can carry out their main duties only if and on the sole provision that a broad public consensus is reached on the following three main issues: first, civil peace and support for democracy; second, the unity of the concepts of democracy and public order; and third, wide public support for the law-and-order organs within the framework of their powers.

The Parliamentary Legislative Commission is also in session at the moment. Its agenda consists of only one item, namely examination of the draft law on amendments and additions to the Law on the People's Councils.

Interim Administrations To Replace Local Councils

AU2908165390 Sofia BTA in English 1558 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Sofia, 29 Aug (BTA)—The local authorities will be replaced by interim administrations until the conduct of local elections in the autumn, under a People's Councils Act Amendment Act which the Grand National Assembly passed in principle today.

The bill was submitted to parliament by the president because the office of the incumbent local councils, almost entirely composed of Socialist Party members, is expiring.

The new legislation says that members of different political forces and independents will form the interim administrations.

The opposition supported the idea, arguing that in many cases the incumbent local officials have not been in a position to carry out their duties effectively.

In the debate on the bill, Socialist M.P.'s expressed the view that the local authorities' term of office should be kept at four years.

TU Leader Petkov on Role of Unions, Indexation

AU2808204190 Sofia ANTENI in Bulgarian No. 34 22 Aug 90 pp 1,4

[Interview with Dr. Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, by Emiliya Bakharova; place and date not given: "The Trade Unions Know How To Make Demands"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Bakharova] Can we count on the trade unions ensuring social protection given the conditions of the economic crisis?

[Petkov] Without sounding immodest, it was the trade unions who introduced the new terminology of the day: indexation, social compensation, the fight against inflation, the cost of living, and so forth. We did not invent these concepts, but have tried to apply them to the current complex period of transition from a state-controlled to a normal market economy. We started preparations for the indexation system and the fight against inflation as far back as last January. Following the signing of the general agreement (on 15 March), we held four months of talks with the government at the level of experts in order to jointly create the prerequisites for the introduction of the indexation system. The general agreement which we signed with the government is aimed at providing a protective net, primarily for the socially weak groups, combined with the effective application of anticrisis measures and a market economy.

These protective measures are of several kinds: first and foremost, protection of incomes, mainly those obtained in the form of wages, pensions, or fixed social allowances. I am referring to protection against dizzy price increases and inflation. Second, protection against unemployment connected with the mass layoffs which have begun. Third and last, the protection of certain social perquisites which hired workers retain from the previous period. Given a reasonable and rational economic policy, these perquisites might at least be preserved, if not increased. Among these, during the last month most attention has been given to the indexation of incomes in connection with the so-called freeing of prices and inflation in Bulgaria.

[Bakharova] What are the prerequisites for the introduction of an indexation system in Bulgaria?

[Petkov] First, it is necessary to set up a new system of keeping statistics on current prices. We have no such statistics at present. It is necessary to monitor current prices, if not monthly, at least quarterly, in order to know how the price index is changing. From this, one should calculate the cost of living and the rate of inflation. It is especially important to define and calculate a "consumer shopping basket." This involves questions of method, as well as technical and organizational matters. Different versions are used throughout the world, but the system used must be specific to Bulgaria's needs. [passage omitted]

[Bakharova] What contentious issues have you encountered?

[Petkov] Debate has arisen on the scale of indexation, in other words, the issue of who is to be compensated and by how much. The government and unions hold differing views. The government, remaining true to its preelection program, wanted to compensate the incomes of the socially weak to a very large extent. From the viewpoint of the former conceptions of social justice, this is correct, and the government's position appears to be very humane. However, our differences begin from this point, because we also support the idea of easing the situation for people with low incomes during the crisis, but this should on no account be achieved at the expense of those with higher wages, which include highly qualified cadres, the intelligentsia, and professional people, i.e. people

whose intelligence and talents can be used to bring us out of the crisis. Of course, the question also arises here of the extent to which the high salaries received by certain people really reflect the work they put in, but this is another subject. Accordingly, as trade unionists, we approach the question of indexation from a social democratic viewpoint, while the government, in my opinion, has remained true to its egalitarian tradition.

If we adopt the government's original idea, it may turn out that in a year and a half or so the present differential between minimum and maximum wages of 1:6 or 1:7 will narrow to 1:2 or 1:2.5. We believe that this will kill any incentive to work and will delay our escape from the crisis both in the short term and strategically speaking. This fundamental issue, which provoked hot debates, has delayed the application of indexation to date. The agreement represents a compromise, and we want it to reflect our views. The outcome also depended on the views of Podkrepa and the Employers Union. Whereas the employers supported our viewpoint, Podkrepa's original position was similar to that of the government. However, their views underwent development. Thus, the agreement is already a fact, having been signed on 14 August. This means that indexation can be introduced from 1 September, and on 1 October the people can receive compensation for July and August, which will grant a breathing space, especially for the socially weak, as well as for us, the trade unions. If we interpret the scale of gross wages and pensions which are specified in our proposal, we obtain the following picture:

If consumer prices rise by 50 percent, the compensation for wages and salaries up to 280.5 leva, or 1.7 times the minimum wage, will be 82.5 leva.

Wages ranging between 1.7 and three times the minimum wage will be increased by 30 percent. For example, the compensation for a salary of 300 leva will be 90 leva.

For salaries in the range from three times to 4.5 times the minimum wage (742.5 leva), the compensation will be 30 percent of the lower limit of this range, i.e. 148.5 leva.

Wages and salaries above 742.5 leva will receive 82.5 leva as compensation.

In the event of a 50-percent rise in consumer prices, pensions will be compensated according to the following scale: pensions up to 1.5 times the minimum pension will be fully compensated; in other words, a pension of 100 leva will be increased by 50 leva, and one of 150 leva will receive 75 leva in compensation;

For pensions ranging from 1.5 to three times the minimum pension (300 leva), the compensation will be 30 percent, but not less that the compensation for a pension 1.5 times the minimum. Pensions of 300 leva will receive an addition of 90 leva, and the same amount will be paid to all pensioners receiving higher pensions. [passage omitted]

[Bakharova] How do you answer certain accusations that the trade unions only know how to make demands?

[Petkov] In order for it to become clear that we are not the kind of trade unions who only know how to make demands, we suggest in the first place that the system should be periodically reviewed, if either of the sides considers that changes have occurred in the original conditions. This gives both the government and the unions room to maneuver. It is my hope that we will display a better standard of conduct at the negotiations in the future, and that it will not be necessary for us to use pressure to compel the government to negotiate.

Agreement has also been reached to make changes to the tax system. A large proportion of the funds needed for this will come from the companies, and not from the state budget. Accordingly, from the following month it will be possible to hold the talks on indexation at a lower level, at the level of the companies and enterprises. The trade unions and the economic managers will sit down together at the negotiating table.

From 1 January 1991 it is planned to abandon the present wages and salaries system and change over to agreeing wages by negotiation. The present system is centralized and imposes restrictions. The new system will be based on cost of living data covering the main groups of Bulgarian wage earners, as well as on the cost of different forms of labor. On this basis, we hope to reach a national agreement with the government, and later on the economic managers and trade unions will reach agreements on the prices of labor and manpower in individual industries and localities. Wages will no longer be fixed at a certain level, but will vary according to the economic results. This will represent a unique change—for the first time in four decades (when the daily wage tariff last existed in Bulgaria), we will return to determining wages as a result of socioeconomic policy. Of course, we will not apply the practice of four decades ago in a mechanical way, but will learn from the latest contemporary solutions of the problem. We realize the risk we are taking. Because such a policy will lead to differences in individual enterprises and companies, it will make the weak go bankrupt, but will also help the strong to make progress. One should not underestimate the dissatisfaction which will arise among the losing enterprises, but this is the only way. We are ready to hold an open dialogue with the people, and believe that they will understand us. [passage omitted]

Deputy Draganov Calls 'Indefinite Token Strike'

AU2808132890 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Aug 90 p 1

[Boris Kostadinov report: "Deputy Dragomir Draganov Announces Strike"]

[Text] On Tuesday, 21 August, Dragomir Draganov, member of the Grand National Assembly, announced an indefinite token strike. Yesterday he handed Ivaylo

Trifonov, chairman of the President's Office, a declaration in which he explains his act.

The declaration, addressed to the president of the Republic and members of the National Assembly points out that on the basis of Article 92, Paragraph One of the Constitution, the president "ensures the observance of the Constitution, the laws, and the citizens' rights and freedoms." On the basis of Article 92, Paragraph Two, the president "ensures the normal work of the state organs." In addition, according to Article 66, paragraph two, "The National Assembly is the supreme organ of state power."

Deputy Draganov thinks that the president has not implemented and guaranteed his rights as provided by Article 92, paragraph one and Article 66, paragraph two of the Constitution. In addition, Draganov writes that while the president does not implement his obligations on the basis of Article 90, paragraph two, he will be physically prevented from executing his functions as people's representative in the Grand National Assembly.

Deputy Draganov further writes that in reporting the 14 August session of the Grand National Assembly DUMA of 15 August has described him as "prey." According to the dictionary "prey" is an animal pursued by another animal with a view to eating it. Dragomir Draganov thinks that being prey contradicts his status as a member of the supreme organ of state power.

The people's representative points out that he remains with the hope that the president's declarations on the precise observance of the Constitution will be backed by specific deeds.

Evidence of Upcoming Winter Energy 'Crisis'

AU2908204690 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 Aug 90 p 4

[Violeta Simeonova article: "Electric Power Cuts Have Begun, What Awaits Us This Winter?"]

[Text] It is still summer, yet electricity rationing has already begun. People are worrying and wondering what awaits us this winter, how will we heat our homes, and how long we will have to remain in the dark....

The discussions about the energy balance in the Council of Ministers do not provide reassuring answers to these questions.

Compared with the same period in 1989, 472,000 less tonnes of coal were mined, despite the fact that the production plans are being fulfilled smoothly. According to the specialists, the main reasons are the exhaustion of the Pernik and Pirin coalfields and a severe manpower shortage of underground miners.

The hydroelectric power plants produced 14 million kilowatt-hours less electricity than last year, because their water was drawn on for crop watering. Currently the amount of water in the reservoirs is 30-40 percent less than in the driest of previous years. The integrated reservoirs of the Belmeken-Sestrimo, Batak Waterway, and Vucha systems have dried up, and the Arda hydro system is close to exhaustion.

The nuclear power plant has produced about 60 million kilowatt-hours less electricity than in the same period last year. The No. 5 generating unit has not been operating properly for some time, and at the moment is shut down for reloading and "linking up" with the No. 6 unit which is under construction.

Only the thermal power plants have managed to produce 356 million kilowatt-hours more electric power than in the same period of 1989.

In spite of the disturbances during January, national electric power production was still sufficient during the first seven months.

The specialists' analysis shows that the amount of solid fuel supplied to domestic consumers increased during the past seven-month period because of the reduced consumption. By the end of the year, 2,063,000 tonnes of locally produced coal and briquettes are expected to be delivered to the commodity fund. Contracts for these amounts have been signed with divisions of the "Fuel and Construction Materials" concern.

However, the maintenance program for the main generating capacities at the electric power plants is running into insurmountable difficulties regarding supplies of imported and domestically produced materials. Last year, only about 1.5 million foreign currency leva were granted for materials, instead of the required 3.5 million leva. For 1990, no funds have yet been allocated for this purpose. The continuing shortages of pipes, electrodes, and insulation materials and the reduction in maintenance work are problems which must be dealt with in the near future. Many maintenance enterprises will probably have to stop the production of important spare parts, because the Energy Industry Committee is not in a position to provide them with the necessary foreign currency.

Acid, sodium alkalis, and chemicals and reagents essential for maintaining the chemical conditions at the electric power plants are all in short supply. It is claimed that if the generating capacities have to shut down, the consequences cannot be foreseen, because it is impossible to keep them in working order.

It is possible that street lighting will be switched off in towns and villages because of the sharp fall in the production of lamps and tubes.

Although our Soviet partners have declared their readiness to fulfill their obligations relating to heavy fuel oil supplies, there is an immense shortage of liquid fuels. The specialists claim that, because of the present complex political and economic situation, the situation with liquid fuels next year will be even more complex.

It will be necessary to save fuel oil by temporarily shutting off central heating and closing the premises of certain unprofitable enterprises. It is better to pay the wages of workers laid off during the most difficult months than for many more people to be left in the dark and the cold. This is the opinion of the experts. From now on, the district central heating plants which use fuel oil will be shut down until the heating season begins.

Cost-saving measures are also recommended, such as price adjustments. For example, a price reduction of 10-15 percent is allowed for apartments linked to the district central heating system which are well insulated. In the conditions of the energy crisis, the duties on imported cars which gulp especially large amounts of diesel fuel also come into question. This coming winter, it will clearly be necessary to choose between permitting central heating and the wasteful use of scant liquid fuels. Severe restrictions will probably be placed on the use of electric power for centrally heating all plants and buildings which are not used for residential purposes.

The discussions in the Council of Ministers have put forward the principle: "The population before everything." Major decisions have to be made in the near future on preparing our energy system to be able to ensure that the coming winter is not a very dark and cold one.

Independent Public Council Worried Over Unrest

AU2808115690 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The representatives of the political parties, public organizations and movements, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and the Chief Mufti's Office, who are members of the Independent Public Council for Preventing Violence in Political and Public Life, express their profound concern regarding civic peace in the country.

An appeal to the Bulgarian people, sent to BTA for dissemination, states that the expectations of the Bulgarian citizens for positive and radical changes after the elections are at variance with the real situation. The crisis processes and phenomena are worsening in the economy, the social sphere, and public relations. Political confrontation and division shows no signs of lessening. The actions of state power are weak and ineffective in practice. Tension is rising on the nationality issue. Respect for law and public order is decreasing, while the danger of manifestations of extremism on the right and the left is increasing.

Especially alarming are the following: the repeated besieging of the National Assembly building and mistreatment of members of parliament; the sit-ins in populated areas, streets, and buildings; the fanning of tension through ultimatums and threats of settling scores by violence; attacks on representatives of the security and law-and-order organs; and the inadequate and biased reporting of events by Bulgarian Television and Bulgarian Radio.

The foundations of civil peace, shaky as they are, are being threatened; this peace is an inalienable condition for the transition to a democratic political system, the appeal states.

Convinced of the sound political sense of the Bulgarian people, the authors of the appeal call for a decisive resistance against all those who create chaos and disorder, instigate violence, and strive to derive political dividends from this. They appeal to the president and the Grand National Assembly to immediately form a government of national consensus and confidence, and for the Grand National Assembly to deal with the legislation which will guarantee public order and the speedy completion of the economic reform.

Commentary Alludes to Possible Effects of Embargo

AU3008091490 Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian No. 35, 27 Aug 90

[Evgeniy Stanchev commentary: "I Am Terribly Proud!"]

[Text] The Persian Gulf conflict has affected many states—some to a lesser degree, others to a greater extent, while some states have found themselves in real trouble, because they were facing difficulties even before this began.

The amir of Kuwait will give Turkey $3 billion to compensate for the losses arising from Turkey joining the economic embargo against Iraq.

By decision of the UN Security Council, Jordan will receive economic aid in order to alleviate its economic situation in connection with the embargo.

The Americans will probably cancel part of Poland's debts as a mark of gratitude for Poland joining in applying the sanctions.

During the consultations at the UN Security Council, one of the participants stated quite officially that he has excellent impressions of the firm position adopted by Bulgaria in connection with the Persian Gulf conflict.

"Bravo!" the others said in support of his statement. "Fine fellows! Keep it up!"

I will be very proud of this assessment during the winter, when I make my way home, hungry, on foot, to our dark neighborhood.

Calfa Interviewed on Separatism in Republics

AU2708083990 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 21 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Federal Premier Marian Calfa by Karel Hvizdala; place and date not given: "I Do Not Consider the Separatists To Be the Political Representation of Slovakia"]

[Text] [Hvizdala] Mr. Premier, you are a Slovak and the Federal Government Premier—i.e., a man who can view the present nationalist problems, so to speak, from within and without. I, therefore, would like to talk with you mostly about this most topical problem:

Would you comment on the statement by Vitazoslav Moric, chairman of the Slovak National Party and the initiator of the meeting of 10 Slovak parties, which resulted in the demand to split the Republic. The demand claims that today the ratio of the votes for splitting the Republic to those opposing it is 25 to one.

[Calfa] I would like to say that the statement by Mr. Moric, which was actually invoked by the outcome of the meeting of some parties in Slovakia, did not come as a surprise. The entire political strategy of that party is based on the idea of the independence for the Slovak Republic, it rejects the idea of federation, and even that of confederation. The Slovak National Party [SNS] also was the only party which, during the voting in the Federal Assembly—as a whole—abstained or opposed the adoption of the government policy statement. That is the first conclusion. I do not consider the political parties that convened at this memorable meeting to be the representation of the Slovak nation. We must be aware of the fact that it, apparently, is only a representation of their founders or, as the case may be, of several dozen—perhaps several hundred—people. The SNS is the only one of them with a wider membership basis—about half a million. Hence, in no way is it a representation of the masses of the Slovak nation. Their demands, therefore, are not the demands of the Slovak people. Let us phrase it so that, simply, in Slovakia, political forces exist which hold these extreme views, and in a pluralistic democracy one must polemicize with such an opinion on the political level. I do not attach much significance to it.

[Hvizdala] How do you feel about the reactions to this statement? The Czechoslovak Socialist Party [CSS] and the Democratic Forum [CSDF] speak of the need for a referendum, and the CSS propose to call a Federal Assembly session....

[Calfa] I accept it at face value. The CSS is not in the Federal Assembly. It is, however, our political party and, therefore, it has the right to form its own opinion or, as the case may be, take a stand. Regarding the Federal Assembly, however, it is important how the political forces represented in the Assembly will decide; their reaction is much more reasonable.

I would also like to comment on the question of a referendum. Frankly, I do not know what the subject for the referendum should be, because the main political forces in Slovakia—which represent the majority of voters—were clear in their judgment: First, they spoke for the federation; second, for mutual cooperation with the Czech nation; and third, for collaboration of all three systems of state organs. I have my own sources of information, and I know that this question is not the main political issue in Slovakia. The situation is not at all ripe for a referendum; moreover, I have no idea how in the present political situation the referendum questions should be prepared, which our peoples were to answer.

[Hvizdala] The question is, should the Czechs and Slovaks live together, or not.

[Calfa] That is the question raised by the SNS and several insignificant political parties, which do not represent the Slovak nation. Furthermore, I believe that the information media does not react adequately or appropriately—their reaction gives their opinions more attention than they deserve. I believe that this statement is just what it is—namely, a declaration by several marginal political forces.

[Hvizdala] Several days ago I was in Slovakia, and I visited Slovak writer Hana Ponicka. She lives there, and fears these separatist tendencies perhaps more than we do in Prague. These ideas appear in the branches of almost all political movements and groups. Do you not underestimate them?

[Calfa] There might be individuals who are scared but the situation is not such that we could conclude that the Slovak nation has decided, or is on the verge of deciding, on whether the Czechs and Slovaks will live together. It simply is a question, which is raised in such a pressing and monumental way artificially. The conclusion that it is the voice of almost all political movements is wrong. One must differentiate between separatism and the need for a greater national conscience.

[Hvizdala] Nevertheless, quite obvious separatist tendences exist. For instance, you mentioned—still in the government statement—that the foreign policy must be only Czechoslovak; a few days later, we hear that Slovaks are founding their own Ministry of Foreign Affairs—they even open their own reserve bank [emisni banka]. How will you, as leader of the Federal Government, react to this?

[Calfa] Slovaks did not establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but a Ministry of International Relations. I see certain nuances in that, and of course, I raised questions. The explanation sounds relatively trustworthy—it is not a foreign policy organ, but an organ for matters concerning the relations of Slovaks to other regions in the world and to Slovaks abroad. In addition, it should also provide a basis for training of foreign service cadres. There has not been a coordinated training of this type, and Slovaks came to the conclusion, regarding this entire sphere, that they will not work by makeshift means, but

will establish an institution which will organize everything for them. They only used a rather unfortunate name.... Hence, there is no need to draw conclusions about violating the constitution based purely on the institutional foundation. Besides, I believe that the Czech Republic is exceptionally active in their foreign relations. Premier Pithart even explained these issues on television. The only difference is that no institution dealing with these affairs has been established in Bohemia. Nevertheless, they work in this area just as much as they do in Slovakia, and perhaps even more.

[Hvizdala] You mentioned Slovaks abroad. There is a hypothesis that the separatist tendencies are mostly supported from abroad, and that support—as well as the inflow of dollars to Slovakia—is determined by these tendencies. Do you think that there is some truth in that?

[Calfa] Look, the standpoint of the Slovak Government and of all coalition movements is that they want to live in the common state of Czechs and Slovaks, arranged according to the federative principle. That must be our point of departure. There are, of course, several waves of Slovak emigration abroad, and the immediately post-war one is now relatively active. After all, I feel that their aim and the reasons for it are quite understandable. Slovakia's memory is fixed in the form in which they left it. On the other hand, there are also realists among them—and I would say that they are in majority—who say that the position of Slovakia is to be decided by the Slovaks who live there. The Slovaks living here, then tell them: You do not even know how the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks developed during the past 45 years. We have experienced a chunk of life together. Leave us alone now, so we can exploit this 45-year experience in our decisions. As far as I know, the representatives of the World Congress of Slovaks are coming to the conclusion that the present arrangement—or the idea—is the business of those who live here and not of those living at the other end of the world.

[Hvizdala] I am still concerned about the possible underestimation of the problem. Last week I visited Sliac, where the newspaper SMER is published. SMER is a moderate newspaper, and I read there that the question of rehabilitating Tiso is just a matter of time. Presently, it would excessively anger the Czechs, Jews, and communists....

[Calfa] First, you are a journalist, so take it as I say it. It simply is an opinion expressed in a newspaper. It is not a Slovak policy. Exactly the same way as the opinion expressed in Prague does not have to be the opinion of the Federal or the Czech Governments—i.e., the federal or the Czech policies. It is just the opinion of one author. Second, I have received several letters following my reading in the Federal Assembly of the Federal Government statement on the plaque dedicated to Tiso. I must say that several people in Slovakia did not like the statement and wrote to me, and why not? I have received, among other things, a letter from a Catholic parish priest in Orava, Slovakia, who basically explained to me—on several pages— his personal opinion on the history of the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks; I have no doubt that it was only his own opinion. He begins with the Hussite wars—he considers Hussites and [Slovak] Brethren to be looting raiders of Slovakia—progresses in this spirit to the time immediately preceding the foundation of the Slovak state, and reaches the conclusion that Tiso acted in the given situation objectively—optimally, in the interest of Slovaks, and he protected them from the Czechs. In his rendition, the evil Czechs have always harmed the Slovaks. Hence, one must accept the fact that these opinions were, are, and will be expressed and, above all, the Slovaks have to come to terms with this. A lot of work is needed in making modern history objective, and in finding in it the proper place for the Czechs and Slovaks. I can come to the conclusion that Tiso was a certain personality before the establishment of the Slovak state; I can reach the conclusion that there was a certain relationship between him and Benes; I can guess as regards its nature; I can make some guesses as to how it all happened after the war, why was Tiso actually sentenced.... Apparently, it is a painful piece of history, and apparently one must objectively say —he did this well, this was wrong, the sentence was justified because of this, but this was not fair, etc. We have the person fixed in our minds only in a single plane. In general, then, I can say that sentencing presidents to death for their activity is not good.

[Hvizdala] Still, he is responsible for the death of 60,000 Jews. Slovakia was one of the 21 countries which adopted a law to this purpose, and it even paid Germans for the Jews....

[Calfa] That certainly is absolutely contemptible.

[Hvizdala] In other words, his complete image is clearly negative. Nothing can outweigh these monstrosities....

[Calfa] As far as the deportation of Jews is concerned, his conduct in relation to Germans—regarding the Slovak National Uprising—and decorating fascists, it is obviously a negative and tragic affair. That Orava parish priest wrote me that many Germans lost their lives in Bohemia during the repatriation, etc., that this page of Czech history is never mentioned, and no responsibility for these lives has been established. I personally do not know how the Czech repatriation looked, and how would I know? I belong to the generations which were, in this respect, fed by a black and white images.

[Hvizdala] Lately, a lot has been written about this, and Professor Vaclav Cerny mentioned it in his memoirs. It certainly was not as negative [as Tiso]. The monstrosities did not take place, the death toll definitely did not reach tens of thousands, it did not have the mass proportions, no law was issued in this respect—one could term it a post-revolutionary excess!

[Calfa] Apparently, the Slovaks see it differently. I, however, do not wish to put it this way because I want to be understood. Regarding Tiso, we took an clear and condemning stand in the government, but I am telling

you that Slovaks are far from reacting to it uniformly. That is one thing. The second is that it is impossible that one person would be all white and another all black; everybody has many shades in between. Apparently, it is a task for objective historians to come to terms with this issue. I would like it very much if these blank spots were removed from our history.

[Hvizdala] Do you think that the Slovak Republic would be able to survive as a state if one only takes into account the territorial demands coming from Ukrainians and from Hungarians...?

[Calfa] I have to start, of course, from the thesis that the question is not actually raised. On the other hand, however, the fact remains that it does not prevent me from thinking about the issue, something like preparing for the possibility. I believe that it is a somewhat leading question. A Czech asks what would happen to the Slovak Republic. I would ask the question—what would happen to the Czech and to the Slovak Republics? The answer to both questions, thus phrased, would, for me, be basically identical—I believe that neither of the republics could survive independently in this region. It is my firmest conviction. The Slovak Republic is somewhat worse off than the Czech one, and I see the difference in the fact that it is the Slovak Republic, which does not have historical borders in its present form.

Obviously, Slovakia would have problems with its nationalities—it would have economic difficulties—but I believe that Bohemia would have identical difficulties. Bohemia has a tremendously giant economic conglomeration near its western borders. Who knows whether there is anything stronger than the two German states, and there is Austria in the south—that all is a Germanic territory. After all, the Czechs have their experiences with Germanization. In other words, the division of Czechoslovakia into Bohemia and Slovakia is the beginning of the end for Bohemia and Slovakia.

[Hvizdala] Moreover, it would be a step back to the 19th century. While Europe is uniting, we would be dividing....

[Calfa] The Czechs have something to identify with historically. They had their kingdom, their state. The Slovaks did not—theirs was the upper Hungarian land. Hence, if Slovakia seeks its state history, it can only find the Slovak state; it is it's problem that it can only find a state which existed in a Europe tossed about in the whirlwind of World War II, in the presence of Hitler's Germany.

[Hvizdala] Mrs. Ponicka believes that the Slovak chauvinist tendencies are also caused by the fact that there are not many people with a proper civic attitude. Because Slovaks traditionally did not have a strong strata of their own intellectuals, the national average can be manipulated much easier....

[Calfa] I personally believe that generations—particularly the postwar generation—are on the same level as their Czech counterparts. I would not say that there is a difference in their education, but they lead a different style of life; after all, the Slovak culture is somewhat different. I will give you an example—if someone in Slovakia spends his whole life trying to build a house, he wants it to look nice—to be neatly painted, and to have a nice garden with a good carved fence [plot na kterem jsou slunicka]—he demonstrates one style of life. Another style of life is not to save for building a house, but to enjoy life. I travel abroad, buy books, go to the theater, see movies, attend concerts and exhibitions. The latter style is predominant in Prague, although it is not necessarily typically Czech. We have different life styles, but we cannot say that one of them is better or worse than the other—that one is inferior and the other superior. I would avoid such a comparison. Hence, the idea of the lower standard is, in my opinion, an idea operating historically. There is a certain atavism here, but, at the present time, it has neither a rational, nor a national basis. That is no longer true.

[Hvizdala] Where should, according to you, a modern educated Slovak of the present day search for his natural identity, his support in history....

[Calfa] I would not look for the identity in the Slovak state. Should I need to look for it, then I have two possibilities: I would either turn to the Slovak revivalists, or I would apparently have to identify with Slavism. I personally am not the type of a person who would turn only to the Slovak history, and I am convinced that the Slovaks must identify above all not only with Slovak history but with the Slav and Czech history, with the best that is contained in this history.

In conclusion, I would like to say: Both Slovakia and Bohemia are experiencing a new time. They revive each other, and seek their national interests without the burden of fabricated historical schemes. It is certainly going to be a period full of conflicts but also one of the new understanding. It will be a period of extreme opinions but also of searching for a common road. It will be a common road in a new purified form. That is our future, and I myself will do anything for it.

Slovak Premier on Intergovernmental Talks

LD2708181590 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1222 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Address by Slovak Republic Premier Vladimir Meciar at the Slovak National Council session in Bratislava—live]

[Text] It is my personal as well as the entire government's interest to tell you as early as possible about the conclusions reached in Trencianske Teplice. The delay in doing so has not been caused by the government.

Before analyzing those conclusions, allow me to express myself on the course of the debate now going on, especially in connection with the rally which was to have commemorated Andrej Hlinka. Andrej Hlinka is

undoubtedly a personality with a place in the history of Slovakia, to which we must pay respect so he can take the dignified place which belongs to him in the history of Slovakia. However, the commemoration of Andrej Hlinka went beyond the framework of the celebration of his person. It went beyond 1938, the last year of his life. Designs arose during the celebrations that used Andrej Hlinka's name in ways that had nothing in common with his legacy.

We know Andrey Hlinka as a founder of the Czechoslovak state and as a man who, shortly before his death, claimed that the only guarantee and security for the Slovak nation was in its coexistence with the Czech nation. This was denied by the speakers at the rally, who thus denied his legacy.

Regarding the debate which has been going on here, some of you have felt hurt by the speech by the first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council and called for democracy. Allow me, therefore, to repeat the democratic rules. A citizen has the right to say that he does not want to live in a certain established state. However, an equal right to tell someone else that one does not agree also exists. Therefore, if one permits another to express disagreement, it cannot be said that this is undemocratic.

Equally, talking about democracy is always linked in our country with a certain amount of civility in behavior. I favor speaking openly, before the eyes of the public, with anyone on any subject, and at any time. We must, however, consider whether we will conduct our discussions by provoking passions among the population, or reject at a rally conclusions reached in Trencianskie Teplice in spite of the fact that at the time they were rejected, no one in Slovakia, apart from me and Mr. Kucerak, knew them—they were clear only to the two of us. We must also decide whether we shall proceed along the road of shouting slogans in the streets, or whether politicians who have the right notions will sit around a table and confront and find the truth in a mutual argument. The latter is the civilized way of conducting our affairs. If, however, any aggresive group begins to push through the right to their own truth by employing other undemocratic means, or by using extreme means within the framework of democracy, it will necessarily provoke a counterreaction. On the whole, this is not in accord with democracy.

Allow me, furthermore, to take a stand on the fact that the person of President Vaclav Havel was questioned. Vaclav Havel is the representative of the common state of Czechs and Slovaks. He is a person who today markedly integrates within himself the interests of both nations. To question his role is totally incorrect and inappropriate.

I think equally that when we debate the questions of our future and our perspectives and we see who is speaking, I, too, have a profound respect for fellow countrymen living abroad. [sentence as heard] Let them come and visit us and see how we live. If they want, let them settle among us and live with us. If they want to help, let them, but for God's sake, let them not counsel us and make policy for us. To decide the statehood, the destiny, of this nation is the sovereign right of those who live here, who themselves understand their needs, and who are able to find concepts for themselves. If we make decisions on the political future of Slovaks and Czechs based on every wave of emigration then we will never come to an agreement. If they cannot give us help, let them not give it. We, however, do not need an ideology which is alien to us when we have our own views clarified on the basis of the study and analysis of our own life experiences and our own needs. In this respect, too, false tones were sounded at the rally in Ruzomberok.

When taking a stand on the issues concerning coexistance between the Czechs and Slovaks, allow me to say that precisely these issues were pivotal in the discussions among representatives of the federal, Czech, and Slovak Government. At the talks in Trencianske Teplice, present on behalf of the federal government was Premier Marian Calfa. He took part in the discussions for two and a half hours and then had to leave because of other business. The federal government was additionally represented by Deputy Premier Vales and Deputy Chairman Rychetsky. The Government of the Czech Republic was represented by Mr. Pithart, the premier, and Mr. Vlasak, deputy premier. The Government of the Slovak Republic was represented by myself and Mr. Kucerak, the deputy premier. Also present throughout the talks was Mr. Krizan, an advisor to the president of the republic, who on the one hand took a stand by his comments and advice, and on the other hand followed the whole development of the discussion. In view of the fact that viewpoints appeared in some mass communication media that fierce confrontation had occured and that the Governments of the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic had acted under pressure from the Slovak Government, I want to say that nothing of that kind happened.

Yes, it was a very sharp exchange of views, held on the level of mutual respect, correct stances, and above all it used matter-of-fact arguments.

In the cases when we and the other side were putting forward differing views, it was not with the aim of seeking confrontation, but to find a way out of the situation. All three governments were well aware of the fact that our conclusions were not authorative for the development of our society as they were only recommendations and represent only a project. We were aware that any changes which are to change the legal setup of our state in the future have to be approved by the political parties, the Slovak and Czech National Councils, and the federal government.

From this point of view I would like to express my deep respect for all those who participated in the deliberations. And though both sides can say that it was a very sharp conflict of views, stands, and conceptions, it was

held with mutual deep respect, an understanding of the needs of the other side, and matter-of-fact analyses of each individual word or sentence about which we disagreed.

The talks were also time consuming—the first day we worked from lunch to 0030. Breaks were taken in the moments when we got stuck in our deliberations and did not know how to overcome them, and therefore we had a break during which we discussed points individually. On the second day we continued our deliberations from 0900 to 1400, and it was again very clear that we were seeking an honest way out suitable for both our nations.

The fact that the stands of the Czech and Slovak Governments were brought together rather quickly during the talks was due not only to personal sympathies, but to the fact that the two governments are in the same position in relation to the federal organs, they have totally equal experiences with them, and see the same ways out as well.

Frank remarks by the representatives of the federal organs and federal government also helped in seeking the truth.

We agreed on all the issues of the talks, and I can say that the Government of the Slovak Republic gained a good point by coming to this meeting with a well-balanced and comprehensive idea about the development of statehood for the Czechs and Slovaks in the coming 15-20 years, despite the fact that it is only a short time since we presented our program statement.

We were very actively involved in this work, and judging from the reaction of the Czech press, it is held against the Czech representation that it was inflexible, and respectively, that there is a need to treat us differently because the Slovak representation is stronger—sometimes it is called more aggressive—something which we deny; we are decent people. Nevertheless, when we think that we are right we defend our belief.

In this field, we have truly done a lot of work in the effort to keep the word we gave to you and through you to the Slovak nation and the citizens of the Slovak Republic.

If we are attacking the existing system of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks in the federative state, it is because of several serious reasons.

The first reason is that the existing form of the Federation in substance was created in 1968, when we formed the common federative state as a state accomodating the interests of the two nations, but which, in fact, has never been implemented. By 1970, a situation had emerged when those engaged in the normalization process adopted so-called laws on powers which, in fact, distorted the effect of the Constitution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic by creating a system alien to this Constitution and its principles. The system of strict centralization and strict bureaucratism was created, and it did not respect anybody.

Following 1968, constitutions of the republics should have come into being, but this did not take place. The whole system of society's mechanism was founded on the basis of the leading role of the party, where the activity of all organs was coordinated by the Presidium, and these organs were strictly managed according to the principles of political leadership. This has, thank God, fallen by the wayside, but the social mechanism of the state has remained incomplete even following the fall in the leading role of the party.

Precisely because the present federation system is not a functional one and does not suit either the Czechs or the Slovaks, it creates space for political discontent. This political discontent encompasses a whole range of views—from people who think that the way out lies only through a strong unitarian organ where the republics are regions, to those who think that the only way out is to break up this mechanism to create independent republics, bringing into existence two independent states. Either one is extreme, we thought, and therefore we looked for goals which bordered on the possible and on common sense. We knew that the situation in this area was so serious that any more delay could only lead to social tension, to the destabilization of the state. In areas where these relations are not being dealt with, or are being dealt with in a lengthy and slow fashion, as, for example, in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, citizens find themselves on the brink of civil war. We do not want this, and for this reason we looked for other ways out, not tension, not hatred, not a breakup, but a strengthening of society in both republics. We also noted that the present federation is an expression of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were created, and these types of federation are breaking up everywhere.

Naturally, the question of entering Europe was also discussed. First of all, I would like to assure all optimists that the question of entering Europe, that is, the European Economic Community, with which Czechoslovakia could integrate, will take at least 15 years. Nobody is expecting a poor relative asking for handouts there. It is necessary to carry out extensive economic and social consolidation in order to enable us to present ourselves to the European Community as a developed and worthy partner with full legal rights.

Today there are discussions about the future shape of Europe. There are several politicians who imagine the Europe of the future as a Europe of small regions or small republics, as a federation of smaller state units. They say that in this way it will be more integrated, no one will have a decisive advantage, and there will not be a leader within the European union. There are many such views. We also discussed these views and we also see in them a possible future situation which can arise when the doors into Europe open and we can cross the threshold. But not today, when we still need to prepare ourselves for the crossing.

It has been said that we have been solving statehood rather than economic issues; this is not true. We have

proceeded in our talks exclusively from the economic needs of both republics. If we do not insure political stability, no money will be forthcoming. And the vision that foreign firms would be willing to invest in our country in a situation when relations between Slovaks and Czechs are not arranged properly is only an illusion for naive people. All companies which come to our country require political stability and legal arrangements which open doors to the capital. And those who think that they can ensure prosperity in conditions of instability are deeply mistaken—they remind me of kangaroos as they hop about with empty pockets. [applause]

Then we have proceeded from the fact that if today we speak about completing the development of society, so then we have to also note the fact that the economic development of the Republic or the Czech and Slovak nations has not been completed. The branch principle, used until now in the managerial system, has brought the country to a point when the infrastructure has not been completed, when we have not completed the construction of basic economic relations and ties on a territorial principle, when the entire existing system of management is a brake, and when any interlinked economic system basically does not exist between a republic and the federation which would function in any visible way. The following thought has been put forward on this: If the Japanese were to come to Slovakia tomorrow, with their most up-to-date factory and with their specialists, and if they were to start a business in Slovakia, then only on the day after tomorrow would they be achieving an output some 20 percent lower than in Japan because there are no communications; the banking system has not been built; transport, the information system, and managerial relations have not been established; and telecommunications do not function as they should. Thus, all this has to be completed on this territorial unit in order that we can say that we are developing a national economic society which should prosper.

Today the processes of decisionmaking, relations, and cooperation between the Federal Republic and national republics have not been completed. All these are still open issues and have still to be solved in the economic sphere.

Although we speak about the economic reform, which will be implemented as of 1 January and which should be carried out by the shock method, we basically are in a situation when this shock is coming to us from outside because of the collapse of international markets. Next year we will have to resist very serious consequences caused by the collapse of the whole supply system and of what which we call consumer-supplier relations.

And if we add to the social tension and the economic difficulties the unclear situation concerning inter-republic relations, then such complications may arise whereby there may be no reform, or unity, and we all, both in Bohemia and in Slovakia, will pay for this. Thus, we have to solve this speedily, and so we have put forward the issue for discussion quite emphatically.

We have also recognized that this is a crisis of the entire system of management in our country. Even if after 17 November we have been striving for changes, the central organs have been changed insignificantly—this apparatus has successfully foiled four attempts at any kind of reform and there is no guarantee that it will be lucky a fifth time. We have said that the entire system of management of this society is based on the principle of administration, red tape, and on centralism, and which today is slowing down the development of the reform, slowing down the reform, slowing down privatization, and slowing down other things which should have been started after 17 November, which we have promised to citizens, and which above all we cannot implement properly today because of built-in shortcomings in this kind of a system.

Smashing the state apparatus is not enough if we replace one face by another; the state apparatus has to be broken systematically, operatively, and has to be given proper functions. Thus we say when we are accused of wanting to break down the Federation or wanting to break down centralism, the administrative and red tape system, that we want to replace it with other relations. When we are being accused of wanting to replace Prague centralism with Bratislava centralism, we way that this is not true. We want self- administration for villages and towns. We ourselves have declared, and we shall keep our word, that we shall gradually liquidate branch ministries, and we ourselves are striving for rules to be changed.

Regarding the existing fundamental issue, we agreed that we recognize that a federative arrangement of the common state respecting the sovereignty, independence, and equal status of both republics best suits the interests of the Czech and Slovak nation. If we identify the Federation with the system of relations that occured after 1970, then we do not want this, we do not want such a federation.

Regrettably, it has now developed that many of those who joined the revolutionary processes after 17 November identify the notion of the federation with the relations which emerged after 1970; they defend these relations and regard them as a guarantee of the joint establishment of the state. For us, such a formulation is unacceptable.

Furthermore, we based our conclusions on the premise that it was inevitable that we recognize the Federation as the union of two sovereign and equal republics. From this conclusion emerges the principle under which the republics will transfer to the Federation that authority which is advantageous for the Federation to discharge on their behalf. Naturally, this principle from which we proceeded and which we unequivocally declared has been questioned in certain intellectual circles in Prague. These circles use the argument that the republics cannot transfer anything to the Federation because, according to the Constitution, the Federation possesses everything and it is the Federation which must transfer authority to

the republics. Thus, put against the political and economic principle, this is a formally legalistic principle which we have refused to accept because the principle is such that the republics will do what the Federation allows them to do. This is not true. The Federation is a common form of coexistence which must suit both nations and will do what both nations need. We cannot confuse an institution with an objective. The objective is that the welfare of nations and the institution must serve this aim, and this is why we want to remodel it. [applause]

We have also been accused that these were anti-Czech measures or initiatives from the Slovak side. This is not true. We demand that every paragraph, every word, in the bill on the authority of the Slovak Government be applied equally to the Government of the Czech Republic. If there is a difference, then the difference is that the understanding of statehood is markedly higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. In this regard, the debate in the Czech Republic is somewhat different. It is perhaps caused by the fact that the Federation is, in the final analysis, a Prague one. Perhaps it is caused by the fact that there exist certain obsolete paternalistic attitudes; perhaps certain Czechoslovakistic tendencies are also in play. We were, however, unified in noting that the need to have one's own statehood was not felt to such a large degree in the Czech Republic. This is why we stress to the fraternal Czech nation that they need their statehood as much as the Slovak nation. Strengthening it is in their interest, just as strengthening our own Slovak statehood is in our own interest.

There have been accusations that basically with this breakup we are breaking up the state in a way which will prevent its existence. I would like to say that the end of centralism in fact means the beginning of integration processes. Here we are in a situation which many do not understand. They do not understand what the government means when it speaks of integration and of an end to centralism. We speak about integration as a natural merging of interests in the economy, politics, culture, science, and everything else, and about centralization when a certain system of management organs orders the way in which these relations should be adjusted, and when in effect they deform the present situation in their evaluation.

We agreed on a project which we put to the public and which we wish to put to you today. We have set up nine expert commissions to deal with this project which should evaluate the actual relations between the Federation and the republics, and take up a stand on them. On the basis of [the findings of] these commissions, draft amendments to the legislature will be prepared, and there will also be a decision by the legislative bodies. We expect it to happen as follows:

After the evaluation of the commissions—we set them up in such a way that five commissions are guaranteed by the Government of the Czech Republic and five by the Government of the Slovak Republic. The federal government is not a guarantor of the activity of any of the commissions. A guarantor is someone who gives the initiative, calls meetings, and begins discussions of these problems. On the basis of such a relationship and after producing actual analyses, they will put forward draft legislative amendments to the governments of the republics, and the Slovak and Czech National Councils. The Czech and Slovak National Councils will put the draft laws to the Federal Assembly. The federal government will not have a legislative initiative in this case. We want it documented that these rights are coming from the republics, and that the Federation will fulfill those tasks which are of benefit to them.

Naturally our proposal is not being well received by the Czech public. For example, we are sorry to hear that the Czech public has not even been informed about the standpoint of the Slovak Government, and many commentaries and actual relations are being distorted so that they give a completely different picture. For this reason I think it would be appropriate for the Slovak National Council or its Presidium to enter into effective contact and consultation with the Czech National Council and its Presidium. We must discuss these questions as much as possible so that we understand each other and so that we prevent mechanisms being created in the Federal Assembly which would block the whole agreement. It is likely that there will be such efforts.

We also agreed that the whole process should be completed at the latest by 1 January 1991. This question was the subject of extensive discussion when we had a meeting with the president. The president then proposed that the Slovak side should back down from the strict requirement of 1 January 1991 with the proviso that they promise that some relations will be solved earlier and some more complicated ones a little later. Our standpoint was that we could back down from this strict formulation, but that the Slovak Government will proceed in such a way as to insure that no obstacles exist on our side by 1 January 1991 for which legislative amendments could not be carried out.

At this meeting there was also an evaluation of the attitudes of the political parties and groups to this document. There was a sentence in the draft documentation which condemned Slovak separatism. We agreed to this sentence with the condition that similar tendencies in the Czech republic would also be condemned, and they were condemned in the communique, because this is not just a Czech affair. The complicated nature of the whole process is also the result of the fact that our proposals are coming several weeks after the governments put forward their government programs, which were formulated by the ministers, and within which many questions which were expected to be dealt with at the level of the federal government should be changed.

There will be changes to the Constitution, probably also in the governments, and a whole new system of relations between the Czech and Slovak Republics will be created. In our original program statement, we stated that the

whole process should be completed within two years. Today we say within six months. [applause]

If the Czech press says that we did not act openly, then I would like to refer all our critics to our government statement in which everything was publicly published, and to the programs of the coalition parties, when we announced everything we are striving for. Clearly accusations of illegality are unfounded, and we reject them. This only proves that those who criticize us are poorly informed in the area of Slovak affairs.

We also discussed the constitutional charter of human rights, on the subject of which our partners proposed that this constitutional charter of human rights should be adopted on 17 October 1990. This would be a document which would be adopted in the form of a constitutional law.

In the substance we did not oppose the adoption of the charter of human rights. Nevertheless, we proposed that this document be adopted at the same time by the Federal Assembly and by the two national councils as the fundamental document on human rights applicable to the whole federation. I think that this concept would also be acceptable to us.

Another proposal which was put forward was to solve the questions of forming the constitutional court of the Federation by 17 November 1990. The citizens would have the right to turn to it with regard to all issues concerning the charter of human rights. We proposed that the seat of this constitutional court be in Brno, and we demanded that a chairman of the constitutional court be Slovak. Our proposals were accepted. [applause]

We went on to discuss the question of preparing the constitutions of the Slovak and Czech Republics, and subsequently the Federal Constitution. Attempts were made before the talks in Trencianske Teplice to speed up the preparation of a federal constitution. We unequivocally opposed the course whereby a federal constitution would be adopted before the constitutions of the republics. The forming processes can take place at the same time, but the issue of primary significance for us is that the constitutions of the republics are adopted first and the Constitution of the Federation is derived from them. We agreed that we were not going to wait for two years to adopt the Constitution, and we pledged—as did the government of the Czech Republic—that the Government of the Slovak Republic would do everything in order to put forward to you, the legislative body, the constitutions of the republics in one year's time at the latest. In this way we would save one year, and therefore we would speed up the process of forming new organs and of establishing new methods of work by the state power and state administration, by one year.

This is a very serious issue because it could give rise to other political conclusions, such as questions of elections, powers of individual bodies, the structure of state power of the republics, as well as the Federation.

We simply assume that we succeed in forming the constitutional law as a model of a social formation in working order, as a model of the Slovak, Czech, and Federative statehood—the guarantee of our progress.

Let me now switch to the topic of specific relations in administering our common affairs.

We have speedily dealt with the issue of who has what authority with regard in defense matters. We have agreed that an interest in the defense of the state is a common interest, a right, and the duty of both republics. We agreed that the Army would be controlled federally by a Federal Ministry of National Defense. We demanded the following changes: for army units to be equally deployed on the entire territory of the Czech and Slovak Federation. We demanded that some 35 percent of the Armed Forces be stationed in Slovakia; today the deployment is only a half of this. We want them to be stationed in units and in traditioanl Slovak locations in order that they insure the protection of the republic in cases of atomic accidents, water reservoir accidents, and chemical accidents. They would be able to help in cases of other natural disasters, fulfil tasks in construction, and in other spheres for which these units are designated, and all the other things which the Army can do. I want to say that I reject the claims of some Hungarian newspapers, according to which Slovakia has a different reason for deploying the Army and demanding the Army on its territory. The Slovak Republic does not want to attack anyone and does not feel threatened by anyone. We feel safe on our territory. [applause]

Then we also discussed the possibility for boys from Slovakia to serve in units on the territory of the Slovak Republic. Such an agreement has been reached. [applause] Naturally we cannot guarantee this for all of them. There will be units of federal designation and movements between the Czech and the Slovak Republics will continue, but our basic demand for these relations to be strengthened and supplemented, above all so that they do not have to move from one corner of the republic to another. This demand has been accepted and both sides have agreed that this is correct.

There has been a lot of debate with regard to parliament's control over the Army. We have not concluded any agreement in this respect, and the issue remains to be dealt with later.

The Ministry of Interior represents a great bundle of problems: We are convinced that the Interior Ministry in its present form is an organ which cannot be managed by society and which is dangerous for democracy. We arrived at a conclusion that it has to be broken down systematically, that screening of cadres or partial changes are not enough, but the breaking—literally the breaking—of this monstrous center of power as it exists in its present form has to take place.

We have proposed the following: All issues connected with the management of public security will fall consistently under the authority of the republics—this has not

been the case up to now. The federation (?will have) powers over relations with Interpol, with the intelligence service, towards the protection of the Constitution, some record keeping, and with criminal issues related purely to terrorism, drugs, and currency. We have also discussed those issues concerning the possibility of creating a federal police corps—a kind of a FBI—which would have the right to investigate criminal offenses on the territory of one or the other republic. We have agreed with this, but we have not given our consent for the existence of clerks in Prague who would give instuctions on how many policemen shoud be in Slovakia, how much they should earn, and what equipment they would have, because we have been up to now badly off because of such relations. For example: In Slovakia, for every 10,000 [as heard, presumably 100,000] head of population, there are 2,600 policemen fewer than in the Czech Republic. This is the case despite the fact that we used to have hard centralism and equality! We have not been happy with this.

Concerning the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, we have proposed that it be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and that it belong either to parliament or to the government. At the same time, we have drawn attention to the fact that the present legislative proposals of the Interior Ministry—that is, for it to be an office firmly centralistically built, while the Slovak premier or the chairman of the Slovak National Council would have the right to send written requests to Prague to obtain some inforamtion—this is not necessary for us, it is not functional from our point of view, and we have rejected this system.

Despite the negative stand in Trencianske Teplice, there are circles in the Interior Ministry which think that no attention should be paid to this, and that things should continue in the old way and that this should be pushed through the parliament as proposed. I want to say that if such a bill is adopted, that is, if the Slovak Government and the Slovak National Council do not have access to state political information, to state security information on its own territory, we would have to set up new parallel bodies—someone else's will cannot be forced on us, and no one can deny the legitimacy of those organs' access to state security information—and this is the case so far.

We have discussed issues of frontier protection and agreed that this should be federalized. Here there were two concepts—that each republic ensures the protection of its frontiers itself, that is, within the military service on the frontiers. Determination of frontiers, international agreements concerning frontiers, and the protection of frontiers concerning issues of international law will be the common issue but, the actual service will be in our power. Then, there was another alternative that this would be a federal power, providing that the republics would have the right to organize cooperation between the border guards and internal security units on their territory.

In the sphere of internal administration, we have agreed that some activities can remain if they are improved. For example, in the registration of the population, as the elections have shown, up to 40 percent of data are wrong. What is this good for? We need our own records.

For instance, we discussed the question of issuing passports and visas, which ought to be changed from the present centralistic form to a situation in which a citizen applies for an indentity card. As is the case now, he would have the right to apply for a passport, which he ought to receive by mail without waiting for a long time in a line. This power ought to be transferred to the competence of both republics. For this reason, centralistic concepts in this regard are not acceptable to us. We proposed that the intelligence service be taken out of the Ministry of the Interior.

External relations constituted a large area of problems. The very understanding of foreign trade was unacceptable in its present form for the Governments of the Czech and Slovak Republic. We proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Trade in its present form be abolished, and if it must exist as a ministry then it should be as a central body with a smaller number of departments, or as a section of the Ministry for Economic Affairs with the proviso that it would dischage on behalf of the republics those powers which are essential, such as negotiations on granting most favored nation status, negotiations on trade quotas, etc. We regarded the other powers vested in the ministry as a mechanism which today acts as a very effective brake and upsets the economic development of both republics. We gave assurances that we do not want to have a foreign trade ministry in the Slovak Government. We do not want to decentralize powers outside Prague, from one government to another. We, however, want to decentralize the system of management of foreign trade in order to ensure that enterprises, plants, cooperatives, communities can decide how foreign trade should be developed. We regard the present mechanism as incorrect. The sooner it is demolished the better for this society. In our view, decentralization cannot end in the republics; it must be devolved downwards to individual enterprises.

This has not quite met with complete understanding. Arguments have been advanced explaining why foreign trade must be conducted in the present form. We think it already is an obstacle to the development of trade relations. We argue that only one form of trade exists—trade that is not divided into domestic and foreign, as in our present system.

Furthermore, a great deal of discussion took place concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You know that the Slovak Government has submitted to you a draft bill on establishing a Ministry for International Relations. The first comment was that this was in violation of constitutional principles. We pointed out that we did not violate a constitutional principle because the Constitution does not vest the federation with the powers which the republics have to regulate within their own authority.

Within our powers, the Ministry for International Relations will regulate relations on a balanced level between the Slovak Republic and other countries. For instance, Quebec has proposed that we establish mutual relations. Delegations from the Russian and Ukrainian Federation will come to establish mutual relations. Three Yugoslav republics have let it be known that they want to establish mutual relations with the Slovak Republic. The governments of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria want to develop relations with the Slovak Republic. Eight foreign countries, among them Great Britain the United States, Spain, and Italy, want to open consulates in Bratislava and expand relations with the Slovak Republic. Therefore, when we are entering into these relations, we are doing so in order to open doors and windows to the world for Slovakia and not to wait for the federal bodies to carry out some activities for us, because in the area of the interest and protection of the Slovak Republic, we regard the function of that ministry as insufficient, not only from the viewpoint of personnel appointments, but from the viewpoint of the provision of information which the Slovak Government does not posses, and from the viewpoint of the provision of certain (?services) which we ourselves cannot provide. I beg you, we are not satisfied with the current situation, and what we are doing now is because what has happened up to know has been inadequate, and because we want to have something which is better and more functional. [applause]

We therefore propose that there must be a division of authority between the republics and the federation, in such a way that Ministry of Foreign Affairs would enter into interstate relations, while republican ministries would enter into intra-national relations, and the division of authority would be split up within the framework of the principles of a uniform state policy.

A great deal of discussion, perhaps the largest part of it, concerned the departmental principles of management. Both sides regarded the departmental principle as one which has no prospects for the management of the economy. It was argued a great deal as to why we are doing this now when the federal authorities will succeed in liquidating departments within the next two years. Let us wait until they themselves liquidate them. They argued that what we are doing is a half step between the nation that is aimed at and the present notion. We raised the question unequivocally like this: We want coal mining, which at present does not come under the authority of the Slovak Government, the power sector, the metallurgical industry, transport, and communications to come under Slovak Government control, and that these sectoral ministries be either abolished or that they exist only within a restricted area of competence. The debate was very extensive, but not about the metallurgical sector, where we reached agreement immediately. There was a discussion about mining because there some cutbacks were already planned which we did not accept. We were also proving that they had forgotten to calculate the effect of losses in the Czech Republic on Slovakia in the cutback programs, that in fact we would not receive the amount of coal we need, that a mistake had been made when calculating the efficiency of mining in the two republics, and that price relations which would be unfavorable for us should in fact be of a different ratio. There was a reevaluation of the whole fuel and energy complex, the result of which was, for example, that Novaky [coal field] will not have to be closed, that after 1996 they will probably be able to function without affecting the environment, and this is why we insisted on transferring mining to us.

It took a long time for us to come to an agreement concerning energy. The argument against stated that the energy industry is a system which markedly unites the federation. Our reply was that electrical cables cannot hold a state together. [applause]

Today an extensive system of Czech and Slovak energy enterprises exists and work practically independently. If management of the energy industry by the republics comes into being, no one will disrupt federal deliveries. No one will say that there will be disruptions of economic ties, for example, in electricity supplies in Slovakia, where there is a 20-percent shortage. One of the points in the discussion was that they could stop selling us this energy. This was an argument used in the discussion. In reply to this, we tactfully pointed out that we would not pay for such electricity, and that oil and gas pipelines cross Slovak territory. So it is clear that action here will be based on common sense, mutual benefit, and that we will help each other where necessary. The energy issue was also a problem because we looked into whether each republic would independently have enough resources for the construction of new power stations. Our argument was that even independence does not exclude the possibility of economic links. Resources can be used jointly, or other states may come in as investors in these relations, which is something each republic can organize and regulate for itself. We also pointed out that the shortage of energy in Slovakia can be solved by the construction of new facilities. But it is possible that the situation which has just arisen will lead us to make a marked reduction in consumption and that we will not have to build new facilities. The Greens, and practically every other person who thinks in an economic way, would welcome this, so energy management becomes different.

There was also a great discussion concerning the question of oil and gas. The existing system has piplines across Slovak territory. We even have pipelines across Zitny Ostrov. The pipes are past the end of their life, we will have to replace them. But the enterprise in charge of transit is in the Czech Republic. Profits of this enterprise are in the area of 208 billion korunas a year. We were justified in objecting that by centralizing this activity the Slovak Republic is losing 1.3 to 1.7 billion korunas. For this reason, we asked for the creation of a Slovak organization which would be in charge of all activity connected with transit on our territory, and also with financial relations. There was a counterproposal, but our

arguments for the creation of a joint enterprise of both republics, the Slovak and the Czech, as a joint stock company, were accepted.

In the transporation and communications areas, there were discussions about whether it is possible to divide this system up at all. Our point was that we do not want anything new. We want to return to a situation which existed earlier. In 1968-70, there were republic ministries of transportation and communications. They worked well, and no one told them why they were made into one last year. So, let us return to the state of affairs which has existed and let us not talk about wanting to break anything up, because the amalgamation was a negative element. We think their division was a positive element. Our interst in communicaitons is above all based on the fact that Slovakia has very neglected communications. If the communication system does not develop in conjunction with the building of the rest of the infrastructure, it will not be possible to develop information technology, or develop automation, or any other systems for which communications are a vital condition. This is why we wanted it in our own hands. We assured our partners that no one on the Slovak side will cut the telephone or electricity cables on the Moravian border. That is nonsense. On the contrary, these systems must be linked. We do not just want to be able to link up with the Czech Republic, but with all of Europe. Expressions of doubt about whether the Slovaks would be up to it technologically were unnecessary. We are up to it, and we will strengthen relations in this are for mutual benefit.

In transportation, we agreed, on the whole, about a road network which should be transferred to the jurisdiction of both republics. Air transportation was also discussed. We said unequivocally that every airport on the territory of a republic should belong to that republic. Questions of air transportation were discussed where we proposed that a joint stock company should be created, and that the air installations should be the property of the joint stock company. We also discussed the question of river transportation. We said that the Danube should fall under Bratislava, the Labe-Odra under the Czech Republic. We also had a lot of discussion concerning the sea fleet. You know we have our ships. We looked for a way of dividing this. But, considering that the discussion was taking place between only the republics, Mr. Vales, the federal deputy premier who was present, advised us to divide it according to who has a larger sea front, and that one should get more. [laughter] In the end, we agreed that the principle of division will be that a joint stock company will be created and that shares will be allocated according to the number of inhabitants in proportion to the total number of inhabitants in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

We left the question of the railroads, the post office, and so on to be further investigated by commissions of experts.

In the economic area we agreed that our relations should be based on the following principles: The most important thing is to create a joint market of the CSFR. This concerns a goods market, a workforce market, and also a capital market which will function between both republics. This means that under equal conditions, each worker of the Czech or Slovak Republic will have the right to find employment in the other republic, there will be the possibility of siphoning off workforce sources and brains, and everything else which is a part of it. This is the negative side which our side is concerned about preventing. There will be free movement of capital. Anyone who has a surplus and wants to invest on the territory of the other republic can do so, and there will also be free movement of goods between the republics. We agreed that we will have a single currency, and the issuing of currency will be done jointly.

We also agreed that we will work together on the question of economic strategy, the unification of norms, standards, and so on, precisely with regard to our efforts to enter into Europe. We stated that by doing this we are in fact pushing the federation into doing something which it has not being doing until now, something which we need, and not doing something which was not useful for us. This is formulated as follows: Create a concept for foreign policy; create a concept for entry into the EEC; concern yourselves with questions of integration with neighboring states; but do not make decisions about the Christmas post or what the railway station in Kozarovce will look like—we can make these decisions in Bratislava. So we basically agreed that these would be the bases for activities in the economy which would be federal and which could be valid.

Another subject for discussion was the budget rules for 1991. You know that at the beginning of the year there were discussions in which it was said that we are living at the expense of the Czech Republic. These views have been expressed, and we have always rejected these views. We said that in a society which has unequal prices, no one can say that he is paying for someone else when he does not know about price levels and true relative values are not expressed, and that in fact the distribution processes only correct the shortfall and the mistakes which exist in price setting. On the basis of our agreement, from 1 January 1991, all these words should be a thing of the past because we agreed that whatever is produced on the territory of the republic will be distributed on the territory of the republic and will be its own income. Although at the beginning we may have some difficulties, we believe that within a maximum of two or three years we will overcome them and the Slovak Republic will be a functioning economic unit which can manage its resources very effectively, and which can record sharp growth. [applause]

We were asked about finance for the federation. Two proposals were put forward. The first was that it would receive taxes from the republics, which was not accepted. The second, which was accepted, is that the federation will have its income from taxes on turnover, taxes on

profit, that the needs of federal organs will be reevaluated, and the figures for these taxes will be set when we know how much money the federation will need. We expect that this will be considerably less than up to now.

We also agreed that the republic system will be internally differentiated, that there will not just be taxes paid to the republics, but that there will be taxes for towns, communities, areas, and republics. So the whole present tax system should change considerably from 1 January. As far as transfers between republics are concerned, in the future they will only be possible as a transfer of capital in the form of a loan, investment, joint investment, or a joint enterprise. Otherwise it will no longer be possible.

As far as the management of hard currency is concerned, we are in favor of the republics and the federation having separate accounts. However, there has to be central control so that we do not get into large debt in the hard currency area, and thus not threaten the stability of the currency. Naturally, the system according to which central organs function at the moment is also unacceptable for us, and we will put forward our ideas on this later.

We have agreed that the entire system of banking in its present form is unacceptable to the Slovak Republic. We require, soon, greater independence and strengthening of powers in the creation of the banking system. In the sphere of customs duties, we have agreed that they would be established federally, because in the case of customs duties set by republics we would have situations when, for example, at Austrian border crossings with both the Czech and Slovak Republic goods would be transported via the republic where the customs duty would be more advantageous. Since there could be no control of this, customs duties would be lost by such actions. Thus, we have agreed on the federal establishment of customs duties.

In the sphere of administration of property, we have not been so generous, however—and we have said that we would call it national property—up to now the national property is understood as state property—and since the state is federal, the property is also federal. We have been explaining that we know the Slovak nation, the Czech nation, but that we do not know the federal nation, thus, the property on the territory has to be owned by the republic and the nation that lives on its territory. Thus, properly recognized property of the Slovak Republic, and of the Czech Republic, should exist. This is very important for the sphere of privatization and other changes which will take place in our country. [pplause]

In the sphere of the environment, we have agreed that air is federal, it does not recognize frontiers, so a federal organ will be necessary to carry out joint actions and coordination. This will be carried out by a joint federal organ, but everything else is the matter for each republic.

In the sphere of labor and social affairs, we have agreed that only the regulations which guarantee the labor market should remain federal, and that everything else, rules of social security and everything else, should be a matter for the republics.

A great discussion took place around the press, radio and television, and CTK. We have clearly stated our demand that these must be Slovak national institutions. The only matter which was discussed was how to ensure the federal element's place in those organs—if it would have independent broadcasting or contribute via the Czech Republic—or how this would be resolved. But basically, a principle was adopted from which we can proceed in the creation of future organs. Thus, we have started work in the legislative sphere in order to submit the relevant proposals before 1 January.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, deputies, this is a rough draft about the conclusions of the Trencianske Teplice meeting. A draft itself does not mean it will be implemented automatically, but according to our deepest belief, this is the only realistic, possible, and best alternative for the development of the Slovak Republic in the present conditions.

We have discussed issues of the creation of the Slovak state, and the creation of the Czech state as an alternative for future coexistence. We have analyzed all possible situations which would arise in the sphere of economic relations, the break-up of the economies of both states, in the sphere of human relations—600,000 Slovaks live in Bohemia, several tens of thousands [of Czechs] live with us here. Labor forces move from one republic to another. There are mixed marriages, the break-up of moral values, the break-up of political values. The emerging prospect is very bad. We have sincerely told our Czech friends that the creation of a Slovak state and advocating this slogan at present as a political representation of Slovakia do not correspond to the interest of the Slovak nation. We have also said that the Czech Republic should seriously deal with forces which say with a certain contempt: If Slovaks want to go, let them! We do not want to break up the republic, however, no one can blackmail or threaten us either. We come as an equal to an equal, to our partner with whom we want to live in a common state. There is no need to cast doubt on issues that if we should break away, the Treaty of Trianon would immediately become invalid and that we would have problems with our own existence. We cannot build our mutual relations on this principle. There are many other things which unite and sustain us.

Furthermore, we discussed questions concerning mutual relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks. We were compelled to note that despite the fact that we had lived for 42 years in a state which had been strictly centralized and which had been led by the party—by this I mean by the Communist Party—and despite the fact that a federation existed after 1968, such a system of isolation between Czechs and Slovaks has been created here that we, in fact, do not know each other. We noted that, for instance, in the area of information, there was not a single journalist of Czech nationality in Slovakia who

would operate as a resident correspondent providing information to Czech citizens. We noted that Slovak newspapers do not reach the Czech land, and if so only in small numbers; even parliamentary deputies get them in small numbers two days late. We noted that there a system did not exist for interchanging cultural values, that economic cooperation had been directed through a system of levies, a plan, and the like, that wanting to build new modern relations between Czechs and Slovaks means building them first on a horizontal principle rather than through federal (?bodies), and above all to get to know and respect each other, show tolerance toward each other, and cooperate with each other. It is necessary to make use of the closeness of both nations' cultures, and of the language. It is necessary to take into account our equal geopolitical interests in the center of Europe, and it is necessary to proceed from the premise that federal officials cannot be a guarantor of cooperation. The Czech and Slovak nations must be such guarantors, but they must properly define their interest.

The process embarked upon in Trencianske Teplice has only begun. It is not yet complete. A substantially greater debate regarding its usefulness is being conducted in the Czech Republic rather than in the Slovak Republic, although there, too, the debate as we have noticed of late is assuming a businesslike tone. We envisage that this businesslike tone will develop in the future. For this very reason we shall, esteemed Deputies, need your help; you must identify with this project in order to influence your colleagues in the Czech legislative bodies, and clarify the questions of relations of the Czech and Slovak political representation in the future period.

Views exist which say that irrespective of what is said, the federal bodies will nonetheless proceed in a centralistic and planned way up to the end of the current year. We ought not to give our legislative support to this; on the contrary we should resist it. There also exist views which voice sincere concern about the state, and very insulting views too have been directed at the Slovak political representation, precisely because we took liberties to put forward such ideas. Holding to the principle of you get what you asked for, we answered such views in the same vein.

We regard the present Slovak political representation as united politically, and as the legitimate representative of the Slovak people. This representation emerged from democratic elections. The government emerged from the elections and the decision of the Slovak National Council, and it has therefore the full legitimacy to decide and direct all questions. Any kind of questioning is an insult not only to these bodies but also to the nation which has empowered this representation to represent them. To this extent, consultations and talks with us which question this would not be possible.

With regard to other activities, we have the support of the president. Discussions are conducted with our coalition partners, but apparently it will still take a great deal of time before a political agreement is reached.

Allow me in conclusion to make one more remark. Citizens of the Slovak Republic, Deputies of the Slovak Republic: Your government has done everything in order to insure that the administration of your public affairs is returned to you on 1 January 1991, and that it is at last completely in your hands. Thank you. [applause]

Slovak Papers Accuse Czech Papers of Nationalism

AU2708085690

[Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers on 22 and 23 August publish several commentaries criticizing Czech press reactions to the recent talks between the Czech, Slovak, and federal governments at Trencianske Teplice (which agreed on the transfer of powers from federal to republican bodies) and to the subsequent call of several Slovak political parties and movements for Slovak independence.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 22 August on page 2 carries a 500-word Igor Cibula commentary entitled "Who Criticizes Petr Pithart; Nationalism as an International Phenomenon." Cibula argues that, contrary to the "dominant view in the Prague political environment that nationalism as a negative social phenomenon exists only in Slovakia, the recent reaction from the Czech side to the radical statement of Slovak nationalists demonstrated that nationalism of the Czech tinge is just as intensive, though sometimes it is camouflaged by concern about the fate of the Czechs' and Slovaks' common state."

According to Cibula, the latest manifestation of Czech nationalism is the criticism in the Czech press of Petr Pithart, premier of the Czech Republic, a politician who, according to Cibula, has "demonstrated the greatest degree of realism and understanding for the elimination of problems in Czech-Slovak relations." The Czech journalists who have criticized Pithart for having "yielded" to "maximalist" Slovak demands concerning the reinforcement of republican bodies prove, in the author's view, that "the Czech bourgeois continues to be a captive of Czechoslovakist visions."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 22 August on page 2 carries a 350-word Marian Sklenka commentary entitled "To Be a Czechoslovak? No!" The commentary reacts to an article published by the Prague daily SVOBODNE SLOVO on 18 August, in which Stanislav Krecek, an official of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, called on Czechs and Slovaks not to let their nationality and language determine their political and civic attitudes and appealed to them "to learn that it is good to be a Czechoslovak." Sklenka calls the SVOBODNE SLOVO article the "pinnacle of audacity." In his opinion, "it is impossible even to engage in polemics with the author of the article. One can, perhaps, only call his attention to the fact that the idea of Czechoslovakism died with the disintegration of our republic in 1939. Ever since then, Czechoslovakism has been a classical political corpse, to

which all those are taking recourse who are not sincere about the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 23 August on page 2 carries a 400-word Igor Cibula commentary entitled "Who Is Afraid of Czech Separatism?" Cibula says that despite the fact that "responsible Prague politicians try to cool down the excitement of the Czech public inspired by the meeting of representatives of the federal, Czech, and Slovak Governments at Trencianske Teplice," the "Czech daily LIDOVE NOVINY continues its campaign which is objectively aimed against their efforts and which is even more damaging to the stability of our federation." To illustrate his point, Cibula refers to the letter of two Czech federal parliament deputies, Jiri Ruml and Rudolf Zukal, to Federal Assembly Chairmen Alexander Dubcek, which LIDOVE NOVINY published on 22 August. In their letter Ruml and Zukal demanded the speedy convening of parliament because, in their opinion, the federal government "yielded to certain [Slovak] pressure" during the Trencianske Teplice talks, without prior consultation with parliament.

Cibula expresses his disagreement with the Czech deputies' views. He argues that, prior to a debate in parliament, the three governments must first agree on exact and well-grounded proposals for the future setup of the federation. A parliamentary "tussle" over these issues might otherwise jeopardize the work of the highest legislative body, as the disputes in parliament on the name of the federation earlier this year had shown.

Cibula also observes that the demand for a referendum on the future of the Czech-Slovak federation is no longer to be heard in Prague. He suspects that this is because "the Czech nationalists are scared that it might be the manipulated Czech citizen who would vote for the breaking away of Bohemia from Slovakia, and not the other way around, which would give the lie to rabid critics of Slovak nationalism."

Report on Communique on Slovak Government Session

AU2708074290 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

["NO"-signed report: "In the Spirit of Division of Powers"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Government of the Slovak Republic met in Bratislava yesterday. At the outset of the meeting, the government members held a minute of silence in memory of the victims of [the Soviet-led invasion of] 21 August 1968 as well as the victims of all aggressions perpetrated by the strong against the weak in the world.

The Slovak Government then acknowledged the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR] Government's Resolution No. 513 of 1990, in which the federal government assigned the task of drawing up by the end of September a concept concerning a legal solution to the presence of foreign nationals (refugees) on the Czechoslovak territory and, at the same time, instructed the minister of defense to make available to the Governments of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic suitable facilities vacated by the departing Soviet troops or other adequate buildings for the accommodation of refugees as well as the necessary number of conscripts carrying out civilian national service to operate these buildings.

It returned [to their authors] the Federal Assembly draft law on employment and the Slovak National Council draft law on the jurisdiction of Slovak Republic bodies in implementing employment policy, asking that both draft laws be revised. It instructed the minister of labor and social affairs of the Slovak Republic to prepare within a week the laws' new wording in the spirit of the new division of powers between the republics and the federation.

It acknowledged measures that have been taken to find employment for graduates of secondary schools and universities. These measures stimulate the public and entrepreneurial sectors to employ school graduates. It instructed the minister of labor and social affairs to specify the proposed measures in greater detail within 14 days.

The government acknowledged the need to increase the number of National Security Corps members as well as the need for new wage and noninvestment funds within the department of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic arising from this increase.

It took note of the proposal to revise the 1990 budget of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic and organizations subordinated to it.

It appointed a new working group of the Slovak Republic Government to coordinate preparations for the EXPO 1995 world exhibition. It is chaired by Jozef Kucerak, deputy premier of the Slovak Republic. Jozef Chren, minister of trade and tourism of the Slovak Republic, is its deputy chairman. The aim of the group will be to coordinate the preparation and implementation of the exhibition with its central organizers in Vienna and Budapest so that Bratislava and Slovakia may take part in it as equal partners.

The government agreed to the setting up of a CSFR Government Commission for the European Communities (EC) and to creating the post of a CSFR Government commissioner for the EC. It also established the post of a commissioner of the Government of the Slovak Republic for EC affairs. He will hold the rank of a Slovak Republic deputy minister. His assignment will be to make sure that Slovakia's interests are respected in the process of the work on Czechoslovakia's joining the EC.

It appointed Engineer Cyprian Juran, candidate of sciences, to the post of deputy minister of agriculture and food of the Slovak Republic.

It recalled Engineer Dusan Ursiny from the post of deputy minister of construction and the building industry of the Slovak Republic and appointed Engineer Ivan Steis, former minister of construction of the Slovak Republic, to this post.

It appointed Engineer Pavol Hraska, candidate of sciences, as deputy to Minister Augustin Marian Huska, who is entrusted with the formation of the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic.

Slovak Deputy Premier on Status of Economy

AU2708091390 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Aug 90 p 7

[Interview with Slovak Republic Deputy Premier Josef Kucerak by Marta Moricova; place and date not given: "Full Employment and Zero Inflation?"]

[Text] The government was formed only recently, and, because this government is a kind of natural continuation of the Government of National Consensus, the public does not perceive this government as a new one. Perhaps this is just the reason why there is a certain impatience and tension. Much time has elapsed since November and nothing substantial has changed in the economy.

[Kucerak] The discontent comes from the fact that many people cannot work during this period—they have nothing to work on, or, they have nothing to manufacture. They make comparisons, of course, and say: We had a planned economy before, we worked and we received a salary. This is true, but what they produced went mostly to the warehouse. The quantity of unmarketable products stored in warehouses was larger than the overall national product. People's satisfaction was fictitious. They were making money, they were coming to stores, but found no goods there. This is what we want to avoid and this is why there is nothing to do in some enterprises. We do not want to further increase the imbalance. It is better not to work than to work only for the sake of working.

[Moricova] This mostly pertains to our machinery enterprises. Special production—or, let us say it directly, arms production—has been one of the most important productions for a number of years and almost all our enterprises "made a living" from it.

[Kucerak] In Slovakia the effects of the conversion are, in fact, greater. We are simply paying for the system of management. This system defined the tasks, specified who would manufacture and how much would be manufactured, and planned the profit. This was even done at a time when it was known that arming was to be limited. The enterprises are not to blame, of course. If the enterprises were more independent—if they were allowed to make decisions about themselves—then they would have come to the conclusion—five or six years ago—that there was an international detente and the tensions were easing. Furthermore, they would have started their orientation toward civilian production sooner. In principle, however, they were unable to influence it. The party leadership kept thinking that Gorbachev's declarations and speeches were fairy tales; they hoped that the situation in the USSR would turn against him and that everything would go the old way—including the development of the machine industry. In this respect, we are paying for the political blindness of the party leadership. There are, however, escape routes from this situation—a fast change to the program, as well as internal changes in enterprises. When we visited Dubnice, one worker said that if there was a greater possibility of differentiating salaries—that is, paying those who work—then they would be able to solve the situation themselves, and only those who really do not work would be unemployed. From this ensues a task for us, for the government: the task of making the remuneration system more flexible so that the enterprises might be more independent in determining how to pay for work.

[Moricova] It is a public secret that bureaucracy is abundant in our country. Few people work in a productive way, there are many administrative workers per one productive worker.

[Kucerak] It is impossible to give the exact number of administrative workers. It has been done before, when economic production units and general directorates were perishing due to various directives, and, irrespective of this, the apparatus lagged behind. This means that attempts to administratively destroy bureaucracy were made but led nowhere. We have to find a new solution and avoid methods employed by the old government, because we know that they were of no help. The only solution is to separate the enterprises from the state. At the same time, it is important to create competitive conditions under which enterprises would be able to get rid of unneeded workers. Then, we must admit, there would be some unemployment. Now we are facing a dilemma: Should we feel sorry for those people who would have to leave enterprises for being unproductive, or for those who buy expensive products made by these enterprises? There will be no inexpensive products on our market as long as there is unproductive administrative apparatuses in our enterprises.

[Moricova] Unemployment is a frequent topic of conversation today. We are not prepared for this; moreover, a Western government is only successful if it can keep unemployment at a minimum level—that is, within such limits that only those people who do not want to and who prefer to live on unemployment benefits do not work.

[Kucerak] There is unemployment in our country, but it is hidden. Last year and the year before, research was conducted and it was determined that there is some 18 percent of wasted working time in our enterprises. In reality, this means that they could lay off the same number of people and nothing would happen. Of course,

each democratically elected government makes efforts to lower the number of unemployed people to a minimum. We have to be aware of an important fact which no country has been able to solve: There cannot be both full employment and zero inflation. There are more contradictions like that in economics. For example, people are complaining of high food prices, yet the farmers want to strike for higher purchase prices. Higher purchase prices would lead to even higher retail prices. In economics, many objectives cannot be achieved independently of other objectives; there must always be a certain compromise.

Sometimes it seems to me as if everyone wants to become rich quickly, without being aware of the fact that there is always a long and patient way to riches, and that it is impossible to become rich by cheating others.

[Kucerak] We will have to get used to the fact that some will become rich quickly—yet it will always have to be in a regular and legal way—by doing business within the law. Because the existing differences originated in an illegal or hidden manner, people watch the rich ones with suspicion. This is why the tax system must change; we are also considering a property tax.

[Moricova] Much has been said about privatization. As long as we do not know what we have, it would be difficult to privatize. Statistical data known so far were rather misleading instead of being a source of information....

[Kucerak] The evaluation of property is nothing other than defining its worth; the worth, as we know, is given by the market. For example, there would be no point in saying that you have some object worth one thousand korunas if no one would be willing to pay this price. On the market, this object will prove its usefulness, social value, sense, and usability by others. If we somehow estimated our property, employing accounting or statistics, we would get some idea which would tell us something, but this would not help us in market relations. If, for example, a foreign partner enters into market relations and then evaluates our enterprise from the viewpoint of its prospects, its international trading relations, whether the enterprise has or has not certain obligations, whether it will be capable of orienting itself toward Western or Eastern markets, and how many qualified people it has. He will make his own evaluation of such an enterprise. This is why we must orient ourselves toward this kind of property appraisal. We approach various foreign firms with a request to help us make estimates of our property, so that we might enter international relations. Not so long ago we spoke with the former Austrian Finance Minister Mr. Androsch, who told us that he could establish a branch in Bratislava which would evaluate our enterprises, but, at the same time, he advised us to make our own estimates employing our methods and then to look for a way of agreeing on a price.

Rudolf Filkus on Slovak Economic 'Handicaps'

AU2708100990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 21 Aug 90 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Rudolf Filkus, Slovak minister and chairman of the Slovak Commission for Planning and the Scientific-Technical Revolution, by Eduard Zitnansky; place and date not given: "We Are Not Overlooking Specific Features"—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The market and how it works is a simple, yet complicated business. Considerations about it are taking on more and more specific dimensions—I should say, considerations about our approach to the market. We attempted to clarify some of the typical Slovak characteristics of this approach in an interview with Rudolf Filkus, Slovak minister and chairman of the Slovak Commission for Planning and the Scientific-Technical Revolution.

[Zitnansky] Does it make any sense to talk about specific features when we know that capital does not belong to any "nationality," and that the market does not respect political borders?

[Filkus] Of course it makes sense, especially in our situation when we are only just embarking on our approach to the market. This may make sense for no other reason than the fact that we recognize our starting point. After all, it is different than in Bohemia.

[Zitnansky] Does this mean that the Slovak version of reform will be different?

[Filkus] I was not speaking about differences or variations. The fundamental principles are—on the whole—similar; however, we have to respect some special features and adapt them to the logic of our considerations and processes. If we were to overlook them, this could have the affect of slowing down our conversion to a market economy. We do not want this.

[Zitnansky] In one interview you defined these special features as Slovakia's handicap. Could you explain to us what you had in mind?

[Filkus] The Slovak economy has several disadvantages in comparison to the Czech economy. The overwhelming majority of these special features are a result of the long-term regulation of the inter-republican division of labor. The rest are a consequence of diverse development in social and economic conditions, or are associated with natural conditions.

The relatively larger consumption of raw and processed materials and energy in the Slovak economy than in the Czech economy will have a greater impact within the framework of payments for this consumption in convertible currency. Material demands on the creation of national income are higher by approximately three percent in the Slovak Republic than in the Czech Republic,

and the material demands caused by imports are approximately six points higher. This is caused both by the structure of production and by the differentiated evaluation of individual types of fuels. The qualitative criteria for economic management (costs and profitability), as well as the results achieved in foreign exchange, confirm this characteristic. As opposed to organizations in the Czech Republic, organizations in the Slovak Republic attained a lower comparative price indicator—14 to 15 points lower—in exports to the ruble sphere, and by 8.1 points to the freely convertible currency sphere. This was, of course, under the conditions of deformed prices which, however, had the same affect in Bohemia and Slovakia. Although it is impossible to be absolutely certain about these differences, their involvement is at the center of all the most significant factors.

[Zitnansky] Obviously, people are mostly talking about the conversion of the armament industry. How is this developing?

[Filkus] Under the administrative-directive system of management, decisionmaking about the orientation of production and economic activity in individual enterprises came under the jurisdiction of the central organs. That is, for a long time, the federal ministries made decisions about production orientation in metallurgical, engineering, and electrotechnical organizations. From this point of view, not only the manufacturing program for armament production, but also the level, structure, and manufacturing capability of the production facilities became a handicap for the Slovak engineering and electrotechnical industries. This affects enterprises mainly involved in armament production, as well as larger enterprises which, to this day, do not have an efficiently organized production program (for example, the Bratislava Automobile Works, the Trnava Automobile Works, the East Slovakia Machine Tool Plants in Kosice, Tesla Piestany, and others).

The impact from the inevitable conversion of the heavy engineering industry—mainly armament production—is considerably greater in the Slovak Republic than in the Czech Republic.

We are aware of the fact that resolving these influences will require the utilization of resources from the national budget because a considerable number of employees, whose income is currently being reduced, will be materially affected. There will be employment problems, and funds will be required for the restructuring of production. Under these circumstances, obviously, it will also be necessary to consider assistance from the federal budget's resources as well as ways of clearing the debts of those armament producing enterprises which are burdened by credit payments and by interest payments on equipment that they cannot currently use in production and so on.

[Zitnansky] You also spoke at the beginning about natural conditions. What part do they play in shaping the economic environment?

[Filkus] These concern agriculture, forestry management, as well as our mineral wealth. In agriculture, the problem is the proportion of arable land to agricultural land (approximately 15 points lower than in the Czech Republic), its soil value and the yield resulting from this (estimated at 80 percent of the level in the Czech Republic), and its profitability, including its influence on the national budget. Forestry production will also have an comparable impact on the resulting contributions—especially from the point of view of the structure of forests and the production of coniferous and deciduous timber (which is more labor intensive and costs approximately 60 percent more). At the same time, the diverse structure of the land is less favorable in the Slovak Republic. The influence on economic development in the Slovak Republic is worsening significantly from the point of view of the extraction and, in particular, of the utilization of mineral resources.

[Zitnansky] What about the people?

[Filkus] Obviously, this is one of Slovakia's most severe handicaps in the conversion to a market economy. We have very few qualified managers with the necessary foreign language ability. We have to permanently resolve the situation in this area so that quality will emerge in the workplaces and in life.

Jezek Explains Planned Reprivatization Law

AU2708102690 Prague MLADFA FRONTA in Czech 21 Aug 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Tomas Jezek, Czech Republic minister for the administration of national property and privatization, by MLADA FRONTA correspondents Eva Prochazkova and Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given: "An End to a Morbid Experiment; 70,000 Immovables that Had Been Confiscated by the State Will Be Returned to Citizens"]

[Text] The nationalization processes of the late 1950's and early 1960's, through which the then regime started its morbid experiment called socialism, were billed then as "the liquidation of the last economic foundation of capitalism and elimination of unwarranted unearned income of citizens." The overwhelming majority of these cases involved suppression of one of the basic attributes of human dignity—the right to private enterprise—and, hence, to the legitimate building up of personal wealth. On the initiative of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center, the Czech Government is drafting principles, on the basis of which unlawfully expropriated property will be returned to Czechoslovak citizens. We have asked Tomas Jezek, [Czech] minister for the administration of national property and privatization, to specify to which property the principles being drafted will apply.

[Jezek] First and foremost, they will concern some 70,000 establishments which were transferred to the so-called socialist ownership in 1959, on the basis of a government decree. These comprise small village pubs, shops, restaurants, and apartment blocks with business

premises, as well as small places of business such as car repair shops, joiner's shops, painting shops, warehouses, and other facilities which their owners had to rent out to socialist organizations because they were barred from operating them themselves. We will also be returning to their owners apartment blocks designated predominantly for housing, but not family homes. Finally, the first round of reprivatization will also comprise mills, saw mills, hotels, and other smaller establishments which were nationalized in the years 1955-61 under the pretext of public or state economic interest.

[MLADA FRONTA] Who will be entitled to lay a claim to the return of the aforementioned property and how will he go about it?

[Jezek] The aim of the principles is to transfer these establishments to their original owners or members of their families who have a moral right to this property, or to other legal heirs if they furnish evidence of their right of succession. A contract will be drawn up on the still unpaid transfer from the organization that presently owns the building to the original owner. These persons [original owners or their heirs] will be able to ask the relevant organization for the drafting of such a contract. They will have to do so within two years after the law on reprivatization becomes effective.

[MLADA FRONTA] What will happen if the state organization has, meanwhile, sold the expropriated property to another private owner?

[Jezek] In that case, the property will remain in the possession of the owner who purchased it properly from the state. The original owner will, however, be entitled to compensation equivalent to the purchase price. The compensation will be paid to him by the organization that sold his former property.

[MLADA FRONTA] It is a fact, however, that many buildings have become dilapidated beyond recognition "in the care" of the state. Will the original owner be able to claim some compensation for the devastation of his property?

[Jezek] Having considered all possible aspects, we have arrived at the opinion that it is simply impossible to objectively determine the level of damage—forfeited rent, depreciation, and so forth—because price regulations, the value of property and money, etc. have been changing in the course of the past decades. All this led us to decide to transfer the immovables to their original owner in the condition on the day of the conclusion of the contract, without any additional financial claims.

[MLADA FRONTA] What will happen if, for instance, there is now a house of culture where a pub used to stand?

[Jezek] The original owner of a building whose nature has changed through a fundamental reconstruction or that has been torn down will receive, upon application, compensation from the Fund of National Property. The price rules on the basis of which this compensation will be paid are still subject to negotiation.

[MLADA FRONTA] How much will all these compensatory payments cost the state?

[Jezek] We assume that those who will be interested in their former property and have already received compensation from the state will be obligated to surrender this sum to the National Property Fund. This money will then be used to compensate former owners whose establishments today belong to another private person, have lost their original character, or no longer exist. We will not, however, pay any compensation to those who will not be interested in the return of the establishment and who would prefer money. I think that, overall, the revenues and expenditures of the National Property Fund connected with reprivatization will be roughly in balance.

[MLADA FRONTA] The draft reprivatization law is pleasant news to former small businessmen, tradesmen, and shopkeepers. Will justice be done also to those who were deprived of their large factories—also smaller private companies—in the nationalization waves of the 1945-48 period?

[Jezek] While I was still adviser to the federal minister of finance I, too, expressed the view that the best thing would be to draw a thick red line under the past and start anew. After consultations with experts, it has become apparent, however, that setting right past cases of injustice is possible and, above all, necessary. As far as the big owners whose property was expropriated prior to 1959 are concerned, however.... [sentence incomplete as published] At present we expect that only the aforementioned smaller establishments will be returned in the physical shape in which they were nationalized. Regarding larger-scale property—factories, for example—their former owners should receive their former property in the form of securities, most probably in the form of preferred shares. These would be sold to them below the market price or, quite possibly, distributed free of charge. This would be in accord with the overall privatization concept. The state does not have money but it has property which it should not have; this process is one of the methods of transferring state property into more prudent, private hands.

[MLADA FRONTA] When will the law on reprivatization become effective?

[Jezek] The draft principles have been submitted to the Economic Council of the Czech Republic Government. They must be approved by both the government and the Czech National Council, which means that the law will come into effect in two months' time at the earliest.

[Several Czech newspapers of 23 August publish report on a news conference with minister Jezek, held in Prague on 22 August, at which he explained the principles of the planned reprivatization law. The substance of Jezek's news conference statements is covered by the above

interview. A RUDE PRAVO report on the news conference, published on 23 August on page 1, specifies that the law in question will not apply to agricultural estates, "whose privatization is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture," and to the property of emigres confiscated by the state, which will be "subject of a special law, which is being drafted by the general prosecutor's office." The law will, however, apply to the nationalized property of foreign nationals, provided they have not been compensated for it previously.]

Record Cereal Harvest in Bohemia

AU2908145390 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 24 Aug 90 p 8

[Unattributed CTK report: "Record Cereal Crop"]

[Text] Prague—The best cereal crop in history will be achieved in the Czech Republic this year. According to information released yesterday by the Czech Ministry of Agriculture, a harvest is expected of almost 8.5 million tonnes of basic cereals. That is almost a million tonnes more than in the previous record year of 1985, in which the farmers harvested 7.6 million tonnes of cereals. Also expected is a record yield of 5.26 tonnes per hectare, while the highest yield on record was 4.73 tonnes per hectare in 1985.

The favorable climatic conditions, which eliminated the need for any drying equipment, have contributed to the smooth running of this year's harvest. The state procurement of cereals also went smoothly.

Nothing can change this year's exceptional harvest results in the Czech Republic, not even the remaining 200,000 hectares to be harvested in the highest localities and in the areas near the border.

Energy Official Views CSFR's Power Production

AU2908085990

[Editorial Report] Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 22 August on page 3 publishes a 900-word interview with Engineer J. Bouska, director of the Energy Department at the Federal Ministry of the Economy, by Martin Fuk, SVOBODNE SLOVO correspondent, entitled "Let Us Not Expect a Decline in the Electricity Consumption." The place and date of the interview are not given. The changes in the policy were the topic of the interview, and Bouska spoke of the complications resulting from the delay in the construction of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, from the obfuscated situation around Gabcikovo, and from the plans to close some blocks in northern Bohemia for ecological reasons. The prospects are not great, according to Bouska, and the energy demands of the economy must be reduced. Furthermore, he said that one should not confuse two issues—namely, the demand for the primary sources (oil, coal, etc.) and for electricity. The consumption of the former is too high in Czechoslovakia and must be reduced, Bouska said. The consumption of the latter is just average. He does not believe that consumption would decline, because the reduction in the industry will be matched by growth in household use.

There will be changes, according to Bouska, in the connection of the CSFR's network with abroad. Thus far, there is only a connection to Austria, but one with the FRG is under construction. Eventually, the CSFR together with Hungary, hopes to join the UCPTE (Union Coordination Production Transport Electricite).

Another issue is its price. According to Bouska, energy has been undervalued and the share of the energy cost in production was only about three to seven percent, or only about one-third of the share carried by foreign producers, and that must be corrected. Bouska does not exclude the possibility of privatization even in this area, but recommends that the state keep majority shares.

Speaking on sources of energy, Bouska said that the giant hydro plants will not be the solution, small ones will be supported, but they cannot cover the demand. Solid-fuel plants are, according to Bouska, the sore spot in the energetic system. "A program will soon be submitted to the government to close by 1995 the most problematic blocs, with a total output of 1,200 MW (during winter peaks the demands on the system reach 14,000 MW). Other blocs will be desulfurized." Bouska also referred to the controversial Bohunice plant. According to him, the V-1 bloc should be closed sometime between 1994 and 1996, while the V-2 bloc should be closed in about 2000.

The only way to deal with the growth in demand and the closing of power plants is, according to Bouska, to build two nuclear power blocks with the capacity of 1,000 MW each by the year 2000. He believes that the most expedient way to do this would be to build them as the bloc 3 and 4 of the Temelin nuclear power plant. The plans for the period after 2000 are not considered as yet.

Bouska closed with an observation that the future of the thermal plants is also threatened by the fact that nobody wants to allow disposal of waste on their territory.

Bohunice Radioative Leaks Said To Be 'Grave'

AU2708084590 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Aug 90 p 7

[Stefan Marusak article: "Half-Life of the Loss of a Feeling of Safety; The A-1 Nuclear Power Station Does Not Operate but the Risk Persists"]

[Excerpts] The V-1 nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice has, in recent weeks, moved into the center of attention, not only of Czechoslovakia, but possibly of the whole of Europe. The V-1, however, is not the only nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice. Jaslovske Bohunice is also the site of the more modern V-2 power station, and of the older, A-1 nuclear power station, which is unfit for use following an accident.

Speaking in the debate in the Federal Assembly's Committee for the Environment on 22 May this year, Deputy Pavel Sremer from Bratislava raised the problem of the damaged A-1 power station, saying that tritium, with a volume activity [objemova aktivita] of 24,000 becquerel per liter, had been ascertained in underground water underneath the power station. [passage omitted]

Emil Bedi, doctor of natural sciences, head of the department for nuclear power stations at the Bratislava Regional Health Office, had this to say about this problem: "The problems at the decommissioned A-1 power station are extraordinarily grave. Tritium-contaminated underground water has been discovered on the premises, at a depth of 20 meters. The radioactivity level reached a volume activity of 24,000 becquerel per liter.

"Radioactive waste is deposited on the premises of the A-1 nuclear power station—in lid-covered containers which are practically unsecured. All kinds of hazardous chemicals have been stored in them for 20 years. As is becoming apparent, the construction barrier [stavebna bariera] is inadequate, and these substances are leaking into underground water resources. This, however, is only one of the possible sources of contamination.

"The crux of the problem is not the ascertained level of the volume activity of tritium, but the fact that we do not have the leakage under control. Our office is in charge of monitoring everything emitted from the nuclear power station. Our measuring devices monitor everything that flows into the Dudvah River, as well as all gaseous emissions escaping through the chimney."

The health officers do not yet know what level of activity is hidden in greater depths [below 20 meters] or closer to the surface. They do not know what levels were there in the past, or how long the underground water resources on the premises of the A-1 nuclear power station have been contaminated. It is quite possible that the levels of one or ten years ago were much higher.

The inspection of wells in the surrounding villages and near the Bohunice nuclear power station has not revealed any increased [radio]activity. In other words, there is no threat to the population for the time being.

What about the norm? Has the admissible norm been exceeded? [passage omitted]

"The norm is strange—it permits only one becquerel per liter," says Dr. Bedi. [passage omitted] "The permitted level of one becquerel (tritium) per liter is a value that is impossible to comply with. In drinking water we routinely measure values of the volume activity of tritium of between 10 and 100 becquerel per liter. A value below 10 becquerel per liter is, in fact, impossible to measure so that, in the case of tritium, the limit of one becquerel per liter is nonsense."

Besides tritium, strontium (which, like tritium, emits beta rays) and cobalt 60 (which emits gamma rays), too, have been ascertained in the underground water.

"In the case of cobalt 60," Doctor Bedi says, "we ascertained seven becquerel per liter. This clearly exceeds the norm for drinking or underground water, and there is nothing to be discussed here."

The important thing is that no one has the emission of radiation under control, and that the emitters from underground water have not found their way into the statistical sheets, which are used in calculating the [radiation] doses received by the population....

The half-life of tritium, which is the heaviest isotope of hydrogen, is 12 years. This means that, in 12 years, the ascertained 24,000 becquerel per liter will be reduced to 12,000 becquerel, in another 12 years to 6,000 becquerel, and so forth. As can be seen, the level of radiation will be high even after 36 years. The half-life of cobalt 60 is five years.

"Substantially higher values than in underground water," Dr. Bedi continues, "have been ascertained in samples [of soil] in the immediate vicinity of the containers. This means that the starting values are much higher. We claim that the containers are not impermeable, but the user claims the opposite. He explains the high level of [radio]activity] by the overfilling of containers in 1984. At that time, their content—a highly active liquid—ran out of the containers. Another cause was floods, which came from the fields and inundated the power station's premises. The true reason is hard to identify. It is undeniable, however, that there is activity near the containers and it is beyond our control. We, therefore, issued a ban on the use of the aforesaid containers, and ordered that all soil with radioactivity levels in excess of 100 becquerel per kilogram be eliminated." [passage omitted]

There are also other containers on the premises of the nuclear power station which contain solid waste. This waste comprises various contaminated articles, starting with parts of the fuel rod casings and ending with pieces of cloth used during deactivation. This storage place is flooded with water.

"The impermeability of this storage place is not guaranteed because the water level has fallen here," says Dr. Bedi. "We, therefore, issued an order to eliminate the contents of this storage place. It is impossible to do this manually, however, and the standard of machinery and automation in the A-1 nuclear power station is very low."

Ever since the accident (1977), highly radioactive waste—including spent fuel—has been stored at the A-1 nuclear power station. Some of the spent fuel rods cannot be taken out of the cassettes in which they have been stored and cooled; some of the rods have increased in volume, others have fallen apart, etc. The rods' casings will have to be cut apart and, unconditionally,

taken away from the storage place because the storage depot is no longer useful. A crack in the depot's wall would result in an accident of a scale which Czechoslovakia has not yet experienced. At the same time, the high level of radioactivity makes it impossible to conduct a check of the quality of the depot's welding seams. [passage omitted]

The cost of the liquidation of the A-1 nuclear power station has been estimated at 1.2 billion korunas. No other accident in Czechoslovakia so far has required a sum of such magnitude. At the same time, a detailed concept of the long-term liquidation of the A- 1 nuclear power station has not yet been adopted. The A-1 has been out of operation for 13 years, but its liquidation could still take decades. [passage omitted]

I admit that, on leaving the nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice a few days ago, I had a safe feeling. Conversations with representatives of the power station had a calming effect on me. Their rationally argued assurances that everything in the V-1 and V- 2 power stations is under the control of knowledgeable experts convinced me.

My feeling of safety, however, did not last long. After the words of the health officer [Dr. Bedi] that the leakage of radioactive substances from the premises of the A-1 power station is not under control, my feeling of safety was reduced by half.

Iraqi, Other Students Demonstrate Against Husayn

AU2808083990 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 27 Aug 90 p 7

["(sob)"-signed report: "They Condemned the Tyrant"]

[Text] Prague—Yesterday at the Old City Square about 50 demonstrators condemned the conduct of Saddam Husayn in the Persian Gulf. "In addition to the members of the Union of Iraqi Students, who organized the action, there were students from Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Sudan," Muhammad 'Ali, one of the representatives of the Iraqi opposition, said. "Tuesday's demonstration in front of our embassy, which supported Husayn, was attended by 20 students paid directly by the Iraqi Government—embassy employees, and Arabs misled by nationalist forces." As we already reported, nobody attended the announced demonstration on 10 August. Supposedly, the preparations were insufficient—the date was not generally known. Furthermore, why now at the Old City Square? They did not want to cause a provocation in front of the embassy, they feared a violent reaction. Yesterday, the demonstrators condemned not only the "madness of the tyrant ruler" but also the arrests of foreigners. They said that they also disapprove of the presence of foreign troops in the region. They believe that the only possible solution is a peaceful one under the protection of the Arab League and the United Nations.

Havel Receives Norway's Syse

LD2908140190 Prague CTK in English 1232 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Oslo, 29 Aug (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel met with Norwegian Premier Jan Peder Syse today.

The president's spokesman Michael Zantovsky told CTK that the Norwegian premier stressed several times that he has similar views as the Czechoslovak Government on the problems of European security and transformation of the European security system.

The premier asked about steps being taken by Czechoslovakia with regard to the European Community.

Both statesmen spoke about bilateral relations. Concrete points included the possibilities of oil and paper imports to Czechoslovakia, use of the experiences of the Norwegian side in the processing of non-ferrous metals, e.g. aluminium, which is a major economic and ecological problem.

President Havel stressed that Czechoslovakia is reluctant to increase its foreign debt and is therefore very much interested in increasing the sale of its products on the Norwegian market.

Premier Syse said the proposals would be turned over to ministers and economic experts and he believed that they would be quickly worked out in concrete agreements.

President Havel invited the Norwegian premier to visit Czechoslovakia.

Jan Peder Syse accompanied Mr Havel to Oslo Airport where he saw the president off.

Vaclav Havel yesterday delivered an address at the "anatomy of hate" international conference here.

Jeszenszky Statement on Leaving Prague

LD2908201890 Budapest MTI in English 1847 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Prague, August 29 (MTI)—In his statement on Wednesday to Hungarian journalists accredited to Prague, Hungarian Foreign minister Geza Jeszenszky reiterated the Hungarian intention of leaving the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty by the end of next year, that is 1991. The confirmation was necessary as at the Prague press conference held on Tuesday, Jeszenszky's words in English were mistranslated into Czech and then into Hungarian: The interpreter mistakenly said "this year" instead of "next year". The wrong date was included in the CTK Czechoslovakian News Agency's coverage and was hence adopted by several other news agencies and newspaper reports. The MTI report also carried the wrong version.

Mr Jeszenszky also regretted the fact that—although there was no mistake in the interpretation here—the Czechoslovak press—partly on the basis of the CTK report—had used his words, said in connection with Trianon, in a sensationist manner.

In answer to the question whether Hungary recognized the Trianon Treaty, Mr Jeszenszky had said that the Trianon was no longer valid. Hungary recognized and complied with the 1947 treaty which was in force today, as well as the clauses of the Helsinki Final Act on European borders. However, most of the Czechoslovakian press reports of the press conference that had dealt with many issues, started with the line that "Hungary does not recognize the Trianon treaty."

In a statement given at the airport before leaving Prague, Mr Jeszensky said his talks in Prague were as successful as he expected. His meeting with Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier was only the starting point of further expert talks on timely bilateral issues.

The Hungarian foreign minister also experienced similar good faith and a genuine readiness for co-operation from Jozef Miklosko, federal deputy prime minister, a Slovakian politician. Mr Jeszenszky reiterated his wish to meet with Slovakian Government officials as soon as possible.

Accord With ROK on Commercial Disputes, Trade

LD2908101890 Budapest MTI in English 0854 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—South Korea is attaching a great deal of importance to the Hungarian-South Korean agreement on settling commercial disputes recently initialled by Mr Hang Bong-so, chairman of the Council of the South Korean Courts of Arbitration, and Mr Jajos Tolnay, president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce.

This is the first agreement of its kind with an East European country, the Korean news agency said.

Under the agreement, it will always be the court in the plaintiff's country which will handle commercial disputes, thus guaranteeing a speedy and fair settlement.

Mr Sandor Casnyi, commercial counsellor at the Hungarian trade representation in Seoul, told MTI-ECONEWS that earlier, a special clause used to be included in each trade contract regulating the settlement of commercial disputes.

The new agreement offers additional legal guarantees for business deals, and increases the confidence of South Korean businessmen in doing business with Hungary, Mr Csanyi explained, adding that there was no precedent yet for either party having to turn to a court arbitration.

Last year, Hungary and South Korea exchanged goods to the tune of 68 million USD [U.S. dollars], with South Korean deliveries amounting to 49 million USD.

Turnover is expected to reach 110-120 million USD this year, with Korean exports sharing 70-80 million USD.

The principal South Korean exports to Hungary are entertainment and other electronic products, and chemicals.

Cars will also now feature on the export list: the first batch of Hyundais arrives here in the autumn.

MSZMP's Thurmer Reports on Moscow Visit

LD2908174990 Budapest MTI in English 1710 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29 (MTI)—Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) [MSZMP] president Gyula Thurmer, who visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU, held talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and other politicians in recent days.

On his return on Wednesday, Mr Thurmer held a press briefing in the party's Budapest headquarters. He said that the CPSU would support the HSWP's current policy and was prepared to co-operate with the HSWP and its present leadership on every issue.

Mr Thurmer said the HSWP was ready to co-operate with the CPSU and other political forces of Soviet society. The recent talks marked the beginning of a new type of relationship between the CPSU and the HSWP, a co-operation laid on new foundations between two national and internationalist parties.

Even as a non-parliamentary party, the HSWP negotiated in Moscow guided by a responsibility felt for the fate of the nation, stressed Mr Thurmer. "Developing links between Hungary and the Soviet Union is in line with the interests of the Hungarian nation, and instead of leaving the Soviet market, we should preserve and even expand our position."

He asked Mr Gorbachev not to engage in an oil war and to do his best to develop Hungarian-Soviet economic links. Mr Gorbachev expressed a readiness to maintain bilateral economic relations at the present level and explore new possibilities. At the same time he made it clear that there had been a deterioration in political relations in recent months,

and it would be difficult to heed the need of developing economic links amidst an atmosphere of political tension.

Mr Thurmer said that it was not out of party interests that the HSWP condemned open anti-Soviet politics but rather that favourable co-operation and a better atmosphere with regard to bilateral relations could only be in the nation's interests.

Mr Thurmer said he had suggested in the course of the talks that the left-wing forces of East and Central European countries should meet as soon as possible to jointly discuss the causes that led to the present situation and the prospects of co-operation.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Ends Trade Talks

LD2908122190 Budapest MTI in English 1106 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Mr Anatoliy Zlenko, foreign minister of the Ukraine, has just ended his talks in Hungary. He was here as the guest of his Hungarian counterpart, Mr Geza Jeszenszky. Topics discussed included the setting up of diplomatic consular or trade representations and the remodelling of trade contacts.

Under Soviet law, the individal republics are not entitled to conclude trade agreements with other countries, but in view of the internal changes in the Soviet Union, Hungary will probably be able to make such agreements, the Hungarian economic authorities are apparently already making preparations for such an eventuality. Hungary would be particularly keen on buying machinery, equipment, raw materials and chemicals from the Ukraine, and would export machinery and consumer goods. Russia has the biggest slice—80 per cent of exports and 72 per cent of imports—of Hungarian-Soviet trade, which amounted to 8.6 billion roubles last year. Second comes the Ukraine with a 14-per-cent share in exports and a 21-per-cent share in imports.

Last year, 626 million roubles' worth of Hungarian goods found their way to the Ukraine, 408 million roubles of which were machinery. Imports from the Ukraine were worth 876 million roubles in 1989. The principle Hungarian exporters to the Ukraine are Mogurt, Raba, Videoton, Technika, Medimpex, Tannimpex and Monimpex.

Prime Minister Antall Leaves for Finland

LD2908133690 Budapest MTI in English 1236 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall left for Finland on Wednesday to attend the XIIIth conference of party leaders of the European Democratic Union.

Whilst in Finland, he is also scheduled to meet the head of the Finnish Government, Mr Harri Holkeri.

The two premiers will review bilateral economic cooperation and discuss the use of a 100-million-USD [U.S. dollar] Finnish Government loan, the operation of joint ventures, and possibilities for boosting two-way trade.

The Finnish Government granted Hungary the 100-million-USD export promotion loan a few months ago, and the National Bank of Hungary has received applications from Hungarian companies for 10 million USD so far.

The luxury Finnish-Hungarian hotel Helia will open in Budapest on September 1, and a Finnish economic and technical days event will be staged in Budapest in November.

Budapest international autumn fair will feature Finland as guest of honor, and the Finnish ministers of trade and industry, and of foreign trade, will soon be coming to Budapest.

Last year, Hungarian exports to Finland were 105 million USD, as compared to 88 million USD two years ago.

Imports were 65 million USD in 1989, and 74 million USD in 1988.

Up to the end of this July, Hungary exported goods worth 49 million USD and imported 30 million U.S. dollars' worth of products from Finland.

Hungarian imports increased by 20 per cent and exports dropped by 9 per cent as compared to the first seven months of last year.

Trade is projected to grow in both directions in the remaining part of the year.

Reportage on Antall's Visit

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For reportage on the visit by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to Finland to participate in the 13th Conference of the European Democratic Union and to hold bilateral talks with Finnish leaders, see the International Affairs section of the 30 August West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Special Parliamentary Session To Continue 29 Aug

LD2808201890 Budapest MTI in English 1908 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 28 (MTI)—The special session of the Hungarian parliament is to continue on Wednesday afternoon.

On closing the Tuesday session, Speaker Matyas Szuros announced that the Buda Central District Court had initiated proceedings with regard to the suspension of Imre Pozsgay's parliamentary immunity. As a result the Committee of Immunity and Incompatibility is to hold a session during the week to decide on the issue.

Mr Pozsgay told MTI that he thought he must have been reported to the police because of his statements in connection with the infamous "Buttongate Scandal" (some MPs had illegally manipulated the parliamentary

voting apparatus). He did not want to make any further comment, stressing he would wait for the decision of the relevant committee.

What MTI could find out from the parliamentary officials was that the action to be taken against Imre Pozsgay was a private prosecution. The writ requesting the suspension of his immunity was forwarded by Gyorgy Szabad, speaker of parliament, to Sandor Olah, chairman of the Committee for Immunity and Incompatibility.

Goncz Appeals for Clean Local Elections

LD2808192190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 28 Aug 90

["Appeal" by President Arpad Goncz—live or recorded]

[Text] My fellow countrymen, friends: Our homeland has arrived at perhaps the most important stage in its political and social system transition—the local authority elections. The opportunity is opening before our people—after so many decades—to themselves elect the responsible masters of their more narrow native soil—their direct aldermen—on the basis of their aptitude and their professional knowledge and humanity. This is a central question in Hungary's future, for the change in system will become complete and concluded through this.

In an individual settlement or district, it is the people who live there who know best those earmarked for leading roles, as well as the tasks that they expect their future leaders to solve.

The preparations for the local authority elections are well under way. It is almost only a matter of only hours separating us from the start of the election campaign by parties and other interest alliances. It is for this reason that I now wish to speak to you.

The historical moment prompts me to speak in the interests of a decent and clean election campaign. In the past months, our society has made use of the opportunities offered by democracy with a maturity which commands respect; it manifested its opinion in a responsible way with the tools of an open and public political struggle. There were plenty of examples, too, during the course of the elections, of passions which skirted the borders of mental terrorization. Thus, I ask that our parties try to convince their electors of their views with a clean election campaign, with the soberness of their program, and with the circumspect selection of their candidates; and that they avoid polluting the atmosphere of the local authority elections through blackening, or even slandering, their opponents.

As president of the Hungarian Republic, I consider it morally impermissible that, in the election campaign—or during the course of nomination—anyone use means which would embitter the general feeling of citizens and crush the faith they have in the future. We should confront arguments with arguments, and principles with principles.

Our homeland and people can only emerge the victors from this political contest if everyone exercises the citizens' rights offered by democracy in the full awareness of their responsibility, in accordance with their conscience, and in the public interest. I have confidence that both the parties and the citizens, who are entitled to vote—in the same way as they have often proved that they are ready for democracy, to form sober judgements—will this time carry the matter of the local elections to success; that their ideas and methods alike will be permeated by human decency, political wisdom, and the beautiful national thought of the Hungarian reform age: Homeland before all else. In the spirit of this thought, I ask my fellow countrymen—all the citizens of our country entitled to vote—not to stay away from the boxes, but to pledge faith, with their vote, in the renewal of our homeland.

MDF on Coalition Prospects, Election Campaign

LD2908155190 Budapest MTI in English 1415 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29(MTI)—The coalition parties together are expected to fare similarly, or even better, at the late September local elections than in the second round of the parliamentary elections on April 8, Sandor Leszak, acting deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democrtic Forum (HDF) [MDF], told the press on Wednesday. Lezsak said the HDF was not preparing for a noisy campaign. In recent months the party had launched some 80 local newspapers to assist the campaign.

In most districts, the HDF will set up separate lists of candidates, which will include both party members and non-party people. Sandor Lezsak also mentioned a list, in which they support a representative of the Federation of Young Democrats, but alliance with the Hungarian Socialist Party is out of the question, he said. The HDF will set up common lists with the governing parties at several places.

According to Sandor Lezsak, the HDF is still acting in the role of an opposition party in a number of small towns, where the remaining elements of the former regime are trying to mobilize all their strength not to miss their last chance during the peaceful transition. Lezsak reported that the HDF currently had 36,000 members and the figure was continually increasing. The party runs independent organizations in more than 800 small towns, and local groups in 800-900 places.

Speaking to journalists about the attempts by former leaders to retain their hold of key political and economic positions, MP Istvan Bethlen, member of the HDF Presidium, said that these people were intent on putting their hand on valuable state assets and using the ensuing gains for their own ends. He requested journalists to help the government prevent such transactions by looking into complaints of this kind received from the population. He added that an office would open at HDF's Budapest headquarters where such complaints can be made.

Foreign Affairs Committee Approves Ambassadors

LD2908155990 Budapet MTI in English 1513 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, August 29 (MTI)—During its Wednesday session, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament approved the nomination of Dr Kalman Kulcsar, senior professor at the Eotvos Lorand University of Arts and Sciences, formerly justice minister, as future ambassador to Canada.

Gyorgy Varga, writer and translator of Hrabal, Havel and Kundera, received the committee's support for his nomination as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, as did Janos Benyhe, editor-in-chief of Corvina publishers, to Brazil and Vilmos Kopanyi, head of department at the Foreign Ministry, to Mexico.

Committee chairman Gyula Horn said that the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union had notified leading parliamentary officials in a letter via the Soviet Embassy in Budapest of their receipt of Hungary's requestive legislation asking for the official condemnation of the Soviet military intervention in 1956. The note is currently being studied by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

Bank Chairman Interviewed on Economic Situation

AU3008120990 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 28 Aug 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Dr. Gyorgy Suranyi, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, by Peter Lovasz; place and date not given: "Despite the Encouraging Economic Signs, We Have Not Yet Overcome the Hardest Part of the Crisis"]

[Excerpts] The role of the central bank has always been of key importance in economics, and it will continue to be so in future. Up until recently, the Hungarian National Bank was the obedient executor of a largely flawed economic policy based on political orientations, although the bank's experts repeatedly warned political leaders that the road they had chosen would lead to a dead end. With the change in Hungary's economy, the role of the bank will change; instead of being the obedient executor, the bank will now be one of the creative forces behind our economic policy. We asked the recently appointed chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, Dr. Gyorgy Suranyi, about the situation of the country's economy, and about the changed role of the issuing bank.

[Lovasz] Mr. Chairman, at a recent news conference, you stated that there were encouraging signs in the Hungarian economy, and that, as a result, Hungary's foreign balance of payments had considerably improved. Is that the result of lasting, substantial changes, or of the discovery of losses which can be eliminated quickly?

[Suranyi] If we consider that, at the end of August—for the first time in 20 years—the current balance of payments showed a credit, then I can safely say that, until the end of 1990, prospects look good. In our trade balance we can expect a surplus of $1 billion, and we can also expect a surplus in our income from tourism. That represents a big improvement, not only compared to last year, but also as regards our agreement with the IMF, which will no doubt lead to a more positive assessment of Hungary on the international money market. In our trade with the industrialized nations—for the first time in 15 years—we have succeeded in exporting more than we imported. That does not mean, however, that we have overcome the hardest part of the economic crisis. In my opinion, our success can largely be explained through the quick elimination of some losses which were previously tolerated, rather than through basic structural changes. Nevertheless, I maintain that positive trends, based on the work of the last few years and on our present sacrifices, have really started to set in.

[Lovasz] What significance did the European economic boom and the trade policy of the importing countries—particularly of the EEC—have in helping our market situation in these countries?

[Suranyi] That probably played an important part, too. We also, however, had to know how to take advantage of our opportunities, and our most immediate competitors in these markets—namely the other CEMA states—did not at all show the same increase in their exports, or the same balance improvements, although conditions were more favorable for them, as well. The Hungarian economy managed to adapt to the opportunities, and that can be seen in the change of importance of its markets and partners. [passage omitted]

[Lovasz] In concrete terms, what bearing does the new law on issuing banks have on the budget and the issuing bank, for example?

[Suranyi] In very simple terms, the law has to stipulate who pays what, and with what means. To what extent, and under which circumstances, does the issuing bank have to finance the state budget? To what extent does the budget and the issuing bank have to finance the loss in exchange rates for foreign credits? The law will deal with these issues and many others. There used to be an impossible situation, whereby the issuing bank granted more of its annual credit to the budget than to the business sector. In short, we think it is important for the law to decide and stipulate quite clearly what belongs to the sphere of so-called monetary policy, (that is to say, to the tasks and functions of a stable monetary system,) and what falls into the category of so-called fiscal policy—in other words, the amounts of daily, monthly and yearly expenses, and the covering of these expenses. As far as costs incurred in the past are concerned, the law will also have to decide on how much the bank and the budget will have to pay. That, of course, also requires a law on the state budget, as well as a law on trade and investment, because the whole financing system has to be modified in accordance with the needs of our new-style economy. On its own, the law on issuing-banks does not suffice. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry on Evacuating Poles From Iraq

AU3008100390 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 28 Aug 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement"]

[Text] The crisis in the Persian Gulf has made the Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertake vigorous action aimed at evacuating Polish citizens from the threatened area.

For understandable reasons, those actions initially focused on Kuwait, from which 595 Poles have left in a relatively short period (about 30 Poles who did not want to leave have remained there). Polish citizens in Iraq are now being evacuated. By 27 August, 435 persons out of a total number of some 2,800 had left that country.

On 22 August, following reports from directors of Polish enterprises that Poles wishing to leave Iraq were said to be experiencing difficulties, the Foreign Ministry instructed the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Baghdad to make it possible for all those wishing to leave to do so, irrespective of the character of their work and their place of work. The embassy is strictly following those instructions in relation to Polish enterprises, which, for their part, have received similar instructions from their parent companies in Warsaw. The ministry has also started talks with Iraq with a view to accelerating the process whereby Polish citizens are issued exit visas.

New Ambassador to FRG Reiter Reviews Goals

AU3008081690 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27 Aug 90 p 1

[Interview with Janusz Reiter, newly appointed Polish ambassador to the FRG, by Ryszard Bankowicz; place and date not given: "Good Neighbors in a Healthy Europe"]

[Text] [Bankowicz] What are the goals that you have set for yourself at the start of your diplomatic mission to the FRG?

[Reiter] My overall aim is to aid in the establishment of such a solid network of relations between Poland and Germany that relations between our two countries become stable and are not subject to fluctuation depending on any given situation.

The specific aims of our political cooperation are set out in the joint Polish-FRG declaration that was signed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl. It sets out a list of issues, which have to be tackled by both sides.

[Bankowicz] What in your mind are the most important of these?

[Reiter] There are matters that are already urgent—namely, to have a treaty that will confirm the present Polish-German border. In the short to medium term, we want to conclude another treaty that will create the foundation for the establishment of a new relationship between Poland and Germany, a relationship that will last for many years.

In the longer term—but we must begin to think about it now—I would place the establishment of relations between Poles and Germans within a Europe which is on the road to integration. I believe that a lasting solution of Polish-German problems will only become possible when the Poles and the Germans are within the EC, whose boundary has now moved to the Odra-Nysa [Oder-Neisse] Rivers. I hope that this will not be too long.

The EC has produced a well-tried model for interstate relations. The various antagonisms, the fears of a more powerful neighbor, have lost their edge in this structure. The problem of mutual dependence has assumed another aspect. One could speak of a model in which everyone is dependent on everyone else, and everybody benefits as a result. I consider these to be very good experiences, worth transferring to Polish-German relations.

[Bankowicz] It seems, therefore, that we are moving toward a common Europe. Is it a Europe in which the Poles would very much like to see themselves?

[Reiter] Yes, but this will not be accomplished overnight. It is the right path, and we must progress along it. The association agreement between the EEC and Poland will be but one stage along this road; the final goal is membership.

[Bankowicz] We shall need a sponsor, a partner, whose support will be necessary. Do you think that Germany, a country which has a concrete position in the EEC, could be such a sponsor?

[Reiter] Germany's role in the EEC is unquestionable. It is obvious that we shall need its goodwill if we are to achieve our goals. I think that we have to win this goodwill, convince this partner that it is in the interest of both our countries that Polish-German relations are forged within the framework of the EC. We are not talking about gifts that the Germans, or anyone else, ought to give us; I am talking of mutual benefits. The Germans in the FRG greatly value the community experience, this new type of relationship between countries. I hope that the Germans, encouraged by this, will seek to establish a relationship with Poland along similar lines by seeing that doing so will be of benefit to them.

[Bankowicz] In what areas will these benefits be?

[Reiter] It will probably be most noticeable in the economic field. The fact that one country becomes wealthier does not mean that another becomes poorer. If my neighbor is prospering, then all the better for me. This is precisely the experience of the EC and that is how we should conceive of future Polish-German relations. I

believe that the FRG political elites understand the need for such a program, and are favorably inclined to give it their assistance. I want to see how strong this feeling is, and make my contribution to strengthen it.

[Bankowicz] When will the Poles be able to travel to the FRG without visas?

[Reiter] When both sides agree to it. There is a lot to be done by both sides. We have to stabilize our economy. It is the present crisis that has resulted in other Western European countries putting up barriers that restrict the right of Poles to enter their territories. Personally, I would like to see travel without visas as of tomorrow, but I realize that this would present great difficulties. Despite this, we have to keep explaining to the Germans that opening up their borders to the Poles,—an act of courage and imagination on their part—would be an investment in the future. At the same time, I fully realize that in Poland we must work to remove the root cause that is delaying the appropriate decision.

[Bankowicz] The Polish mentality is dominated by the memory of Polish-German conflicts, wars, battles, disasters, and victories. German economic and cultural achievements arouse apprehension, as well as admiration. The mutual influence and benefits that these two neighbor nations exerted on one another remain largely unknown.

[Reiter] This is true, but personally, coming from Koscierzyna in the north of Poland where the inhabitants appreciate the depth of past interaction between Poles and Germans, I see this in a very special way. If the history of our two nations is reduced to battles and conflicts, it is a false and oversimplified picture. It has to be altered. It obscures the fact that both nations gave and took a lot from one another. It obscures the recognition of all the advantages that flow from the fact of being neighbors; for example, the importance that German material wealth has always exerted on Poles through the intermarriage of Polish and German burgher families in the past. I believe that we can still learn a lot from the social culture and behavior of the Germans.

[Bankowicz] Are they also conscious of the fact that in Polish-German relations there are values worth exploring?

[Reiter] I think they are. This is shown by the large numbers of Germans who are learning Polish, are interested in Poland and its culture, and who are proving to themselves that our country has a lot to offer.

[Bankowicz] What do you think of the German minority in Poland? Do you think that time will prove to be the best healer? Will it heal feelings, as well as misunderstandings?

[Reiter] No, time itself will not solve this problem. It is a problem which cannot really be compared to the situation of other minorities in Poland, because its roots lie extremely deep in history. It is the result of cultural differences and is linked with the disparity between living standards in Germany and Poland. It is also tied to the cultural chasm that divides the West from the East, where Poland is still fixed. The sources of the problem can also be traced to the disastrous policies formerly applied to the Upper Silesia region, policies which discriminated strongly against the indigenous population. No, the problem will not resolve itself. It will be solved—if I can go back to what I said earlier—when Polish-German relations take on a different character, and when we are both neighbors in a Europe which knows no barriers.

The problem of the German minority in Silesia will disappear when people of different nationalities, cultures, and ways of life live among each other, when such a thing becomes an everyday fact of life, and is regarded as a factor that enriches, rather than threatens, everybody.

I think that we must allow the German minority to freely develop its cultural traditions. The FRG will assist us in this, for example, in the teaching of German. This opportunity must be available for everyone. It should not divide Polish society, but assist in its integration. Democratic forces in Germany are concerned that support for the German minority in Silesia should not lead to heightened tensions between Poles and Germans. The exercise is to build bridges, not create chasms.

FRG Writer Calls for Tolerance in Silesia

PM2908134590 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 21 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by Andreas Lawaty, deputy head of the German-Polish Institute in Darmstadt, FRG: "Silesian Bridge"]

[Text] I have always felt a sense of impotence and speechless amazement whenever I read about the "eternal German" Silesia in German publications and the "eternal Polish" Silesia, which was oppressed and forcibly Germanized over the centuries, in Polish publications. My sense of powerlessness and speechless amazement were invariably caused by the fact that Silesia has been forever regarded in terms of either national apologetics or power politics, or else a straightforward propagandist brainwashing campaign. Is each of the sides really doomed forever to be the repository of the only truth? Are both sides really doomed forever to talking about each other and never talking to each other? An attempt to study and understand both perspectives, and even to comprehend their subjective arguments, is by no means a manifestation of schizophrenia: It is a manifestation of sovereignty and freedom. An attempt at viewing German-Polish relations in terms of mutual influence and enrichment does not indicate naivete or weakness, but suggests a widening of horizons.

Upper Silesia is a classic example of a region which defies description or categorization and over which it is impossible to rule in terms of a national state. Rene Schickele, an Alsatian who as a writer felt equally strong

links with French and German culture, expressed his experience in a sentence which was subsequently used by August Scholtis, a writer from Upper Silesia, as a motto for his novel, "East Wind" (published 1932): "My heart is too large for one homeland and too small for two." What could appear in the guise of an inner identity crisis can, at closer scrutiny, turn out to represent a rich potential of humanist values, tolerance, and openness. The main character of August Scholtis' novel, Kaspar Teofil Kaczmarek, complains to St. John of Nepomuk shortly before 1914 that the population of Upper Silesia is in a state of unrest because Polish people live exclusively in rural communities whereas Germans live in cities, and he comes to the following conclusion: "It would be best both for the village-dwelling Poles and the town-dwelling Germans if each side could leave its place and walk along the roads to meet each other half-way, all the while intoning "Peace to all men of goodwill."

Kaczmarek, an Upper Silesian and a Till Eulenspiegel-type character, becomes drawn into the dispute between the Poles and the Germans. As far as his own nationality is concerned, he lives in no man's land, since he talks Polish with the reverend priest and German with the state official. But in a world where everything is precisely distributed and divided, there is no room for a no-man's-land, nor can such a thing as bilingualism be tolerated. When confronted with the national question, therefore, and forced to choose, Kaczmarek must make a decision: "Since I am neither Polish nor German, but belong partly to each side, and because the good Providence gave me my power of reasoning and my feelings so that I can make my decision.... I want to be, therefore, wholly German, and I curse my fortune for having kept me thus split apart until now.... Let me be a good German. Wish me joy from what I want to enjoy."

Kaczmarek could equally well have decided to be a Pole. Despite his decision, however, he remains a man who belongs on the borderline between the two quarreling sides, and whose only protection is the armor of his stubbornly chosen identity. On a visit to the Ruhr Basin, he finds himself drinking with his Upper Silesian compatriots in a Polish miners hut. As Scholtis describes it further on, the Poles from the Russian partition zone "conducted their Polish discussions about national freedom. They sang their anthem, 'Poland Has Not Perished Yet.' On the other hand, the Germans from Rhineland, who are well-known in the West for being good democrats, sang together with the Poles, for why should one nation not enjoy its freedom alongside others?..."

The picture of Upper Silesia painted here by Scholtis did not fit in even in those days, in the year 1932, with the general spirit of the times, which already foreshadowed the events which were to come later. The novel was not reissued again in the FRG until 1970, and even then it met with no response. Scholtis, whose soul was too large for one homeland and too small for two, could not attract a sympathetic response either in Upper Silesia—by then completely Polish—or among the exiled compatriots, by then completely German. At that time both sides looked only for arguments to reinforce their own position and avoided uncomfortable questions. Nothing smoothes troubled relations better, however, than a mutual readiness to ask uncomfortable questions and examine one's own conscience in answer to them.

The Eastern European liberation process, which embraces both the Polish reform and the German unification, create unimaginably rich possibilities for us all to arrange our common future together anew. These possibilities will become even more clearly defined as soon as the question of our common border becomes definitively sealed as part of the whole unification package and thus ceases to divert our attention from the real questions facing us in the future. In the face of an absence of economic and political equilibrium between the two states, new fears have been springing up on the Polish side, while on the German side there has been noted an occasional lack of interest and a lack of the sensitivity necessary to build up a genuine partnership. Inclusion of the question of Polish-German relations in the process of European unification could become the catalyst they need. I believe also that Upper Silesians could be the best candidates for opening up channels of communication and fostering openness between European nations. Why do I believe so?

First, because Upper Silesia is the only region that has preserved vestiges of multicultural national traditions in the context of a nationally homogenous Poland. True, the imposed stricture to opt unequivocally and exclusively for one or the other side left a number of negative traces; nevertheless, it still seems that the traditions of a peaceful symbiotic coexistence could be reactivated, especially as such a coexistence is vital for the European future. Official recognition of the right to free admission to a German—or other—cultural heritage could forge a spiritual, moral, and psychological bridge between Germans and Poles, provided that this right will not be abused by either side, including Germans in the FRG.

Second, historically distinctive regions could play a role of greater importance than they have up to now within nation states in a unified Europe with a noncentralized, federal structure. Upper Silesia could develop a regional identity which would not be externally restrictive, but would find a healthy foundation in its civilizational and economic potential. It is a region which could very quickly effect the necessary modernization leap and which moreover could bridge the material gap between Germans and Poles.

In order to gain all these advantages and prevent the emergence of new tensions, we would have to consciously assume a certain vital task:

First, it is vitally important that neither Germans nor Poles assume an attitude to the other nation proportional to that nation's extreme forces. If they do so, each conciliation will inevitably end in a fiasco, because

nationalists in the one country need their opposite numbers in the other, so as not to lose sight of the enemy. It would be tragic if the extreme forces—of which there is no shortage in times of crisis—were to paralyze the mutual progress of the two nations toward each other. The German minority in Poland should be advised to be more judicious in assuaging its thirst for German culture and refrain from snatching at every inferior scrap that is being thrown in its direction. Instead, it should free itself of its complexes and develop its democratic traditions geared toward Europe. Similarly, it would be advisable for Polish Upper Silesians not to see the roots of their identity exclusively in the Silesian Uprisings or—as in the recently reactivated Polish Western Union—in celebrating their defensive traditions and readiness. On the contrary, an active readiness for dialogue could in time rob even the professional German "expellees" of the scant public support that they still command.

Second, we should support all evidence of readiness to view the history of Silesia as a common history shared by Poles and Germans (and Silesians) alike and depart from the pattern of idealizing the struggle for German and Polish identity. This is an appeal to scholars on both sides to begin an open and self-critical dialogue. Fear of the possibility that truth could be abused should not prevent anyone form studying and proclaiming the truth. Each nation must realize that it is more becoming for it to be mistrustful toward itself than lenient toward its own mistakes and errors.

Third, national conflicts are never free from underlying economic reasons. It was so already before the last war. All those who have Silesia's interest at heart should also be interested in ensuring that this region should not be split apart by an ever-deepening economic gulf which follows the ethnic division. Future German economic involvement in this area should be to the advantage of the whole region, not just of one group in it.

The development and progress of Upper Silesia will also depend on whether or not a free, sovereign Poland and a unified Germany will in time successfully enter European structures. All Upper Silesians—that is, those who stayed on in their region, those who have gone there, and also those who were expelled from it or simply left it—can influence these processes to a notable extent. And perhaps one day we will witness a process of reconciliation of all Upper Silesians, regardless of which nationality they admit to, so that we can at last enjoy a microcosm of European variety and unity in this very region.

Jaruzelski on Acts Against Soviet Monuments

LD2908182190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1600 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Presidcent Wojciech Jaruzelski published a statement in connection with the Soviet aide-memoire of 24 August and a letter from Marshall Ogarkov, chairman of the Union of Soviet Veterans, on the subject of the fate of the monuments to Soviet soldiers who perished in the battles for the liberation of Poland.

It is stressed in the statement that the president is truly sorry to hear that quite often, in an unhealthy and attention-seeking atmosphere and in circumstances devoid of elementary culture, here and there monuments honoring Soviet soldiers are being dismantled, headstones removed, and sometimes even the ashes of the dead taken away. This is all the more regrettable because it is taking place when perestroyka in the Soviet Union is making it possible to jointly elucidate painful matters and eliminate so-called blank spots.

In his statement, Wojciech Jaruzelski said that he knows that these sorts of blameworthy practices, which go against the centuries-old Polish tradition of respect for the dead, arouse the outrage and the revulsion of the decissive majority of our society. An expression of this are the statements made by the representatives of various groups: intellectuals, writers, and politicians. The president joins his voice with these enlightened voices of disapproval and expects that all responsible political forces and local authorities will successfully oppose these sorts of practices.

Environmental Inspectors To Visit Soviet Bases

LD2908194890 Warsaw PAP in English 1756 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Szczecin, Aug. 29—Polish environmental protection inspectors have been given free access to the Soviet military bases following talks held between Poland's plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland and the plenipotentiary of the Soviet side held in Szczecin, an official of the voivodship office in Szczecin told newsmen.

Szczecin inspectors chose for their first inspection a Soviet navy base in Swinoujscie where there is a well-founded suspicion that petroleum derived substances have poisoned the aquiferous layer and polluted ground waters.

Environmental protection inspectors also plan to check several other bases, including two Soviet airfields near Chojno and Kluczewo.

Walesa on 'Solidarity Monopoly,' Presidency

AU2908084390 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25-26 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Report on interview with Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa by Piotr Adamowicz and Witold Ziolkowski; place and date not given: "The Start of a New Road"]

[Text] Piotr Adamowicz and Witold Ziolkowski interviewed Lech Walesa, excerpts of which will be published by ANSA, the Italian press agency. In todays edition, we are publishing the full text of that interview "especially for ZYCIE WARSZAWY." Our Gdansk correspondent, Piotr Adamowicz, forwarded the text to us.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How do you feel after 10 years of "Solidarity?"

[Walesa] Life did not make it easy for us. The struggle was long, and there were many problems. Some 10 years ago it was a matter of breaking away from a bad system. We managed to achieve that. Nevertheless, in those days we could have muted our cries for freedom and increased our cries for bread. Brezhnev was alive then. Did anyone that August foresee that this would cause the collapse of a whole system in Eastern Europe? Absolutely not. This is our, Poland's, achievement and this is something of which to be proud. Our "Solidarity" method of struggle with the system was the correct one. Now we have to be careful not to repeat the same mistakes our predecessors made and have a "Solidarity" monopoly. Because we were successful, the same people now have to secure the victory of pluralism. If national economy is the password, then it cannot only be allowed to apply to the economy. We need several trade unions, a vision which is capable of giving much more, a market—in the political sense—and lots of parties; and not solely a "Solidarity" and Citizens Committee monopoly; not just a "Solidarity" prime minister and president. We have to divide, just as societies divide. I have stated before that Poland needs two legs to stand on. Again I repeat that each of these has five toes. Why not try all 10 options? This is not something that is imposed from above, it is assistance toward assuring the rebirth of a normal political life. We are trying to model our country on Europe, and we too have Christians, socialists, communists and conservatives. When all these people become sufficiently educated we shall become like Europe.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Some 10 years ago Lech Walesa was the spokesman for 21 demands. What would you like to do for Poland today?

[Walesa] From the historical point of view, we can divide the demands into two parts. First, to overcome communism, which we have done, and second, to shape a new system. We are just beginning on the latter.

At the moment, we only have a 35-percent democracy. The party has collapsed, but we have not succeeded in spreading democracy wider. We have not included new blood. There is no full-blown democracy and, thus, my oath from the old days still binds. Only free elections will release me from the responsibility for all that is happening. I have considered why there is so much apathy. Why did 60 percent not take part in the elections? Whose fault is it? Mine? I hold the elites responsible that they have allowed some 60 percent of the people to remain passive. In the West during election campaigns, people become motivated, political alliances are strengthened, and new political parties arise. In Hungary, the presidential referendum attracted less than 20 percent of the people. Did they not care about having a good president? No! It is communism, not the people. They are passive, they have become too comfortable. What use is it to me, I cannot become president anyway, they say. One has to show people that one can become president, prime minister, or parliamentary deputy. One can have influence.

During the 16-month period, it was important to build up "Solidarity." At that time there were no plans, no remedies. Today, nobody remembers what Geremek and Mazowiecki wrote in the intellectuals letter. It was important to include them as advisers even though democracy might have required their exclusion. This resulted in their greatness today.

Or the "roundtable" as a political fortress, which was denounced as a lowly compromise. Many people today hold it against us. But at that time it gave momentum to many processes. These people maintain today that all that happened since was inevitable anyway. Without the "roundtable" we would not be where we are today.

There are moments that are decisive. They accelerate matters. But there are also moments that slow down development. An example of this would be missing the opportunity that the collapse of the Communist Party has presented, and missing the opportunity to widen the circle of participation in Polish politics. When the Communist Party collapsed, the "roundtable" toppled over, because one partner disappeared. They hold a majority of 65 percent and their party has ceased to exist. We needed to include people—regardless of cost and our opinion of them—even from the insignificant parties. At that stage we would have had some sort of differentiation, and these people would have begun to agitate for support and activate society. They would have forced themselves and others into action. This was our cardinal error which has destructive consequences and leads to the people saying: "How can these chameleons carry on?" For politicians this is understandable, for the people it is not.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is this platform not too small for Lech Walesa, who in 1981 was head of a giant movement and today only leads a stunted movement?

[Walesa] Our child is the present freedom and victory. I chose my place, and it was effective right up to the time that the "roundtable" ceased to be binding. It was a good position for attack and action. After the party's fall my position changed. I cannot be too active, because we now have our prime minister and our parliament. I would have felt myself released from my responsibilities had we grasped the opportunity. To speak plainly, if we had introduced full democracy, and I had not been successful, I would have told myself, stop meddling, because you have no right. If I had not been accepted, I would have no moral right to continue my campaign. I am about 90 or 100 percent sure at this. I dismantled the old order, I put forward Geremek, Stelmachowski, Wielowieyski, and Mazowiecki to occupy key positions in this old order. I hold myself responsible that they did not stimulate the political situation in Poland.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What role do you see for yourself?

[Walesa] To lead the country to free elections. These will then absolve me of any responsibility for Poland, or force me to assume another role. The question is: Where should I finish my mission? We need a president who is strong and accepted by society, and we need a just political system that comes from free elections. Where do the 65 percent come from now? It does not come from the mathematics of democracy.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Are you not pulling the wool over everyone's eyes? Have you not said that the number one candidate for the presidency is Lech Walesa?

[Walesa] I know. I know that I shall win. The problem lies elsewhere, because I do not want victory for the sake of victory. I want to have strong support. Only then will I be able to fulfill my tasks, encourage, plead, or say no. If only 40 percent vote, then they will say that 60 percent did not participate or did not want you. In such a case I would not want to be president, thank you very much! Another thing, if I am to stand as a presidential candidate, then the presidential elections have to be compulsory. Every Pole will be obliged to vote. They must all speak out. The result will then be crystal clear. I fear that we shall have a repetition of tiredness, apathy, and a result similar to the Hungarian one.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What do Poles need most now?

[Walesa] Motivated people, so that they do not stand on the sidelines. My efforts are directed at this—namely, to encourage people to take a position even though it be against me. It is crucial that they act. When they do, I shall then begin my campaign for their support.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When should parliamentary elections take place?

[Walesa] As soon as possible.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] This year?

[Walesa] Timetables already exist. It is a question of some six months. This is a lot. But since there are timetables, perhaps it is better that we do not try to accelerate things. Lets accept that by 3 May 1991, everything will be settled.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What about presidential elections?

[Walesa] I am not involved in any presidential campaign. I have to be sure that there will be a 90 percent turnout. I am more interested in seeing that we prepare a good electoral law that will make voting obligatory.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Are you going to run as a candidate?

[Walesa] I do not really want to.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But you feel you have to?

[Walesa] I am a Pole, I have no choice. I started the reforms, I fought, and I have led for 10 years now.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Are you keeping the people in the dark about your candidature?

[Walesa] Correct. I want more opponents. I can find my own supporters. I have to change my political circles in order to define myself better. For example, I cannot permit ROAD [Citizens Movement-Democratic Action] to withdraw. It must transform itself to such an extent that it does not crystalize back into a monopolistic form. If it reverts to the "Solidarity" Citizens Committee, it will be reverting to a monopoly. "Solidarity" is giving birth to many political groups, but it continues as itself—namely, a trade union. After the elections, I shall take a further step and for the second time I shall call for "Solidarity's" banner to be folded up. The free elections are a final stage. The "Solidarity" banner means a fight for freedom and democracy. We must not let it become exploited, manipulated, or tattered. It cannot be cut up into pieces that are handed round for everybody.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What will Lech Walesa do if Tadeusz Mazowiecki's candidature for the presidency is put forward?

[Walesa] I think that he will not run as a candidate. If he runs, then we shall fight to win. We shall conduct a campaign along Western lines.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How do you see the future of the government if you were to win? Is cooperation with Mazowiecki possible?

[Walesa] Everything depends on the way we play it from here. If Tadeusz Mazowiecki does not forget that it was "Solidarity" and I that backed him, if he understands the essence of the reforms, he will continue to lead the process, because he is a strong element in this game. I hope that the prime minister understands the essence of these reforms, and I hope that he sees his role.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Some people have said that they foresee a crisis around the presidency this fall. Will this happen? Others are saying that Bush's invitation to Jaruzelski supports the present order in Poland.

[Walesa] Only God knows the answer to that one. The invitation has a completely different point of view, a different perspective, a wider, deeper one. Let us look at this different perspective and listen to what is really important. But I will continue to say what I think.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Some political commentators believe that you are traveling to become, so to speak, anointed in preparation for the presidential campaign.

[Walesa] I would not like it if everybody began to try to use the pope; that shining pearl. I mean, to manipulate the pope. This pearl belongs to the whole world and Poland.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What will you say at the monument on 31 August?

[Walesa] Simply, that we have only resolved about half of the problems which face us. Looking at the past these are the most important ones, but from the point of view of the future they are not the most important ones. It is no longer important to say that we destroyed a system. In the future one can do research on it and produce doctoral theses. The most important thing is what and how we shall build for the future. We have to build our authorities and structures, not only for today, but so that they last for generations to come. Some people forget about this. We have to rebuild the economy. We have very hard work ahead of us. The real work is only beginning. The final results will testify to what we did and what we achieved.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] In other words, this is only the start of the road?

[Walesa] Yes, the start of a new road.

Solidarity 'Ever More Critical' of Government

LD2808181390 Warsaw PAP in English 1724 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Olsztyn, Aug 28—Deputy Chairman of the National Commission of the Solidarity Trade Union Lech Kaczynski today held a meeting in Olsztyn, northern Poland, with Solidarity shoplevel activists from that region to discuss union's current tasks.

Speaking about the most important tasks facing the union, Kaczynski pointed to preparations for negotiations on wages and working conditions in factories in the light of forthcoming privatization, and easing the effects of growing unemployment.

First of all, Solidarity must focus on union's social tasks and defence of interests of the working people and not on political activities, said Kaczynski.

Asked on Solidarity's attitude towards the government, Kaczynski replied: "Our attitude towards the government is ever more critical, but we have not yet withdrawn our support for it because we are aware that there is no feasible alternative of a new government today."

Solidarity's 10th Anniversary To Be Marked

LD2908212490 Warsaw PAP in English 2057 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Warsaw, Aug. 29—The central ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of Solidarity will be held in Gdansk on Friday, August 31, where participants in the August 1980 events are to meet at the Gdansk shipyard hall.

Among them there will be Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and other cabinet members, representatives of the factory strike committee from 1980, members of the present Solidarity National Commission, men of culture and foreign guests. Mieczyslaw Jagielski, who was vice premier in 1980 and signed the Gdansk agreement, is also expected to come. Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa are to deliver addresses.

The central ceremony will be followed by a mass celebrated by Poland's Primate Jozef Cardinal Glemp. After a mass, a commemorative plaque is to be unveiled, and a gala concert will be held in Sopot in the evening.

Similar ceremonies are to be staged in Jastrzebie the coming Sunday.

Balcerowicz Plan Seen Losing Supporters

AU3008083490 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Aug 90 p 3

["knysz"-signed report: "Balcerowicz's Shares Are Down"]

[Text] The Balcerowicz plan now has only slightly more supporters than opponents. In a survey carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center in the middle of July, 26 percent of the respondents said they support it, and 24 percent said they oppose it.

During the seventh months of the Balcerowicz plan's existence, the number of supporters of this plan has shrunk by 16 percent and the number of opponents risen by the same percentage. The number of respondents claiming to have too little knowledge for a meaningful answer has risen by as much as 16 percent.

Those who support the plan are usually people with higher education, urban residents, white collar workers, and also people employed in trade and services, as well as wealthy people. Some 65 percent of these people think that the sacrifices imposed by the plan are "greater than expected," but 52 [percent of these] people think that the final results are "worth" these sacrifices.

Sixty percent of those who support the Plan are pleased with the work of the government, and 86 percent think that "present policies permit the country's emergence from the economic crisis."

Half of those who support the plan said that if the parliamentary election had taken place at the end of July, they would have voted for the candidates nominated by T. Mazowiecki and the Alliance for Democracy. Eighteen percent said they would have voted for L. Walesa and the Center Accord, and seven percent would not have voted at all.

Those who oppose the plan are predominantly people with less education, rural inhabitants, and pensioners. Eighty-seven percent of them think that the sacrifices imposed by the plan are "greater than expected," and as many as 90 percent think its effects are "not worth" these sacrifices.

Fifty-nine percent of those who oppose the plan think that the government's policies so far present no chance

of emerging from the crisis. In an election, 16 percent of the opponents would have voted for candidates nominated by Mazowiecki and the Alliance for Democracy. Twenty-three percent would have voted for candidates nominated by Walesa and the Center Accord, and 25 percent would not have voted at all.

Center Accord Petitions Jaruzelski Resignation

LD2908192290 Warsaw PAP in English 1649 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Warsaw, Aug. 29—The Centre Agreement [Center Accord] today started collecting signatures under a petition calling for the stepping-down of Poland's president, according to Centre's plenipotentiary Adam Glapinski.

The appeal adopted by Centre says that the situation in Poland is still ambiguous a year after the signing of the round table agreements and the formation of a new government.

"We are not a fully independent, free and democratic country yet. Systemic reforms in the economy have come to a standstill and the nomenklatura, somethimes only 'repainted', continues to be in power. The presidency of General Jaruzelski is a symbol and embodiment of the existence of Communist relics in Poland," says the appeal.

The appeal calls on all citizens' committees and all shop-level Solidarity committees to start an action supporting the demand for an immediate stepping-down of General Jaruzleski.

"We call on all Poles to participate in all legal actions aimed at this end, to demand from deputies and senators to join the action in parliament, to lay down signatures under the demand for the stepping-down of General Jaruzelski, to adopt statements, send letters to speaker of the Sejm (lower hosue), to place posters and to organize meetings and rallies, [no closing quotes as received] reads the appeal.

TU Chief Proposes 'Social Pact' With Government

LD2908191890 Warsaw PAP in English 1655 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Warsaw, Aug. 29—Chairman of the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) Alfred Miodowicz has sent a letter of intent to Chairman of Solidarity Lech Walesa and Chairman of Solidarity-80 Marian Jurczyk which reads in part:

Ten years have passed since the signing of the "August agreements." The list of 21 postulates opened up the road for Polish reforms. The anniversary of those agreements, (signed) in Gdansk, Szczecin and next in Jastrzebie is also conducive to consideration and thought.

It seems it is high time to consolidate activities, join efforts of all groups and orientations of Poland's trade union movement for the benefiit of those who whom they have been created and who are the core of society and the nation, for all the working people.

I am of the opinion that in order for our activities to be effective, we must set aside the issues still not finally solved which exist between us or those on which we have different points of view. Let us focus on the most important issue—how to help the working people, how to help Poland.

Our OPZZ trade union movement has come out with a proposal to sign the so-called "social pact" with the government. It seems to us that this is an important issue and the very idea right and worthwhile thinking it over. However, we do not want to act alone, thus, we would like to get know your opinion on this issue.

There is also a number of other problems which, as I believe, could be easiest to solve together, to the benefit of the working people and of the country, reads the letter.

Mazowiecki Rejection of 'Revanchism' Lauded

PM2908115590 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 14 Jul 90 p 5

[Jan Bijak article: "Faith Will Breed Hope: Changes in the Government"]

[Text] Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki addressed the Sejm on the government plans for the second half of the year. It will consistently implement the current economic program, but—according to an earlier announcement—it will "adapt its policies to a trend which will place more importance on market supply," and undertake moves designed to galvanize the economy. The government wants to accelerate the process of privatization, and it will also give closer attention to agricultural questions. These matters are discussed in Jacek Poprzeczko's article below.

The prime minister put forward his proposal for changes within the cabinet. The most significant move is the departure of the two figures who, as it were, symbolized the roundtable agreement and represented a post-Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] span of the bridge constructed by the government. Those who used to criticize the government for not being wholly "ours" have received their satisfaction. Now only the president and the parliament—elected according to the rules negotiated at the time—remain to represent the roundtable accord. And perhaps we will manage to preserve some elements of the spirit and the style of the roundtable accord, though this is not at all certain.

The prime minister's address did not lack for dramatic accents. He called for reflection and restraint and spoke about the dangers threatening our progress on the Polish road to democratic transformations, about the fact that our sense of responsibility for the country and the state is growing weaker, about the substitution of the language of brutal conflict for that of reasoned polemical argument, and about the dangerous phenomenon whereby the opponent with whom we should argue is instead regarded as an enemy

who should be annihilated. He presented the options we could take: "We can either continue to establish new legislation and new economic and political structures under conditions of respect for the law and mutual tolerance —which does not necessarily preclude political struggle—or we can sacrifice our common good, harmonious coexistence, and the priceless gift of stability and peace in the country for the sake of party quarreling, strife, and the pursuit of ambition at the expense of the state structures—the structures of our own state."

I would like to highlight one particular theme in the prime minister's address: a theme which I believe to be very important and which, on the one hand, is typical of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's style and way of thinking and, on the other, strongly emphasizes the difference between his interpretation of future transformations of Polish democracy and the concepts favored by the "champions of acceleration," to use the term currently in style.

The tone of the prime minister's address was vastly different from the shrill cries of the "nomenklatura hunters," who see the said nomenklatura as the embodiment of all evil and the culprit responsible for all disasters. Tadeusz Mazowiecki does not fear accusations of being lenient toward the real culprits. His attitude to communism and totalitarianism is widely known and completely unequivocal. As head of government, however, he must ask the question: "Are we prepared to resign ourselves to an eruption of mutual hatred and resentment, or shall we offer everybody a chance and a place of their own in a free Poland?" He declares: "We are resolutely opposed to the policy of revanchism," and appeals to everyone to "remember also all those who, having lost their faith in the old order and their desire to see it return, are still afraid that the new Poland could be vindictive and incapable of magnanimous moves." According to Mazowiecki, "totalitarianism does not only imply the existence of 'them' as opposed to 'us'—it implies a certain wider historical reality" and we must adopt this truth as our point of departure if we want to carry out a thorough and socially useful analysis of that system. That part of the prime minister's statement contains a number of noteworthy observations which deserve to be used as germinal ideas in a much-needed debate on the necessary preconditions for the transition from one system to the next.

The climate created by the public mood; people's initiative and dynamism; their will to participate in the transformations which the country is undergoing: These are the most important matters. It will be very hard to talk about them if that part of society which, in the prime minister's words, "had in the past, as a result of our tragic national destiny, formed ties—be they stronger or weaker, be they the consequence of conviction or calculation—with the old system," is pushed into marginal positions.

Here let me say a few words about the Gdansk meeting between the trade unionists, led by Walesa, and a delegation of our parliamentarians. I watched the live televised report of that meeting. My conclusions do not fill me with optimism—assuming that the report was a fair representation. After the prime minister's statement to the Sejm we could have expected a much more sober analysis of his proposals. The government went halfway to meet those who have been criticizing its work so harshly in recent times. It has introduced changes and it has been applying "acceleration." ("I previously expressed my belief that genuinely democratic elections should take place next spring at the latest. I make a point today of emphasizing the words 'at the latest,' since I am now convinced that we should also consider much earlier dates.") In this way, it also provided an alibi for those among its critics who might feel that pride or ambition prevented them from softening their tone and entering the path of dialogue. I formed an impression, however, that none of these signals was received or read correctly in the Gdansk Shipyard hall where the meeting took place. This would indicate that divisions have gone too deep already and that they engage the opponents' energies too much. True, Lech Walesa did say that he supports the Mazowiecki government; there was a further mention of this in the statement issued after the meeting between Walesa and Mazowiecki at Bishop Dabrowski's residence, but it all looked highly unconvincing against the background of the fierce criticism leveled against the government at the shipyard.

All this invokes fears—or, to put it more precisely, aggravates the fears—that the quarrels and controversies will not ease and that that the widely desired truce of God will not materialize even though the country's need for it is very great. In this situation there is nothing for us to do but to follow the prime minister's example and appeal for public concern and sense of responsibility to be applied if we are to prevent a destruction of our common good, even if we cannot stop the differences between opposed political camps becoming widely advertised and reinforced. And if the two opposing camps fail to arrive at some form of truce in the near future (not necessarily eliminating the differences, but agreeing on the procedures according to which the argument could be conducted), if that turns out to be impossible, then we really must bring the date of the elections considerably forward. Unless we do this, the foundations on which this government bases its activity—that is, public confidence in the government and belief that it is capable of leading the nation out of the recession and near ruin—could crumble and collapse and we could find ourselves amid chaos and destruction. And this is what people are really beginning to fear most—yet again.

New Administrative Divisions Discussed

AU3008084090 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Professor Bohdan Jalowiecki, adviser to the Office of the Council of Ministers, by Renata Wrobel; place and date not given: "The Administrative Divisions—No Final Decision"]

[Text] [Wrobel] Has the government a proposal to change the administrative divisions of the country?

[Jalowiecki] The prime minister has formed a team of 30 people who have been entrusted with preparing a project

for the new territorial division of the country. The team will begin work in October 1990, and the project deadline is June 1992. We shall then have a period of project evaluation, debated by the Council of Ministers and later publicly in parliament. The project has to be well prepared and be a long-term solution.

At present there is no other official project. Everything that has appeared in the press consists of personal ideas. Some are better, some are worse. An example of a bad one is the so-called Katowice proposal.

[Wrobel] You mean the suggestion put forward by Wojciech Czech, the Katowice Voivode? This would create 12 province-voivodeships, which would be divided into "regions" [krainy] and "lands" [ziemie].

[Jalowiecki] Yes, even Radio Free Europe broadcast it. It seems that the author has already fixed the boundaries of the Upper Silesian province. These types of suggestions cannot be taken seriously. You cannot redraw the country administratively "from the bottom upwards." If all the present voivodships wanted to do this, we would soon run out of land to satisfy their ambitions. These matters have to be tackled centrally. Obviously, specific boundary lines would have to be consulted with interested parties.

Such proposals only rouse public opinion, when in reality the issue is still a long way away. One hears rumors that such and such a voivodship is to disappear. These are just rumors. No decisions have been made.

[Wrobel] But Professor Jerzy Kolodziejski told GAZETA POZNANSKA that in the future there will only be 12-14 voivodships and that the district [powiat] will be reintroduced. POLITYKA published the article.

[Jalowiecki] We must take this as Professor Kolodziejczyk's personal view, rather than an official statement by Minister Kolodziejczyk. It is too early for a government view.

[Wrobel] We mentioned district, and this is one of the issues that arouse deep feelings.

[Jalowiecki] District is a name that has symbolic meaning, and people are attached to the name. The 1975 reform that swept them away created a lot of problems. The present administrative division is in reality two-tier. Regions came about for very specific matters only. The name "rejon" is from Russian, and there is a possibility that when the country is reorganized territorially, the name, district, could be reintroduced.

[Wrobel] Will we see the reappearance of the former districts?

[Jalowiecki] Probably not as they formerly were, because a lot has changed in Poland since 1975, and a lot more will change before the new divisions become reality. The final shape of the districts depends on changes to our system, changes which will be indicated, if not resolved, by the new Constitution. The Constitution ought to say something about the numbers of local administrative levels.

[Wrobel] If one were to believe some people, one could be deceived into thinking that a change of administrative divisions is the simplest thing in the world. Its just a matter of drawing a line on a map.

[Jalowiecki] The line on a map is the final touch, not the beginning. The basic issue is one of division of competence. What matters ought to belong to the voivodship level? This will follow the model that is finally accepted for the administration of Poland. It is obvious that more administrative units means greater centralization. If there are fewer, then they will have to be stronger, especially economically, and central administration will be devolved. I think that the Polish state will evolve in this direction—namely, fewer, but stronger voivodships.

[Wrobel] Thus, a reduction in the number of voivodships is almost a certainty?

[Jalowiecki] The Committee for Regional Economic Development [Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju] carried out research a few years ago that showed an equal number of people were for and an equal number against. Some experts supported the idea of small voivodships, that is to say, minor amendments to the present divisions. Others said that there should be fewer. It seems that the experts, as well as the regions, now prefer the latter.

[Wrobel] Why is there talk of change? In what way is the present system failing?

[Jalowiecki] Because the present voivodships are too small to organize their own development. They are not equal partners for economic interests from abroad. It is ridiculous to require that everything that is linked to international cooperation or economic development should go through Warsaw. That is why we need strong voivodship-regions that will become visible on the European map. At the moment, it is difficult to say how many there ought to be.

Religious Periodicals, Market Prospects Surveyed

PM2908093590 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 7 Jul 90 p 7

[Bronislaw Tumilowicz article: "TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY Holds Firm"]

[Text] A new "configuration of forces" is developing in the daily press and periodicals market, and all editors—including those who publish religious works—are trying to adapt to the new situation. The Catholic press no longer holds a privileged position (regarding the content of the information it carries), nor does it encounter any discrimination in the form of publishing restrictions. Today, when anyone can purchase the paper and the printing services and then write whatever inspiration

dictates, only the readers can decide on the number of copies of any given paper will run, or, in fact, they can decide its very existence.

Thus, we will no longer find at newsstands many religious periodicals formerly published by those lay Catholic organizations which, until recently, took a prosocialist stand (KIERUNKI [Directions]; TYGODNIK POLSKI [Polish Weekly]; ZA I PRZECIW [For And Against]; or MYSL SPOLECZNA [Social Thought]). On the other hand, almost all those periodicals whose sponsors at the time refused to support the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON—disbanded November 1989], and whose editorial boards include the post of so-called ecclesiastical assistant, have survived. New religious press titles are also appearing, but nearly all of them—apart from a handful of exceptions—have to grapple with considerable difficulties.

The difficult situation of the Catholic press is illustrated in the "Polish Episcopate Commission's Appeal to Public Media" issued February 1990 and signed by Bishop Adam Lepa, which discusses the "serious threat" endangering readership of Catholic papers and periodicals. High publication costs force people to give up buying these titles regularly. Instead, various cheap and unambitious periodicals gain in popularity, though their moral and social influence is often harmful. These are the main theses of the document. Consequently, the Commission appeals to the faithful to ensure that each family should buy at least one Catholic publication regularly. It also recommends that the network of parish press kiosks and newsstands be developed further. A further model of a Catholic press system is currently being drafted by the Public Media Synodal Commission, chaired by Rev. Dr. Jan Chrapek.

The Krakow weekly TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, which probably influences public opinion more than any other title, continues to hold firm. Its print run has grown from 80,000 to 100,000 copies, while returns only amount to around two percent. Some 60,000 copies of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY are distributed through subscription organized by the Ruch distribution network, and another proportion of the print run is distributed directly from the editorial office. The periodical is financially stable even at the relatively moderate—by today's standards— price of 1200 zloty [Z] per issue.

Among the strictly religious periodicals, that is, those whose chief editors are clergymen, the best position is reserved for the Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY [Sunday Visitor]. After a temporary collapse, it has already reached its earlier print run figure of 200,000. Distribution is organized by two private joint companies, which supply issues of the weekly to parishes in the Katowice and neighboring voivodships. Begin in May of this year GOSC NIEDZIELNY has also been available on newsstands. Financial and publishing difficulties forced the editors to introduced reformative moves which have been described as "escape into progress." Though copy price went up from Z400 to Z500, the paper now has 12 instead of eight pages. Some changes in content matter have also been made. GOSC NIEDZIELNY is no longer austere. In a bid to attract wider readership, a number of new, lighter and shorter forms of journalism (and even cartoons) have been added to the traditional fare of items dealing with social and moral issues. In addition, the paper carries job advertisements (published free of charge), reviews, and televisions programs.

Another blueprint for survival has been applied by the biweekly GWIAZDA MORZA [Star of the Sea] published by the Gdansk Diocesan Curia. Its print run dropped from 15,000 to 13,000 copies, while the copy price remains at Z400, though cost calculation indicates that it ought to be raised to at least Z1000. If it were not for help from the West (for instance, the supply of paper), the periodical's situation would not appear too rosy, even after certain changes have been made in its content. This is because everybody agrees today that the demand for religious subject matter is decreasing. Nor is there any reason for printing full versions of all pastoral letters and other ecclesiastical documents.

Elsewhere, diocesan periodicals have also reduced their print runs. These include LAD BOZY [Divine Order] in Wloclawek; NIEDZIELA [Sunday] in Czestochowa; NOWE ZYCIE [New Life] in Wroclaw; POSLANIEC WARMINSKI [Ermland Messenger] in Olsztyn; PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI [Catholic Review] in Warsaw; PRZEWODNIK KATOLICKI [Catholic Guide] in Poznan, and others. The religious publications market also handles the 100,000-strong print run of the monthly Polish edition of the Vatican daily OSSERVATORE ROMANO, of which only a small proportion is purchased by the faithful, and this only as a result of fervent appeals from the clergy.

Despite all difficulties, new periodicals are also appearing. Except for the smallest ones, practically each diocese, fired by editorial ambitions, publishes its own press titles. As a result of this trend, new periodicals are appearing, such as WZRASTANIE [Growth], PIELGRZYM [Pilgrim], and others. The Koszalin-Kolobrzeg Diocese publishes a new biweekly WIERZE [I Believe], of which five issues have appeared to date. Nevertheless, its editors are fully aware, as are their many rivals in the ecclesiastical press sector, that each new issue could turn out to be the last.

It is also worthwhile to note the situation of press and publications scene in other Christian churches and religious communities in Poland. The quarterly WIADOMOSCI POLSKIEGO AUTOKEFALICZNEGO KOSCIOLA PRAWOSLAWNEGO [The Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church News] has a print run of 2,000 copies;—the religious and social monthly of the Evangelical Reformed Church JEDNOTA [Unity] also publishes 2,000 copies of each issue. The Baptist monthly SLOWO PRAWDY [Word of Truth] has a print run of 3,000 copies; the Evangelical Methodist monthly PIELGRZYM POLSKI [Polish Pilgrim]—2,000 copies,

and the Evangelical Augsburg [Lutheran] biweekly ZWIASTUN [Herald]—13,000 copies, while the Polish Catholic periodical RODZINA [Family], formerly a biweekly with a 25,000 print run, has cut down on both its frequency of publication and its print run: This year, so far only one issue was published. The MARIAWITA monthly, published by the Catholic Mariavite Church, is beset by similar, grave troubles: This year, it did not appear at all.

Against this background, the situation in the press and publications scene of the Church of the Seventh Day Adventists looks quite reasonable. The ZNAKI CZASU [Signs of the Time] monthly appears in a 25,000-copy print run; the GLOS ADWENTU [Advent Voice] monthly has a print run of 3,000 copies, and the half-yearly LEKCJE BIBLIJNE [Biblical Lessons] is published in a 6,000-copy print run. In addition, the Znaki Czasu Christian Publishing Institute issues some 30 book titles per year.

Award Anniversary Resurrects Transylvania Issue

Vatra Romaneasca on Anniversary

LD2908123990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Report on interview with (Jan Coja), national deputy chairman for Vatra Romaneasca, by Budapest Radio reporter Anna Ketfalusi; place and date not given]

[Text] Romanian organizations in Transylvania are preparing for the anniversary of the second Vienna declaration with memorial services and demonstrations. In Cluj County, for example, Vatra is organizing a noon rally. The bells of all Romanian churches will toll for 10 minutes. A military parade is being organized. In Cluj County the state flag will be flown at half-mast. Our correspondent Anna Ketfalusi interviewed (Jan Coja), national deputy chairman of Vatra Romaneasca.

[Ketfalusi] At the very start of our discussion, he pointed out that though at its inception Vatra was less of a cultural organization than it declared in its program, at present it conducts exclusively cultural activities. If this is so, then what about the memorial services planned for 30 August? I asked. How far will be this be a cultural event, and why is it needed?

[Begin recording] [(Coja) in Romanian, fading into Hungarian translation] I think that this is made necessary by the huge bulk of the Hungarian reactionary propaganda material, which questions the Trianon peace settlement, and more or less comes out in favor of the Vienna award. In such circumstances, when the Hungarian foreign minister says that we are a multinational state, that we do not observe the rights of national minorities, when Hungarian revisionism has an enormous literature, then even if we do not politicize we have to take a stand.

[Ketfalusi] The Hungarian Government has reiterated virtually ad nauseam that it has no territorial demand vis-a-vis Romania. Vatra, even so, accuses Hungary of this, and it nourishes this fear among the Romanian population. Why?

[(Coja)] First, because the Hungarian Government could change at any time. Second, because there is a large Hungarian emigree community, which deals exclusively with this problem. So the Hungarian Government pronouncements do not constitute a guarantee. They mean no more than a newspaper article. If a situation similar to that in 1940 were now to arise, who would imagine that the Hungarian Government would keep its promise? Nowadays people think we are taking this Translyvania business too far. Moreover, some suspect that Vatra is serving the Romanian Government's intention to divert the population's attention from economic problems by keeping the Hungarian threat on the agenda. But if this were the case, then I would not stop here. This could, in just the same way, be in the Hungarian Government's interest as well, for the situation there, too, is difficult. It is possible that the two governments have in fact agreed to maintain this tension.

[Ketfalusi] You say this precisely a few days before 30 August. Do you not think that in the present explosively dangerous situation this could have tragic consequences?

[(Coja)] Naturally this danger exists. But celebrating the event is made necessary by the large decree of tension which the Hungarian propaganda has evoked, and in this a big role is played by Hungarian Television and Radio, which everybody listens to in Transylvania. Right up to this day, the Romanian Government and the Romanian authorities have not given the appropriate reply to these hostile manifestations, which shows not only the weakness of the government, but of the entire Romanian society. That is the reason why there is a need for actions like this. Even if this action is a little bit exaggerated, it is still better than not having a reply to everything that is in fact directed against us.

In the beginning we only wanted to hold a sort of scientific session about the Vienna award. Now it appears that this has changed a little bit, but we will ensure that we do not create an opportunity for incidents. This is all the more important, since we hear ever more frequently that all these clashes in Romania are taking place according to a kind of scenario. Yet, this scenario is written in accordance with Hungary's interests, so that it should be finally demonstrated that Romania is not capable of resolving the problems of Magyars in Romania. Hungary would thus be justified in seeking help from other states. It would in no way be in our interest, therefore, for conflicts to develop on that day. This could only be in the interest of somebody else, or of some others—I do not know who. [end recording]

What you have just heard reflects the official position of Vatra Romaneasca.

Joint Parliament Discusses Award

AU2908182190

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian at 1400 GMT on 29 August begins a live relay from the Metropolitan Hill Palace on the opening of a joint "solemn" session of the two parliament chambers—the Senate and the Deputies Assembly—on the commemoration of "a sad anniversary" and a "tragedy" in the history of the Romanian people—namely, 50 years since the Vienna award—whereby part of Transylvania was awarded to Horthyist Hungary. An unidentified correspondent reports that "almost all senators and deputies are present," as well as "Prime Minister Petre Roman, who takes his seat in the box reserved for government members," and many press representatives. The correspondent says that "Senate Speaker Alexandru Barladeanu and Deputies Assembly President Dan Martian take their seats in the presidium."

At 1407 GMT, Barladeanu greets the foreign diplomats and "the prime minister and members of the government," who are present. He says that we gathered not to celebrate a "happy moment," but the Vienna award, whereby "part of Romania's territory was arbitrarily torn away from it." Without making any direct reference to the dispute with Hungary, he points out that Romania has overcome that blow, too, after which he proceeds to talk about the current period of radical change in the country and, in this framework, about current attempts to "destabilize" the country and increase tension.

At 1419 GMT, Dan Martian reads a draft statement of Romania's Parliament on this anniversary, which reiterates Romania's desire for national "reconciliation" and the creation of a "pluralist society." Martian concludes the presentation of the draft statement at 1427 GMT. Barladeanu then invites representatives of all parties to make statements in connection with this commemoration.

At 1427 GMT, Radu Campeanu, leader of the National Liberal Party and vice president of the Senate, takes the floor and calls the Vienna award "an abominable act." He speaks about the present situation and about the requirement to fulfill people's economic needs. He calls for observance of three principles: observance of the Trianon Treaty, of the country's sovereignty, and the country's official language. He endorses the Parliament's declaration.

At 1435 GMT, Ion Diaconescu, vice president of the National Peasants (Christian-Democratic) Party, takes the floor. He rejects any "revisionist" attempts, emphasizes the inviolability of Romania's borders, and pleads for "rapprochement" between peoples. He also endorses the Parliament's declaration.

At 1443 GMT, Geza Domokos, president of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], takes the floor and refers to the "arbitrary" nature of the Vienna award in the dangerous European context of that time of nationalism, chauvinism, and war. He then talks about guaranteeing the national rights of minorities in new Romania.

At 1452 GMT, Mihai Balanescu from the Ecological Movement of Romania, speaks about ensuring the national rights of minorities, which should live "in brotherhood" with the majority Romanian people.

At 1458 GMT, Radu Ciontea, senator from the Transylvanian Romanians National Unity Party and leader of the Vatra Romaneasca Union, takes the floor. After presenting some historical background, he talks about a revival of Hungarian "irredentism" at home and abroad and about unfair attacks on the Vatra Romaneasca Union, and calls on all citizens to "prove their loyalty" to the country. He submits to the session an amendment to the Parliament's draft declaration.

At 1510 GMT, Victor Surdu from the Agrarian-Socialist Democratic parliamentary group objects in rather strong terms to those who talk about "Romania's peoples," rather than "one Romanian people" with several national minorities. He also takes to task those people who do not want to accept the results of the May elections and prefer to demonstrate in the University Square.

At 1526 GMT, (?Dumitru Ene), deputy from the National Salvation Front, who talks about the government's determination to do away with totalitarianism and promote democracy and stability; he appeals to all "responsible political forces" to conduct a "pluralist dialogue." He endorses the Parliament's declaration on the Vienna award.

At 1538, Barladeanu says: "Gentlemen Deputies and Senators, the list of speakers who represent all the groups in the Romanian Parliament has concluded. We have to stress the very pleasant and promising fact of the unanimity with which this draft-statement has been accepted.

"This is a very happy fact and, at the same time, a proof of the political maturity of our assembly of people's deputies.

"Now, I should take your votes on this statement, however, Mr. Ciontea, who agreed with the draft statement, proposed an amendment. I am going to remind you of this amendment in order to submit it to your judgment whether it should be introduced or not introduced within a sentence in a second page paragraph, which says: Today, 50 years after the event, the alternative is understanding, reconciliation, freedom and tolerance, Mr. Ciontea proposed that we add that no one should exploit the Romanian structural tolerance and, in the name of this tolerance, ignore the principles of democracy, as it exists in the states which we admire. Thus, this is the passage. The idea, as you can see is the following: Mr. Ciontea agrees with what has been said, both with conciliation and freedom. In essence, however, he draws attention to the fact that tolerance should not be understood as an encouragement to the violation of democratic principles. Is that right, Mr. Ciontea? I would like to ask Mr. Ciontea whether he believes that this nuance—we are going to examine its substance [word indistinct]—is absolutely necessary in this block, which is the draft statement, or is it sufficient that it be published in the OFFICIAL MONITOR as Mr. Ciontea's personal opinion. I would like to ask Mr. Ciontea what he thinks about it."

After some commotion and indistinct voices, Barladeanu continues: "So, he insists that this passage should be included in the draft statement. Then, after you heard the text of the proposal, I put Mr. Ciontea's proposal to a vote. Mr. Domokos, I beg you not to start a controversy on this occasion."

Geza Domokos, president of the UDMR, takes the floor in connection with Ciontea's amendment. He says the following: "Ladies and gentlemen, I am stepping forward with regret, that now, at this solemn moment, we are in disagreement. But, perhaps this is not bad. This is a democratic parliament and, in just such moments, it is advisable that we state our opinions and be frank about it. I do not support the amendment proposed here. I

believe that the option for understanding, reconciliation, freedom, and tolerance should not be made conditional on anything. Democracy has a profound meaning, which cannot be interpreted [words indistinct]. I would like, therefore, [words indistinct] us to agree to stick to the text of this declaration, which is clear and beautiful."

Barladeanu then invites Radu Campeanu to take the floor. However, Geza Domokos says:

"I would like to add something. I expressed the endorsement of the UDMR for this important document. If this restrictive amendment is adopted, however, then, with regret, I will withdraw the endorsement of our group."

Amid commotion, an unidentified speaker, presumably Radu Campeanu, says that the "draft declaration is good, in general," but it should contain something for the "heroes and martyrs of Romanian Ardeal."

Barladeanu invites deputies to keep a moment of silence for the victims of 50 years ago.

In connection with Mr. Ciontea's amendment, Barladeanu says he cannot open a polemical discussion on Ciontea's amendment or other amendments not discussed at the session—so he submits it to a vote. No result of the vote is announced, but Barladeanu asks Geza Domokos to reconsider his attitude. At 1553 GMT, the live relay is interrupted and the hookup returns to the studio where announcer says that, until the hookup with Parliament is reestablished, music will follow.

At 1623 GMT, the hookup with the parliament session is reestablished. Barladeanu's voice can be heard announcing that the "proceedings are resumed." Barladeanu invites Geza Domokos to take the floor.

Domokos says, "Ladies and gentlemen, the parliamentary group of the UDMR has once again read and carefully studied the amendment presented by Senator Ciontea. We are fully of the opinion that this text is alien to this document because of its polemic and [word indistinct] nature. But in order to reach a consensus on the adoption of this statement of great importance, we have decided that the whole document be accepted and endorsed by our parliamentary group. [applause]

"Ladies and gentlemen, please view this decision of ours as an outstretched hand of those people who wish the country's well-being, desire democracy, our unity, and who are interested in being united and in working together for a new common future. Thank you." [applause]

Barladeanu again submits the declaration to the vote of the Parliament, which endorses it "unanimously."

The proceedings and the live relay end at 1630 GMT.

Parliament Statement on Anniversary

AU2908164590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1419 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Statement issued by the Parliament of Romania on the 50th anniversary of the Vienna award issued at a bicameral session held in Bucharest on 29 Aug—read by Deputies Assembly President Dan Martian]

[Text] The tearing away half a century ago, through the criminal Vienna award, of a part of Transylvania and its annexation to Horthyist Hungary, imposed forcefully by the Fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, was an historic injustice, a flagrant violation of the norms of justice and international law and of the scared rights of the Romanian people.

The tearing to pieces of Romania's body, which had been already torn apart in the same fatal year of 1940, and the wave of terror and violence that followed the award profoundly hurt the feelings and national awareness of the Romanian people.

It is to our people's merit to have joined the antifascist coalition in time and to have freed in 1944—through their own and the Romanian Army's bloody sacrifices during the antifascist war—the whole of Transylvania and thus returning to the homeland the territory torn away by that award.

In 1947, international treaties—recognizing the historic reality—for the second time since 1918, sanctioned the fact that Transylvania had belonged and belongs to Romania for good and that it is completely Romanian territory.

After the war, the peoples in Eastern Europe were forcefully subjected to the experiment of an unprecedented utopia—communism—which is at variance with the whole of European history. The utopia proclaimed a new era of a so-called genuine friendship among people and claimed that it had solved for good the nationality problem in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, especially in the eighties, the whole of the Romanian nation, as well as the ethnic minorities, were subjected to a systematical program of wiping out the moral and historic values that define their ethnic identify.

The Romanian Parliament believes that—after the overthrow of the dictatorship—favorable conditions were created for establishing new and natural relations among all citizens in our country: Romanians and those of any other nationality. The sufferings of that time must constitute a warning today, so that injustice and oppression may be excluded for good from our political activity. Violence leads to more violence, hatred breeds greater hatred, contempt breeds contempt, death leads to further death. This is the lesson of the tragedy of 1940.

Today, 50 years later, the alternative is understanding, reconciliation, freedom, and tolerance. The recent history of our continent proves that hundreds of years of confrontation can end with a reconciliation opening new

roads. In order to achieve such cooperation and conciliation, it is imperatively necessary for all sides with an open mind and no hidden thoughts to desire this.

Parliament, as an embodiment of the national sovereignty at this time, reaffirms the desire to build a pluralist society as soon as possible with the same rights, freedoms, and responsibilities for all citizens of our country, be they Romanians or other ethnic minorities. The road to this is one and indivisible: the same rights of all, the same respect for the history and identity of the majority nation and of the ethnic minorities. Democracy, equality, and identity does not mean, however, the creation of autonomies, of extraterritorial enclaves which would finally lead to the artificial creation of a multinational territory and to the country's dismemberment.

The policy of disinformation, of insinuations, and of an accusatory press campaign, which is intensifying while the rights of ethnic minorities are recognized, widened, and actually applied, can only delay and actually endanger the proper progress of the normal development of our society, create difficulties for our general situation. It can also only distort Romania's image abroad.

The tension created artificially, the acts of disorder and the violations of public order will not brighten the atmosphere in our country, but, on the contrary, will accentuate the economic and social difficulties facing our people and perpetuate uncertainty and instability.

In this context, national consensus has to become a primary goal for all of us. Democratic rights and freedoms are, and remain, the same and are equal for all citizens of Romania, irrespective of their nationality. Thus, we will be able to become a component part of the community on our continent, of a single and free Europe of [sovereign] nations.

The achievement of the supreme interests of our nation requires cooperation among all political and social forces in our homeland and the participation of all citizens in the continuation and deepening of the democratization process in our country initiated by the 1989 December revolution. May the principles and values proclaimed by the revolution constitute the link capable of ensuring the cooperation of all these forces irrespective of existing programmatic differences.

The Romanian Parliament calls on all citizens of the country to show a constructive and moderate spirit, civic responsibility, to work to ensure the prevalence of national interests, and to pull the country from the numerous difficulties facing it, thus guaranteeing it a prosperous future and a dignified place in Europe and among all the nations of the world. [applause]

Unity Party Endorses Communique

AU2908174890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1438 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Statements-Interviews—Statement of the National Unity Party of Romanians"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—The National Unity Party of Romanians associates with the communique of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 25, 1990, a statement of that party shows. We emphasize the fact that the Romanian Foreign Ministry's answer proves full national responsibility which we hope to become a constant of the entire government' s policy concerning any tendency of interference in Romania's internal affairs.

We think that, taking into consideration the violation of the elementary norms of international law, of diplomatic norms and of contemporary European political spirit through the reiteration of anachronic and irredentist political actions inciting Romania's Hungarian minority, the attitude adopted by the Romanian Foreign Ministry is the right one, the statement further shows. The communique specifies:

We voice our confidence that each political grouping, imbued with dignity and national responsibility, has the duty to support the Romanian Government in promoting a firm attitude of fight against any destabilizing actions be they internal or foreign.

We subscribe to the statement made by the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union on August 26, 1990 whereby it also supports the Romanian Government's stand in connection with the Hungarian Government which has gone beyond its political powers.

Senator Ciontea Views Transylvania

AU2908203990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1458 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Address by Senator Radu Ciontea, leader of the Vatra Romaneasca Union, at a joint parliament session on the Vienna award in Bucharest on 29 August]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, prompted by dubious motives, we are urged by various means to review our past, the past which hurts us. You have certainly read—in papers of various leanings and colors—our appeal and their appeal to begin a new life on new foundations following the political turning point that took place on 22 December 1989.

For 45 years we were obliged to do constructive work on the basis of lies. There are [word indistinct] of consciousness which try to take tolerance for vigilance [words indistinct]. Often it seemed to me, and I want to stress this simple supposition, that there is a (?force) whose intention it is to urge us to do our constructive work—instead of on the foundation of lies—on a foundation of denial. This would be even more serious.

But we are here in this parliamentary hall, and the fact that I am convinced that above us in the heavens maybe the wisest and most outstanding figures of Romanian democracy—Romania, which was a European country and which will not begin to be a European country today or tomorrow—are looking upon us from afar, where they are, hoping that we will be their successors. We are,

therefore, especially not allowed to let our wounds fester. The most thorough lessons of history are learnt from suffering. And it is not we, the Romanians, who should be ashamed, and it is not we who should have the scruples to say—true, with pain—that tomorrow will mark half a century since Horthyist Hungary, protected by the cheap interests of the great powers, cruelly tore away part of Romania's territory.

Thinking of the atrocities committed, especially to the Romanian and Jewish people in Transylvania during the years of arbitrary occupation, we believe that it is a dignified attitude on our part not to hide anything and to say what all of us know—namely, that the latent Magyar irrendentism accentuated in Romania, as if at somebody's order, not only in Romania, but even in Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, especially after the turning point of 22 December. We also have to regret from the bottom of our hearts that a great part of the peace and energy, which we could have used for the reconstruction of this Romania of all those who have seen the sun [words indistinct]. We do not want this energy to be wasted any more on annihilating these anachronistic nostalgic aspirations for domination of certain territories [words indistinct].

I take pleasure in saying and to recall that on 11 July when we met in the Palace Hall at the first constituent assembly, in his solemn speech President Barladeanu said, among other things, the following: The strength of a chain is ensured by the resistance of the weakest link. It is thus regrettable that forces within and outside the country believed that Transylvania was that weak link in the strength of the country. What happened afterward proved how untrue that belief was. It was obvious that that was not true and it was obvious—and please forgive me for my vanity—that the Vatra Romaneasca Union, the most slandered nonpolitical organization in Romania by the Hungarian-language newspapers in our country and abroad, had tragical premonitions—ever since its foundation—which, unfortunately, came true.

It is a quite delicate thing for me, but since I am not doing this for the first time, and because I represent the ideas of the Transylvanian Romanians National Unity Party [words indistinct], and because I am also the president of the Vatra Romaneasca Union, I want to launch an appeal—and I am launching it because a whole country can hear me [words indistinct]—to all those who are living in this country, irrespective of the language in which their lullabies were sung to them, to prove—not only in solemn meetings—loyalty in both everyday life, and in political attitudes, as well as in all the other areas, because often I ask myself how sincere are some of us when we speak here, when we speak on television in the Hungarian language, when we write in the Hungarian-language newspapers, or when we write in Romanian-language newspapers. There is such a great difference between the ideas expressed and the actions undertaken that I actually do not understand: Is it not possible for us to decide once and for all on who we actually are; we, who cause trouble by joining forces, will be condemned by history. We are not allowed to hamper our country's progress and, as has been stressed, we are allowed to [words indistinct]. It would have been a positive thing, and this has been stressed. On Monday the speaker before me, the distinguished deputy, writer, and man of culture, Geza Domokos, said on television that neither the Magyar minority in Transylvania nor the other ethnic minorities in Transylvania, as well as the majority Romanian population were asked when the Vienna award hit our country's body, and this is true.

It is equally true that neither the Romanians in Transylvania nor the other ethnic groups had reason to cheer. Maybe it would have been appropriate to condemn here and now those atrocities and maybe it is not too late yet to withdraw some of the invectives, at least the most serious and unjustified ones addressed to this nonpolitical but not apolitical organization of Vatra Romaneasca. Because I was really impressed with the dignified and clean content, with the tolerant nature, and with the moral prestige of the document read here, I have taken the liberty to formulate an amendment to page two, paragraph five of the text that was read here and I want to propose it to you who have the authority to pass judgment on it whether or not it is opportune.

Thus, paragraph five on page two should read as follows:

Today, after 50 years, the alternative option is understanding, reconciliation, freedom, and tolerance. No one should profit, however, from the Romanian structural tolerance, and no one should ignore—in its name—the principles of democracy as they have been established in the states which we admire also for this lesson in democracy.

Otherwise, I have had the feeling that Vatra Romaneasca has acted as coauthor of this document, and, together with my colleagues of the Trasylvanian Romanians National Unity Party and you who are members of the Vatra Romaneasca, I rejoice at the fact that a national consensus has been reached. Once again I repeat that the tragic premonition that Vatra Romaneasca had, based on pain, came true. We are ready to forget; we are ready to begin a new life; we are ready to understand everything—whether good or bad. Let us serve this country (?tomorrow) by ensuring the loyalty of all citizens of this country toward this government, which is trying to elevate our country to at least the water level if not to the level all of us are hoping for.

Armed Forces on Alert

LD2908181990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Excerpts] On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the second Vienna award, which returned northern Transylvania to Hungary, several demonstrations are planned throughout Romania tomorrow. Istvan Erdelyi reports from the scene:

[Erdelyi] Nobody can expect a mass demonstration. Nobody can pull together 5,000 people out onto the streets against Magyars, (Zsolt Neger), member of the

presidium of the Bihor County Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], said in Oradea a few hours ago. I also talked here in Cluj with (Lajos Molnos), chief editor of ERDELYI HIRADO and (Zoltan Palfi), secretary of the Cluj County UDMR, who told me that the county leadership wrote a memorandum to the county prefect office and to the county police command asking that in defense of peace and calm, the protection of public order and public institutions, the UDMR headquarters, the theater, schools, and churches should be stepped up. [passage omitted]

The campaigns of incitement have naturally strengthened in recent days. One paper wrote: We, residents of free Dacia, do not tolerate your pagan, Asiatic race. Go back to the mother country, lie beside Tokes, who has been punished by your God precisely in the dear homeland. Vatra Romaneasca has called for dignity in its press statement. By the way, this so-called cultural organization has called for a mass rally tonight, and presumably this will set the tone for tomorrow's demonstrations. Armed Forces are on full alert in Transylvania. Here in Cluj, the police has been beefed up and so has the Army. Alongside them the local organization of the National Salvation Front has provided an additional 500-strong civil guard for keeping order.

Defense Ministry Commemorates Award

AU2908174690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1608 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Political Life—Scientific Session at the Ministry of National Defence"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—Wednesday, August 29, the Ministry of National Defence hosted the scientific session "The Vienna award an Odious Attack to Romania's Territorial Integrity".

Present were military and civil workers in the ministry's institutions and central departments.

The readers, researchers in the military history field, emphasised the very complex questions of the critical period previous to the odious Vienna award of August 30, 1940, the persecution and atrocities committed by Horthyist Hungary's Army, the multiple forms of resistance of the population in northwestern Transylvania, the difficult situation of the Romanian Army forced to retreat without fight, the Romanian Army's contribution to the fight against fascist and Horthyst troops for the homeland's liberation.

At the end of the proceedings a moment's silence was observed in the memory of the victims of the terror when that territory was under Horthyist occupation.

Campeanu Calls Award 'Condemnable'

AU2908191790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1739 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Joint Session of Romanian Parliament: Mr. Radu Campeanu's Address"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—Speaking on behalf of the NLP [National Liberal Party] Parliamentary Group, Mr. Radu Campeanu, vice-president of the Senate, said inter alia:

Twenty-two years after the 1918 union, an international act was committed, a condemnable act, an act against the Romanian people's interests. The history of diplomacy calls it the Vienna arbitration. The Romanians' conscience and national history call it the odious Vienna award. It tore off the country's body, the northern part of Transylvania. It did that against the fundamental principles of international law encroaching upon the sacred right to self-determination of peoples, hence of the Romanian people.

That act was implicitly condemned several years later in 1947 when that decision was annulled by the peace treaty. But it was not annulled and condemned only by international bodies; it was first of all condemned by the Romanian people.

It goes without saying that the rights over Transylvania as they devolve from the history of the Romanian people are inalienable. This is a truth nobody has the right to deny no matter where he comes from or what he does. But these rights also imply obligations for us as a majority population. The imprescribable rights we have impose on us certain obligations, a political and social organization apt to guarantee the freedom of the individual, the freedom of the citizen, the freedom of creation, of expression, of thought, of feelings and religious faith, of any religious faith. At the same time, we are called upon to guarantee a broad and genuine freedom of initiative in the economy, and also guarantee all the citizens of the country their social rights.

We also have the obligation to guarantee the right of the ethnic minorities to specific character. This means their right to express their moral and cultural conceptions and even their political options, with one condition, that of full respect for three fundamental rules. The first rule is respect for the intangibility of our frontiers as they were agreed under the Trianon Treaty which we consider indisputable. The second rule is full respect for national sovereignty and unity. The third rule is respect for the Romanian language, as a fundamental principle, and its acknowledgment as the official language of the Romanian state. It is with these rules and by observing them that national reconciliation can be achieved. This is the price to be paid. It is reasonable, it is right, it accords with history. But if this is the right, as I have said, there also are obligations imposed by the same history and which have no right to neglect. The historic evolution of our people demands that these principles be observed. There is no national being without them and everybody, at home or abroad, must be aware of this fact.

Domokos Calls Award 'Arbitrary'

AU2908191690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1747 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Parliament's Joint Session: Deputy Geza Domokos' Address"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—In his address, Geza Domokos, HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania—UDMR] president, made reference to the events fifty years ago in Europe "when in fact no corner of our old continent remained untouched by the destroying wave of barbarism" and said inter alia:

Romania was also touched by that wave of aggression, violence and unjustice. The Vienna award which was signed fifty years ago was and still is one of the most tragical chapters in the Romanian national history. That arbitrary measure aimed at annihilating Romania's sovereignty and territorial integrity, its unconditional submission to Nazi Germany's expansionist policy. Overlooking the elementary norms of international law and justice, the Vienna award represents one of the offences committed by the great powers during the Second World War with huge political and moral prejudices for the Romanian people and also for the Hungarian population in southern Transylvania, endangering at the same time the idea of the two ethnic groups' coexistence in that area where each of them has created a civilization with multiple interferences of values and interests.

Expressing his conviction that to give this commemoration undesired accents of disunion, recrimination and xenophobia is not in the interest of the Romanian nation and of the country's future, Geza Domokos further said: The Vienna award represents first and foremost a memento of the compulsoriness to observe international legal norms. The whole troubled history of our century teaches us that the disputes among nations leading to homicidal conflicts could have been avoided if the cult of dialogue and reality had prevailed and the partners had firmly taken the positions of democracy. We should also take into consideration as a lesson to be learned from that period the fact that in this region of Europe the persistency and danger of nationalistic, chauvinistic currents can be counteracted only by consolidating democratic institutions which do not prejudice any state's sovereignty but consolidate it. In our country, as anywhere else in this continent, democracy is unconceivable without the full observance of the national minorities' rights, of certain rights that have never been and will never be considered as privileges and the sanctioning of which will make Romania one of the really democratic nations. We consider the pseudo-scientific literature which offers the Romanian opinion false information about the threat of "Hungarianism" as a regrettable, anachronical and noxious outliving of traumas which may be genuine but put today in the service of dangerous and condemnable manipulation.

Belonging to this country with their cultural heritage, with what their forefathers had achieved on this land and with their own future projects, Romania's citizens of Hungarian nationality have not and will never have other thoughts than those related to a dignified coexistence with the Romanian nation and the other ethnical minorities. Feeling linked to one another because of our past, we want to consolidate this link even more in future, a future based on the principles of law and democracy.

Barladeanu: Award 'Poisoned' Hungarian Ties

AU2908204290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1825 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Joint Session of Romanian Parliament: Mr. Alexandru Barladeanu's Address"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—In his opening address, the president of the Senate, Mr. Alexandru Barladeanu, said inter alia:

We, as representatives of this people's sovereignty, cannot pass over the tragic moment of our history which was the Vienna award without defining in a declaration the principled stand the Romanian Parliament understands to promote and observe as regards the relations between the Romanian majority population and the ethnic minorities.

Recalling the 1940 events he said:

Deprived of its alliances, Romania became one of the first victims of the fascist policy of aggression. The first lesson should be learned from this: our policy must be structured in such a way as never to lack sincere friendship abroad which is possible only if our policy guarantees the observance of the principles of social and international coexistence the human civilization has achieved. As known, the award deeply damaged the relations between the Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania. The poisoned roots of that state of affairs still exist, and during Ceausescu's dictatorship they have acquired new and brutal dimensions.

Fifty years after the Vienna award, the European and world history is entirely different. As far as Romania is concerned, living and development conditions have radically changed as compared both with 1940 and the 1947-1951 interval. We can say that we live a unique period not only in the development of our country but also of mankind. History has yet not recorded a passage from a communist to a democratic society, from an entirely nationalized economy to a market economy. But this is the road we have embarked upon and along which we must go despite the difficulties we will encounter.

Stressing that the transformation process the country undergoes is a long one, the president of the Senate said: For the time being we have only the compass of our wishes; we know the cardinal point we want to reach but there is no experience in the world to show us how to get there. It is our people, through its wisdom and work, that will have to find the way to it.

Referring in the same string of ideas to the so-called demonstrations in University Square and to the conflicts generated by irredentism or chauvinism, Alexandru Barladeanu stressed:

Under the pretext of freedom and democracy, attempts are being made to cynically apply the principle "the worse the better." The attempts at public order are in fact intentions to lead the people to misery and degradation under the slogan of the inalienable right to criticism.

Anyone has the right to criticize the installed power as one wishes; one can criticize it for what it does; one can criticize it also for what it does not do; but one has not the right to criticize it only for the fact that it does exist, for the fact that the nation has entrusted its destinies to them and not to others.

I personally try to see—and do not succeed—what serious and real social or political forces are behind those attempts to cause disorder, to destabilize the present situation, to increase unrest and tension. I'm tempted to think that such real political and social forces do not exist, that they are only groups without social weight but with clear political interests. Maybe they are only those having lost their privileges after overthrowing dictatorship, maybe they are those wishing to gain privileges in the new social order, but if we eliminate the eventually honest people involved only because of their ignorance I am convinced that we can find out who they really are.

On the same line, the grave events like those in Tirgu Mures in March and other manifestations of intolerance—extremist attitudes, the various forms of irredentism and chauvinism are all obstacles raised in front of the people in its still difficult advance to a new society. Does anyone seriously, not formally believe that there could be a way back now, when not only the Romanian revolution has taken place, but all former European socialist countries—the Soviet Union included—undergo similar processes? To believe such a thing is sheer nonsense. We consider that we have only one way, maybe with hesitations and failures, that to democracy.

French Ambassador Lauds Romanian Stand on Iraq

AU2908125690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1053 GMT 29 Aug 90

["Romania in the World—France's Ambassador: 'An Important Sign Romania Gave to the World'"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—In an interview with the newspaper "ROMANIA LIBERA," France's new ambassador in Bucharest, Mr. Renauld Vignal, said: "Romania's attitude towards the Iraqi crisis came as a pleasant surprise. Who said this country was not a European country? Owing to this stance, Romania unquestionably asserted its European quality in the joint effort to condemn aggression, to contribute to the resolutions of the Security Council and of the European Community. In doing so Romania took risks if we consider Iraq's huge debt to it, the oil imports from that country and the important economic cooperation ventures under way. The fact is also significant that no Romanian politician criticized that decision. That was an important sign Romania gave to the world. Its attitude was strictly European."

Scientific Cooperation Protocol With Switzerland

AU2908141490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1339 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 29/8/1990—The protocol of the sixth session of the joint Romanian-Swiss Governmental Commission for Economic, Technical and Scientific Cooperation was signed on August 29.

The document was signed for Romania by Mr. Romulus Neagu, secretary of state at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, co-chairman of the commission, and Switzerland by Mr. Silvio Arioli, ambassador with the Federal Foreign Economic Relations Office and representative of the Swiss Federal Council for Trade Agreements.

During the session the sides assessed there were wide possibilities and prospects to develop mutual friendly relations, economic, technical and scientific cooperation and bilateral trade.

Information was exchanged regarding the social, economic and political situation in the two countries and the stage and prospects of cooperation in industry, economy, science, technology, trade and in international economic organisations.

Roman Receives Swiss Economic Delegation

AU2908174790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1606 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—After the works of the sixth session of the Joint Romanian-Swiss Commission have concluded in Bucharest, the Swiss delegation, led by Silvio Arioli, ambassador with the Federal Foreign Economic Relations and representative of the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Trade, was received Wednesday morning by Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman.

In a statement for the Romanian press, the head of the Swiss delegation characterised as very important the protocol signed in Bucharest at the end of the sixth session of the Joint Governmental Commission. He considered it opened favourable prospects to the Romanian-Swiss economic cooperation, especially between the newly created autonomous units and commercial societies in Romania, which are now being organized, and their counterparts in Switzerland. He also mentioned certain fields where an efficient cooperation is possible between the two countries, like machine building, energy, tourism, environment.

Mayor Meets University Square Demonstrators

AU2908133490 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1300 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Today, after a dialogue that lasted for more than four hours, the meeting between Bucharest General Mayor Mr. Stefan Ciurel and the representatives of the University Square demonstrators concluded at the Bucharest Town Hall. The capital's general mayor said that this meeting with the demonstrators representatives—a personal initiative of his—aimed at facilitating a better understanding of their claims and demands, so as to have a clearer picture of developments in University Square in recent days.

The dialogue showed that the representatives of the University Square demonstrators continue to demand the resolution of some problems left behind from prerevolutionary days or that have emerged immediately after the December 1989 revolution. Among these problems are: elucidating the events of 13-15 June in Bucharest and facilitating a dialogue between the authorities and the representatives of the demonstrators. The Bucharest general mayor said that all the problems raised during the dialogue with the University Square representatives will be submitted to the relevant official bodies as soon as possible.

Original National Peasant Party Refounded

AU2908173990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1433 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/8/1990—A communique released on Wednesday by the Provisional Steering Council of the National Peasants Party (PNT) announces the refoundation of that party founded by Iuliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache.

The communique specifies that that party has no connection with the Christian-Democratic National Peasants Party "which has taken over the two politicians' name to espouse the partisans' good faith for purposes alien to the policy of the real National Peasants Party."

Jovic Discusses Reform, Kosovo With Senators

LD2908151990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1314 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—Dr. Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, today received a U.S. Senate delegation comprising seven prominent senators, led by Senator Robert Dole.

During his meeting with the U.S. senators, President Jovic spoke of activities in the implementation of political and economic reform in our country, preparations for the adoption of the new SFRY constitution, and of the work on the future democratic system in Yugoslavia. He also pointed out that the forthcoming multiparty elections in the republics, and at the federal level too, will constitute a significant step in this direction.

Answering the senators' questions, President Jovic spoke in detail of the efforts being made as fully as possible to give life to human rights as a key component of our internal sociopolitical development. In this context he briefed the U.S. senators on the measures taken to normalize the situation in Kosovo, the cultural and economic rights enjoyed by the Albanians in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and on the civic rights enjoyed in Yugoslavia as a whole. For a most objective approach and to better clarify the situation in Kosovo, he suggested to the U.S. senators that they carry out a comparative analysis between these rights and the rights enjoyed by national minorities in other European countries, and further afield, to see that the Albanians in Yugoslavia, as citizens and as a national minority, have human and national rights which are greatly in excess of the practice in other countries. He pointed out that the essence of the problem in Kosovo is separatism, and also the wish to secede from Serbia and, in ultimate analysis, from Yugoslavia too.

President Jovic pointed out that the U.S. Senate is running the risk whereby under the guise of working for the respect of human rights it will support separatism and the breakup of Yugoslavia, and that genuine endeavors to protect human rights of all the citizens in Kosovo are only possible if the solution for these and other problems of Kosovo is to be sought within the framework of Serbia and of Yugoslavia. Any other approach would not only be incomprehensible and unacceptable for the Yugoslavs, but would also amount to spreading the illusion among the Albanian population in Kosovo that they will be able to bring about secession, which can only lead them into conflicts having unforeseeable consequences.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, Senator Dole expressed condolences to President Jovic in connection with the disaster at the Dobrnja mine, and handed him a check for $10,000 as aid for the families of the miners killed in Kreka.

Shots Fired Blamed on 'Albanian Terrorists'

LD2908204390 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Guests from the U.S. Congress were welcomed at Pristina airport by Momcilo Trajkovic, vice president of the Serbian Executive Council based in Pristina, and escorted them to Grand Hotel where they had talks. Our correspondent Behdjit Baraliju reports on the talks which were held in Pristina today:

[Baraliju] At 1500 today the U.S. congressmen and their colleagues met representatives of Albanian alternative political organizations in the Grand Hotel in Pristina. Their talks focused on the violation of human rights in the province, i.e. massive layoffs from work, and a ban on Albanian-language information media, and on the number of people killed and imprisoned this year.

After an hour and a half, the congressmen met Serbian representatives of Bozur, the Committee for the Truth, and priests from the Pec Patriarchate. The Serbian representatives refused to hold this meeting, which was also attended by journalists, in the same hall where the congressmen had had talks with the Albanian alternative organizations' representatives, because a photograph of Tito hung there.

The congressmen stated today that they had arrived in Kosovo with goodwill and with no prejudices. Bozur, the Committee for the Truth, and the Serbian Orthodox Church expressed their conviction that the Albanians in Kosovo have the most extensive rights ever granted to a national minority in any state in the world. Replying to a question from the congressmen on their comment on the number of people killed, they stated that nobody was killed. Asked to present their stand on the use of force by police this morning against the Albanian people who had gathered to greet the congressmen, they replied that Albanian terrorists among the crowd fired at the police. They stated that the Albanian call for democracy is only a pretext for creating a greater Albania.

In connection with the position of Serbs in Knin and Croatia, Bozur stated that Serbs are oppressed both there and in Kosovo, both where they form a majority and a minority. The Serbs in Knin demand the same rights which have already been granted to the Albanians in Kosovo.

The Serbian representatives dispersed from the meeting convinced that the congressmen are only interested in Albanian rights in Kosovo, while they neglect the rights of Serbs.

After these talks members of the U.S. delegation continued on to Zagreb.

More Workers Reportedly Leave Iraq for Jordan

LD2908130590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1230 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Baghdad, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—A new group of Yugoslavs left Baghdad for Amman today. It comprises 106 workers who were employed at various building sites throughout Iraq. They will leave the Jordanian capital for Belgrade on a special JAT [Yugoslav Airlines] flight early tomorrow morning. Since 2 August, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, more than 2,600 our workers have left Iraq for Yugoslavia.

It is estimated that there are at the moment about 5,000 workers from Yugoslavia on Iraqi building sites. Because of increasing shortages of reserve materials, and of food too, an even more dynamic return of our workers employed by about 100 Yugoslav enterprises in that Arab country is likely to continue.

Peterle, Jansa Discuss Army Service With Markovic

AU2908114990 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 22 Aug 90 p 1

[Veso Stojanov report: "The Army Is Yielding to Slovenia's Demands"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 21 Aug—Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle and People's Defense Secretary Janez Jansa stayed in Belgrade today, where they held talks with SFRY Prime Minister Ante Markovic and his associates about the realization of the Slovene Government's demands concerning the military service of Slovene recruits. On their return from Belgrade they held a brief news conference at the Brnik airport, presenting results of their morning talks.

Lojze Peterle said that this was the third meeting on that subject. He said the Slovene delegation reiterated that the Slovene demand is legal, realistic, and realizable, as well as that the Slovene Government is bound by the Assembly's decision. "This time, an agreement was reached, and the Army's views were less set in advance. I would like to point out that Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, whose presence we requested and particularly expected, did not appear for the third time now. That shows the attitude of the Army top leadership to Slovene demands. His deputy, Admiral Stane Brovet, participated in the talks instead.

"Regarding the results of the talks, which I assess as successful, we agreed this time that a new schedule should be prepared to the effect that in September, 20 percent of the recruits will remain in Slovenia, and the other percentages will not change. We are going to speak about this in particular at the session of the Executive Council, and we will inform the Slovene Assembly. In my opinion, a shift has occurred, but not as much as we wanted. However, it seems that the road to further talks has been opened. Prime Minister Markovic was of the same opinion," Lojze Peterle said.

Janez Jansa explained in more detail the meaning of the increase in the percentage of recruits remaining in Slovenia. He said that according to the agreement, somewhat less than 30 percent of the Slovene soldiers would serve in Slovenia after basic training is completed and transfers effected in September. Together with exceptional cases—those who go to military school centers that do not exist in this particular district—nearly 60 percent of the recruits will serve in the Fifth Military District. "I think that the key step has been made and that things will start getting better, if not by September, then at the next call-up. That is to say that this percentage is going to be increased, and not reduced as was the case in the past," Janez Jansa added.

Janez Jansa also said that they touched as well upon the case of soldier Alojz Spendov, who was buried at his birthplace yesterday. The Army representative reiterated the official version that according to the investigation—which has not been concluded yet—it was a case of suicide. The problem is that his parents do not believe this and they demand a postmortem by a civilian institution. This was carried out yesterday, but there is still no official report from there either. According to Janez Jansa, the investigation is being carried out by Army investigative bodies. When the results of the investigation are made available, more will be known about the exact cause of death, Janez Jansa added.

Kadijevic's Attitude Chided

AU2908124990 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 22 Aug 90 p 1

[Vojko Flegar commentary: "An Honorable Retreat]

[Text] Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, obviously cannot comprehend the fact that cooperation cannot be restricted merely to the obedient and like-minded, even in defense matters. This is the most likely reason why he would not "voluntarily" recognize his Slovene colleague Janez Jansa as a partner in talks. Since Kadijevic's post is political, at least as much as it is professional, it would certainly be instructive in the future to warn the federal secretary, at the appropriate level and according to protocol, against his disdainful attitude toward his Slovene counterparts.

However, the Slovene Government must not judge the proposals that Lojze Peterle and Janez Jansa brought from Belgrade yesterday—in reply to the Slovene Assembly's demand concerning the territorial army service—only from the point of view of a violation of diplomatic rules. The Yugoslav People's Army has made "a few more" concessions: Surprisingly, because in most of its reactions to the above-mentioned demand in the past it declared that it would "hang on to the very end"; but also expectedly, because some generals know, at least in principle, that one cannot fall on the bayonets, and at the end of the Knin week, the Army is using all its strength to pull itself out of that inglorious muddle.

Therefore, the "increase of percentage" is perhaps a search for a possible honorable retreat from the Slovene "battlefield," with the door left open to negotiations about the "systemic legalization" of the territorial principle. Is it too soon for one to accept, or demand, an "unconditional capitulation," or is now the time?

A possible affirmative answer to the telegram from some Kosovo barracks would be understandable if it came from the people who received it. The question is, however—it unfortunately lacks piety—whether it would be good for Slovenia if its authorities failed to think in a dialectical manner about strategic and tactical aims.

Mesic Confirms Meeting of Tudjman, Milosevic

AU3008085490 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 90 p 1

[Unattributed TANJUG report: "BBC on Tudjman-Milosevic Meeting"]

[Text] London—In his report from Belgrade for the BBC—the part concerning speeches Franjo Tudjman and Stipe Mesic had made in the Croatian Assembly—journalist Stevan Zivanovic said the following: "Mr. Mesic, who is going to replace Stipe Suvar as Croatian representative to the SFRY Presidency, has confirmed to journalists that Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic had a private meeting recently and added that Serbia had still not replied to the Croatian offer to hold official talks. This may mean, Mr. Mesic said, that Serbia is not willing to renounce its policy of fomenting unrest in other parts of Yugoslavia."

Peterle Wants Sovereignty Before Restructuring

LD2908102390 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] During his press conference on the occasion of the 100-day anniversary of the new Slovene Executive Council administration, the Slovene prime minister, Lojze Peterle, spoke critically of allegations that the new Slovene Executive Council concerns itself predominantly either with confederalism or with sovereignty. He said that one could not discuss confederation until our republic has gained complete sovereignty. There are fewer and fewer conditions for a confederation within the framework of present Yugosalvia. If this were to happen Slovenia will join it as a sovereign state, Peterle stressed, adding that the Slovene Government has already drafted a few elements for a possible confederal accord.

Politics Said Not Behind Planned Slovene Strike

LD2908132790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1119 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—The strike committee session held today to help prepare for a general strike, scheduled for 10 September in Slovenia, rejected this as a political strike directed against the present government and democratic process in Slovenia. Members of the Federation of Free Slovene Trade Unions restricted leadership, who are organizing the strike, made it clear that this is a socio-labor strike demanded by the workers, that is, trade union members. Among the seven key trade union demands emphasis must be placed on the need to conclude, as a matter of urgency, a collective agreement for social activities and for noneconomic matters. The same is true of a collective agreement for the economy, without any restrictions being put on the payment of personal income.

Former Kosovo Officials Detained for Questioning

AU2908104990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 90 p 3

[M. Antic report: "Interview Without Force"]

[Excerpt] Pristina—The news that Jusuf Zejnulahu, former president of the former Executive Council of Kosovo and member of the now nonexistent Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Agim Malja, former director of Pristina Radio Television, were detained by the internal affairs service the day before yesterday—which BORBA reported—has proven to be true. It is also true that both of them were allowed to go home on the same day following an informative talk.

In a telephone conversation yesterday with the two men, we learned that Jusuf Zejnulahu was on the premises of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs for about 13 hours, and Agim Malja for about 12 hours.

In a brief statement for BORBA, Jusuf Zejnulahu first said that "he could not explain in great detail over the phone what had last more than 12 hours," and then added:

"They took me in some time before 0900 and released me around 2200. The interview was conducted properly and without the use of force or means of coercion. They asked me many things about which I cannot now speak in this way. The interview concerned some of my stands and statements regarding the suspension of the Assembly and Executive Council of Kosovo by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which neither I, nor the other members of the Kosovo Executive Council, have accepted or will accept. After all, this is what I have been saying publicly up until now. They asked me a lot about my last interview to the Pristina ZERI I RINISE newspaper, in which I presented some of my stands connected with events in Croatia, and about what could happen in Kosovo. They also talked about the general strike by Albanians which has been announced by the Independent Trade Union of Kosovo, as well as many other issues and current Kosovo problems."

In reply to a question on whether he or someone else from the former Kosovo Executive Council was involved in organizing this strike, and whether the reports were true that the suspended Kosovo Executive Council was

operating underground and making decisions which are later implemented by someone else, Zejnulahu said:

"This also interested the people from the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, so they asked me many questions concerning this. The only thing that I can now say is that we do not accept this suspension because we were chosen by the Kosovo Assembly." [passage omitted]

Kosovo Youth Organization 'No Longer Exists'

AU2808124290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Work of Socialist Youth Federation of Kosovo Ceases"]

[Text] Pristina—The Socialist Youth Federation has to all intents and purposes ceased operating in Kosovo. As has been announced, in line with the conclusions of the 12th Congress of the Socialist Youth Federation of Serbia, a decision was made in the Republican Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation to suspend all the rights and obligations of the Presidium of the Provincial Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Kosovo.

As explained, this decision is based on the fact that the Provincial Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Kosovo had not carried out its specific obligations which require that it embark on a transformation of the present youth organization into the Social Democratic Alliance of Young People of Serbia-New Democracy [Socijaldemokratski Savez Mladih Srbije-Nova Demokracija]. Moreover, the work of the Provincial Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Kosovo has been blocked for a long time due to interethnic divisions and confrontations, so, technically it no longer exists.

Djukanovic Wants SFRY 'Organized Federatively'

LD2908144190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1050 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—There's no use in convincing those who want to secede from Yugoslavia to remain it, Montenegro's Communist Party Secretary Milo Djukanovic said on Belgrade's Politika-TV.

Djukanovic said he was convinced Yugoslavia would survive and stressed that it should be organized federatively.

The talk on TV was carried in today's edition of POLITIKA daily.

Djukanovic is one of the innermost circle of Montenegro's party top that took over the party early this year after mass rallies in the republic in protest over the policies of the party leadership on Kosovo, Serbia's southern province troubled by ethnic unrest.

[Passage indistinct] leadership had no intention of defending itself from senseless stories that it moves were directed from Serbia. He added that a majority of Montenegrins had not succumbed to Serbo-phobia.

Asked whether ethnic Albanians living in Montenegro could win the republic's first post-war multi-party elections late this year since they are expected to form a coalition with Muslims, Catholics and Montenegro's former leadership, Djukanovic said that coalition would never work since Montenegro has a majority Montenegrin population.

Raskovic Said To Meet Croatian Police Minister

AU2908171390 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] The turbulent political scene in Croatia has been further perturbed by an exclusive article in Zagreb SLOBODNI TJEDNIK on a meeting between Jovan Raskovic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party, and Josip Boljkovac, Croatian police minister, at a restaurant near Zagreb a few days ago. The article is entitled: Better Under a Peaceful Roof Than in a War Trench. There has been no comment or possible denial issued by the headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party in Knin. A press conference has been announced for the afternoon. Dragan Stavljanin reports from Knin:

[Stavljanin] In an exclusive article accompanied with photographs featuring Jovan Raskovic, Josip Boljkovac, and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party who mediated and organized this meeting, SLOBODNI TJEDNIK says that the meeting was held in the restaurant Under the Old Roof, on Buzin Road on the way out of Zagreb toward Velika Gorica, on Friday, 24 August, at about 2230.

It is further stressed that there were several guests at the restaurant, and Raskovic and Boljkovac allegedly allowed SLOBODNI TJEDNIK journalists to record the conversation and to take photographs. The newspaper asserts that Raskovic allegedly consented to the publication of the conversation, but only after some 10 days.

According to SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, the usual greetings were followed by a conversation that concentrated on the events in the Knin region. Raskovic said that the situation is calming down, but that Serbs still feared a possible attack by the Croatian authorities. Boljkovac replied that they have nothing to fear and that it was actually the Serbs who started it all.

Boljkovac then asked about the return of the weapons. Raskovic replied that this will be somewhat difficult, because people fear possible revenge. According to SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, the police minister replied that there will be no revenge but the law must be respected. The events in the Knin region reminded Boljkovac of the wild West. You must explain to your people that they must return their weapons for the sake of their own peace, Boljkovac said.

Raskovic allegedly replied: This is possible, but the Communal Secretariat for Internal Affairs must be returned to Knin. Boljkovac thought that this would be rather difficult because allegedly Croatia wanted to reduce the number of people employed in the police.

According to the SLOBODNI TJEDNIK story, no agreement was reached on the return of the weapons, but it was reached on the removal of barricades on approaches to Knin. Anyhow, the conversation did not aim at achieving a final agreement.

Regarding relations within the Serbian Democratic Party, Raskovic said that Milan Babic and Dusan Zelenbaba are turning somewhat to the right.

Of course, the question arises to what extent one can believe Zagreb SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, an unofficial, confederal, and above all sensationalist weekly, especially after the uproar about the transcript of the conversation between Raskovic and Tudjman. At the headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party in Knin, there has been no comment on or denial of the SLOBODNI TJEDNIK story. Dusan Zelenbaba, vice president of the party, said in a telephone conversation that he did not know anything about this, but that one should not place too much trust in that newspaper.

Regarding the situation in the Knin region, the Belgrade Radio Television team established last night that there were no night sentries on the main roads.

Serbian 'United Opposition' Rejects Election Law

LD2908165690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1620 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—United opposition of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia has rejected the draft election law proposed by the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, it was announced by six opposition parties on Wednesday [29 August].

The opposition described the draft law as undemocratic and said it did not provide equality of all parties at the elections for Serbia's legislature.

The Democratic Party, the National Radical Party, the Liberal Party, the Democratic Forum, the Serbian Movement of Renewal and the Serbian St. Sava Party have fixed the date for the protest rally—September 12. The announcement stressed that the authorities did not accept the opposition's essential and minimal demands and did not evince any readiness for democratic dialogue.

Talks between the opposition representatives and a representative of the authorities held at the republican assembly on Monday did not yield any results, the announcement stressed.

The opposition parties' main demand is that an opportunity to present themselves during the election campaign in the media, primarily on television, is given to all parties participating in the elections, and that the election commissions be multi-party.

Bosnian Party To Urge Emergency Assembly Session

LD3008051490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2153 GMT 29 Aug 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—The Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Socialist Democratic Party said today in an asessment of the overall political and economic situation in this Yugoslav republic that the situation was deteriorating daily and that it would ask the president of the republican Assembly to convene an emergency session to analyse the causes of the worsening of the political and economic situation.

The Central Committee said in an announcement issued after today's meeting that it had been concluded that the causes lay wholly in the nonfunctioning of the competent state institutions and organs, which was evidenced by the latest events—disturbances and strikes, increasingly frequent ethnic strife and even the use of violent methods.

All this induces growing fear, uncertainty and anxiety, the announcement said. At the same time, the state organs are acting as if everything was fully in order, and, showing that they have no ear for the overall social and political situation, are making huge increases in their salaries—which only provokes further dissatisfaction and unrest.

Civilian 'Youth Defense Units' Formed in Zagreb

LD2808192290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croation 1512 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Zagreb, 28 Aug (TANJUG)—Today's session of the Executive Council of the Zagreb city municipality, according to Croatian Radio Studio Zagreb daily news, reached a decision on setting up Croatian voluntary civilian youth defense units. Their role, as revealed, is to take an organized part in safeguarding and saving people's lives and material and other goods from elementary disasters and other dangers.

The voluntary civilian youth defense units will be organized on the territorial principle. They will be manned by volunteers. Persons between 15 and 30 years of age, irrespective of their war assignments, can be members of the youth units.